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ABSTRACT
How can Rawls’s The Law o/Peop/es as a theory o f justice that 
clarifies the responsibility o f  consumers in affluent societies to workers in 
impoverished societies whose labor produced the goods being consumed? If it is true 
that some o f the most serious cases o f injustice involve labor arrangements in the 
global economy involving something similar to economic slavery as described by 
Marx, then an adequate theory o f  justice should address such problems. I will argue 
that Rawls’s theory in the international application should be revised in order to 
avoid criticisms o f  being either irrelevant to crucial cases o f injustice or merely a 
modus vivendi argument that fails to accomplish Rawls’s intent. To demonstrate the 
need for these revisions, I ask: how would his theory be different if  Rawls had 
maintained both the positive and negative dimensions o f  freedom? I explore the 
reasons that Rawls dismissed positive freedom as a valuable concept, including the 
influence o f  Isaiah Berlin and others. I examine various definitions o f positive 
freedom with special interest in the words o f T.H. Green who advocated the “the 
liberation o f  the powers o f  all.” ' This liberation assumes both material conditions 
and moral justification. If  Rawls had maintained this notion o f positive freedom as 
social self-expression with enabling conditions then Rawls would have prevented 
various criticisms. This definition o f  positive freedom shapes three parts o f my
' T.H. Green, Lectures on /he Pr/ncip/es o/Po/itica/06/iga//on. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 2000.
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argument: first, positive freedom entails resources as enabling conditions; second, 
positive freedom is social freedom in relationship with others; and third, positive 
freedom is activity o f  the will and therefore a labor o f self-construction. I link 
criticisms o f  Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Pogge, and G. A. Cohen as examples o f 
criticism related to the potential for freedom to be merely formal in Rawls’s theory.
I conclude that positive freedom is a concept worth retaining because it helps 
account for Rawls’s drift toward socialism. Finally, I conclude that further extension 
o f the Law o f  Peoples as informed by this robust notion o f  freedom would lead to 
connections with liberation and feminist theory and greater relevance for issues o f 
labor justice in the global economy.
INTRODUCTION
Two main ideas motivate the Law o f Peoples. One is that great 
evils o f human history -  unjust wars and oppression, religious 
persecution and the denial o f liberty o f conscience, starvation and 
poverty, not to mention genocide and mass murder -  follow from 
political injustice, with its own cruelties and callousness... The other 
main idea, obviously connected with the first, is that, once the gravest 
forms o f political injustice are eliminated by following just (or at least 
decent) basic institutions, these great evils will eventually disappear.'
Political liberalism, with its ideas o f  realistic utopia and public 
reason, denies what so much o f  political life suggests—that stability 
among peoples can never be more than a modus vivendi. The idea o f  
a reasonably just society o f well-ordered peoples will not have an 
important place in a theory o f  international politics until such peoples 
exist and have learned to coordinate the actions o f their governments 
in wider forms o f  political, economic, and social cooperation. When 
that happens, as 1 believe, following Kant, it will, the society o f  these 
peoples will form a group o f satisfied peoples.^
“Realistic utopia” was Rawls’s attempt at a middle ground between realism 
and utopian theory in international relations. It was his hope o f  reclaiming and 
fortifying earlier liberal utopian theories that were overthrown by realist criticism. 1 
want Rawls’s theory to work. The splendid hope o f achieving just peace has 
universal appeal. It is precisely because 1 have high hopes for his work, that 1 offer 
criticisms and suggest revisions. His final book. The Law o/Peop/es, claims that 
liberalism can develop and sway international relations in answering tough questions 
regarding the extent o f  just intervention and use o f force. Although the cases o f
' Rawls, LP, 7.
 ^ Ibid., 19.
intolerance that he considers are primarily cases o f  religious intolerance, and the 
cases o f  intervention are primarily cases o f  war, this international theory o f justice 
may be applicable to other social and economic cases as well. When do cases o f 
economic injustice warrant intervention? I approach Rawls’s international theory 
with this question: can Rawls’s The Law ofPeop/es as a theory o f  justice that 
clarifies the responsibility o f  consumers in affluent societies to workers in 
impoverished societies whose labor produced the goods being consumed? If it is true 
that some o f the most serious cases o f  injustice involve labor arrangements in the 
global economy involving something similar to economic slavery as described by 
Marx, then an adequate theory o f  justice should address such cases. My argument 
concludes with the claim that Rawls’s theory in the international application should 
be revised in order to avoid criticisms o f  being either irrelevant to crucial cases o f 
injustice or merely a modus vivendi argument that fails to accomplish Rawls’s intent. 
The limits o f  toleration and the justifications for intervention are the subject o f  the 
Law o f  Peoples.^ This study explores toleration and intervention in economic 
freedom.
As culture wars rage, fueling global conflict, liberalism offers great potential 
for peaceful conflict resolution through promoting freedom and tolerance. Why then, 
is this liberal theory unacceptable to thinkers who claim that the only solutions to the
 ^ This question concerning intervention because o f economic injustice is also 
raised in the work o f  Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Future o f Feminist Liberalism,” in 
Fane/i'es o/PeministL/hera/ismi^ di?  ^Amy R. Baehr (New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 122.
problems o f  hunger and poverty require rejection o f liberalism? Mending the 
polarizing split between the socialist and Marxist theories in opposition to liberal 
theory could be furthered by shared concern for real world problems like hunger and 
poverty. Those who value freedom might reconcile with those who advocate 
limiting freedom in order to ensure equal access to property resources, meaningful 
labor, and community if  it was understood that freedom itself requires such 
limitation. Freedom is more complex than the definition o f  negative freedom that is 
often defended by liberals. The positive liberty tradition offers a challenge to 
Rawls’s theory.
My argument is based on the value o f liberty. Different arguments could be 
mounted based on equality or other values."* However, I focus on liberty because I 
want to engage others who claim that liberty is the sovereign virtue. Promotion o f 
other virtues or values might lead to conclusions similar to mine in terms o f 
suggested policies or institutions. However, to avoid stalemates in civic dialogue, it 
is worthwhile to explore arguments based solely on freedom as a cardinal value. If 
one person says equality is the trump value and another person says, no, freedom is 
more important than equality, there are no grounds for dialogue. On the other hand.
"* Dworkin, Sovereign Fir/ue. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2000).
Dworkin argues that equality is the highest virtue, and that it should have precedence 
when various values conflict. His policy conclusions are largely consistent with my 
own, although he doesn’t consider many international cases. The drawback to his 
work is that he would not convince a person who rejects equality as a comprehensive 
good, and defends liberty instead. Mine is an alternative argument that leads to 
similar policy conclusions.
if  it can be shown that meaningful freedom requires di measure o f equality, then 
agreement over policies might move forward. Clearly, freedom is the value Rawls 
defended most strongly. Yet, his theory was criticized for promoting a notion o f 
freedom that is merely formal rather than truly meaningful. In order to access the 
relevance o f his international theory to problems o f workers’ rights in the 
international economy, I explore the ways that resources, social systems, and labor 
are related to freedom.
In order to consider the implications o f his international theory for 
obligations between persons in different societies, it is necessary to consider the 
nature o f duties and obligations in his theory as a whole. \n J  Theory o f Jus/ice 
Rawls linked duties o f  mutual respect with “moral personality.”  ^ Persons approach 
each other with mutual respect within a society because they recognize moral quality 
o f human life. Then duties o f  mutual aid result. Rawls noted the influence o f  Kant in 
these duties o f mutual aid that result from mutual respect.^ Rawls distinguished 
between natural duties and obligations, by saying that obligations arise only if 
background conditions are in place. He said that obligations arise only when we 
participate in systems o f  mutual benefit voluntarily.^ If the participation is 
involuntary or involves an institution that is unjust then that participation does not
Rawls, TJ, 337.
 ^ Ibid., 338.
’ Ibid., 343.
obligate one. Rawls wrote, “Acquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly unjust
institutions does not give rise to obligations.”* How to prioritize natural duties when
they conflict with each other is the problem. Rawls wrote:
The real difficulty lies in their more detailed 
specification and with questions o f  priority: how are 
these duties to be balanced when they come into 
conflict, either with each other or with obligations, and 
with the good that can be achieved by supererogatory 
actions? There are no obvious rules for settling these 
questions. We cannot say, for example, that duties are 
lexically prior with respect to supererogatory actions, 
or to obligations.^
His proposal for resolving such conflicts is to provide a fair procedure for persons in 
specific contexts to sort out competing claims at the various levels o f decision 
making. This study considers ways in which these claims about duties and 
obligations must be altered in order to apply to the international level.
My argument demonstrates that criticism Rawls received for promoting a 
notion o f freedom that is merely formal and is not meaningful can be linked to the 
positive liberty tradition. At the same time, this challenge, based on the inadequacy 
o f Rawls’s concept o f  freedom, reveals potential to improve Rawls’s theory through 
adjustments required in the face o f severe poverty. The genuine interest and passion 
for freedom is a shared value that unites those who promote positive liberty and 
those who promote negative liberty. This critique o f  Rawls’s theory can be offered
Ibid.
 ^ Ibid., 339.
by developing a more robust conception o f freedom that takes into account economic 
power. I will argue that the best contributions o f Rawls’s theory continue to be 
developed, reformed, and defended in the work o f  three contemporary Rawlsian 
critics motivated by concerns o f  wealth distribution: Martha Nussbaum, Thomas 
Pogge, and G.A. Cohen. The fact that a feminist theorist, a cosmopolitan thinker, and 
a Marxist all agree that in Rawls’s theory freedom may be merely formal is worth 
pondering.
In the introduction to the 1992 paperback edition o f  Po//0'ca/L/ôera/ism, 
Rawls acknowledge the potential problem that the concept o f freedom in liberalism 
might be merely formal as Hegel, Marx, and socialist writers have o b se rv e d .R a w ls  
attempted to avoid this pitfall, addressing the problem in a section entitled, “Basic 
Liberties not Merely Formal” (VII: 7 )."  Nonetheless, Nussbaum, Pogge, and Cohen 
are examples o f later critics o f Rawls who do not think Rawls fully resolved this 
problem. This overlap in their work points to the potential for linking criticisms o f 
Rawls to the concept o f positive liberty. Since none o f these three critics specifically 
uses the term “positive freedom,” I admit that it is a stretch to suggest that their 
concerns can be linked through development o f  this concept. Although none o f them 
advanced the concept o f positive freedom, it is equally true that none o f these three 
critics o f  Rawls specifically rejects the concept o f positive freedom as a corrective
Rawls,PL, Iviii.
"  Ibid., 324.
for problems in Rawls’s theory. I do not claim that any o f these three thinkers would 
want to identify with this controversial concept o f  freedom, but rather that their 
concerns for freedom that is meaningful, robust, and realized in connection with 
capabilities intersect with concerns o f  those who advocate developing a concept o f 
positive freedom.
Rawls did not explicitly promote only negative liberty. Rather, he rejected
the distinction between positive and negative freedom altogether. However, by
severing freedom from abilities, by refusing to apply the difference principle at the
international level, and by trying to remain neutral on questions o f the moral quality
o f freedom, he resorted to a negative concept o f freedom. For these reasons his
notion o f  freedom has been criticized for being merely formal.'^ He dismissed the
possibility that there might be an important difference between positive and negative
freedom, but then repeatedly resorted to defending this theory against the problems
underlying the complexity o f freedom. Freedom and liberty are used interchangeably
in his work. The development o f  a definition o f  the terms includes Rawls’s
references to Isaiah Berlin, G.G. MacCallum, and Felix Oppenheim. Rawls wrote.
In discussing the application o f the first principle o f 
justice I shall try to bypass the dispute about the 
meaning o f liberty that has so often troubled this topic.
The controversy between the proponents o f negative 
and positive liberty as to how freedom should be 
defined is one 1 shall leave aside'^.
See H.L.A. Hart, “Rawls on Liberty and its Priority,” in /feac//ng Rau’/s, edited 
by Norman Daniels, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989). Also Norman 
Daniels, “Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth o f Liberty,” in the same volume.
He claimed that the debate “is not concerned with definitions at all,” but rather 
with how to prioritize values that are in conflict when different types o f liberties 
conflict.'^ For his working definition o f the term, “freedom,” Rawls followed G.C. 
MacCallum who argued that the distinction between positive and negative liberty is 
not meaningful because both types o f liberty are defined triadically.’  ^According to 
this line o f thought, which was developed most fully by Felix Oppenheim, freedom 
can always be explained by identifying the subject o f  freedom, the potential inhibitor 
o f freedom, and the specific area or substance o f freedom.'^
1 do not disagree with the conclusions o f Rawls, MacCallum, and Oppenheim, 
that freedom can be diagramed triadically. However, that merely demonstrated that 
positive and negative freedom are not distinguished by different structures, not is the 
difference captured by the terms “freedom from” and “freedom to.” My claim is that 
Rawls slips into characterizing freedom in the negative sense, and fails to resolve the 
need for a less empirical notion o f  freedom, such as positive freedom can offer. He 
followed the positivist reduction o f freedom to a merely formal, value-neutral 
concept. This fails to capture the rich, beloved dynamic o f  freedom that people
Rawls, TJ, 201.
Ibid.
Gerald C. MacCallum, “Negative and Positive Freedom,” ThePMosophica/ 
Review, Vol. 76, No. 3 (July, 1967), 102.
Felix E. Oppenheim, D im ensionso/Freedom York; St. M artin’s Press, 
1961), 130.
would choose in the original position. Rawls denied that the distinction between
positive and negative liberty gets at anything that cannot be addressed by protecting
the worth o f  liberty. However, the insurance for the enabling conditions o f  freedom
is forgotten in the international application o f  his theory. This background debate
regarding the work o f Oppenheim and MacCallum is analyzed more fully in Chapter
One where positive liberty is defined. Rawls wrote:
Therefore, I shall simply assume that liberty can 
always be explained by reference to three items: the 
agents who are free, the restrictions or limitations 
which they are free from, and what it is that they are 
free to do or not to do ... The general description o f 
liberty, then, has the following form: this or that 
person (or persons) is free (or not free) from this or 
that constraint (or set o f constraints) to do (or not to 
do) so and so'^.
In that way, Rawls followed MacCallum in dismissing the significance o f a 
distinction between positive and negative liberty. All liberty can be described by a 
triadic conception, so the difference between freedom to and freedom Jrom is not a 
meaningful distinction, according to Rawls. He argued that the conflicts surrounding 
the debate between positive and negative liberty traditions are really conflicts about 
how values like liberty, equality, and community should be prioritized. The attempt 
to stick with a purely empirical conception o f freedom fit well with Rawls’s hope to 
derive normative conclusions without beginning with premises dependent on 
comprehensive religious or philosophical schemes. In his essay, “The Basic
Rawls, TJ, 202.
Structure as Subject,” Rawls expressed his commitment to remain within the “canons 
o f a reasonable empiricism.” The Kantian concept o f  positive freedom did not 
meet this criterion.'^
Therefore, setting aside the positive liberty controversy, Rawls claimed to 
deal with the conflicts over prioritizing liberty in relationship with other values 
through his two principles o f Justice as fairness as conceived and ordered. 1 will 
argue that Rawls would have avoided much criticism and later revision o f his theory 
if he had addressed issues o f positive liberty more fully from the beginning. 1 do not 
disagree that the structure o f both positive and negative liberty can be diagramed 
triadically or that the terms freedom y^/w and freedom /o fail to capture the essential 
distinction between negative and positive liberty. However, the fact that liberty can 
be diagramed by an abstraction in that triadic structure does not mean that there is no 
real substance to the concern for positive liberty. In order to fully grasp the 
influence o f Kant’s vision o f perpetual peace on Rawls, it is necessary to understand 
Kant’s concept o f positive freedom
Rawls proceeded as if  he had taken care o f  the problem o f positive liberty by 
this definition, although he acknowledged the conflicting arguments about how to 
prioritize competing values that underlie the subject. His separation o f  liberty and the 
worth o f liberty was an attempt to bypass these problems. By focusing on
John Rawls, “The Basic Structure as Subject,” Amen'canFM/osopMca/ 
Quarier/y, 14(1977), 159-65, 165.
Rawls, PL, xliii, n.8.
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constitutional and legal restrictions as the primary subject o f this discussion o f 
liberty, he attempted to draw a circle that would leave issues o f economic business 
arrangements as well as family arrangements outside the scope o f  political 
discussions o f  freedom. He wrote, .. there are many kinds o f  conditions that 
constrain them ... Yet these distinctions can be made without introducing the 
different sense o f  liberty.” ®^ The continuous problems Rawls encountered 
safeguarding the worth o f  liberty raise questions regarding that claim. Martha 
Nussbaum, Thomas Pogge, and G. A. Cohen are among voices that have criticized 
Rawls for insufficiently taking into account the consequences o f  economic power on 
freedom. Their criticisms are included at the end o f  each subsequent chapter. Now 
it could be objected that the problems o f material resources, social cooperation, and 
workers’ rights can all be addressed in different ways with no recourse to the concept 
o f positive freedom. This may be true. Nevertheless the rich, resilient literature on 
positive freedom is intriguing enough to warrant examination as a tool that might 
help with revisions needed in Rawls’s theory.
In his most recent work. The law o/Feop/es, Rawls acknowledged that 
there are societies unable to realize freedom due to economic poverty. This is the 
specific problem I will address, drawing on his earlier theory in order to analyze 
what help Rawls can be to those concerned with issues o f  global poverty and 
injustice o f global trade. In this final work, he applied his earlier theory to a world o f 
societies sharing a law o f  peoples. Maintaining that his original theory cannot be
Ibid.
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extended and reformatted to apply to international relations, he argued that the theory 
applies only to decent or democratic societies. Once again, he claimed that the 
priority o f  the first principle is possible in cases where primary goods make the 
worth o f  liberty equal. So what about the many situations where poverty precludes 
the worth o f  liberty? He addressed these as cases o f nonideal theory. He said that 
these “burdened societies” are owed a “duty o f  assistance,” but did not adequately 
address the global systems o f colonialism and multinational corporate trade.^' He 
did note that liberal democracies have been motivated by imperialist tendencies in 
the past, but did not fully answer how to eradicate those impulses in the future.
More thorough reflection on this problem makes up the body o f this dissertation. 
Although my primary focus is on the international application o f this theory in The 
o/Peop/es, references to his earlier work are necessary in order to explicate this 
last work.
There is irony in a criticism o f Rawls that argues his work does not defend 
freedom with enough strength. As a classical liberal, Rawls intended to promote 
freedom to the maximum level compatible with fairness. Rawls wished to develop a 
notion o f  justice as fairness that would counter utilitarian systems and leave 
openness to various conclusions regarding matters like distributive Justice. His 
systematic J  Theofy o/Jus/ice, first published in 1971, continues as a 
cornerstone o f  political philosophy. His approach posed a thought experiment with
Rawls, LP, 111.
22 Ibid., 54.
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the goal o f  erasing privileges o f social or political position such as race, class, ability, 
or wealth. He suggested that people in the “original position” be behind a “veil o f  
ignorance” meaning that they would know nothing about their station in life. From 
this position o f equality they would reasonably develop principles to govern society. 
Among his conclusions was the claim that freedom or liberty should be maximized 
as long as it was compatible with equal freedom for all others. The two principles 
that define justice as fairness include the “difference principle” designed to limit 
inequalities to those o f  benefit to the least well off. However, prior to that principle 
in both order and importance is the “freedom principle” requiring the maximum 
freedom commensurate with equal freedom for all. Interference with freedom is 
only justified by measures necessary to protect freedom for all, and inequality is only 
justified by measures necessary to promote the welfare o f all.
This model proposed a four-stage sequence for applying the theory o f  justice 
in a constitutional democracy.^^ The first stage involves choosers in the original 
position selecting the principles o f justice. The second stage is like a “constitutional 
convention” in which the justice o f political forms is considered in order to choose a 
constitution.^'* In that way choosers are designing a just procedure for resolving 
differences. Next, the third stage is the legislative stage where choosers assess the
23 Rawls, TJ, 196.
Ibid., 196.
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justice o f  laws and policies.^^ Then finally, in the fourth stage the application o f rules 
selected in stage three takes place as judges and administrators implement the 
process.^^ Rawls proposed that the second, or constitutional stage, would be focused 
on securing the first principle. In contrast, the third stage, or legislative stage, would 
be the arena for attention to the difference principle. The priority o f the first 
principle over the second principle and the consequences o f  that ordering 
demonstrate Rawls’s valuing o f freedom over equality. Although he hoped to 
balance and reconcile both equality and freedom in a reasonable and persuasive way, 
he had to amend and modify his project as it developed in the future because o f 
unresolved questions about that ordering. Rawls hoped that the polarization and 
deadlock between socialist advocates o f equality and liberal advocates o f  freedom 
could be resolved by this procedural notion o f justice. Therefore, he thought it 
unnecessary and unproductive to pursue the positive freedom debate. Instead, his 
project attempted to balance freedom and equality in the most reasonable way.
He conceded that one potential problem in this attempt to balance freedom and 
equality could be related to inequalities o f  political liberty. For this reason, the 
“worth o f  liberty” he distinguished from liberty itself. He considered the risk that 
freedom may be compromised by unequal influence in political systems. Yet, he 
thought this could be corrected through provisions for public financing o f  campaigns 
and other measures to ensure equal access to political voice despite conditions o f
Ibid., 198.
Ibid., 199.
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unequal wealth. In other words, Rawls thought that where justice as fairness is 
realized, the equal worth o f political freedom could be assured through institutional 
arrangements. However, he never adequately addressed the implications for 
economic redistribution required to rectify the problem o f  wealth distribution as it 
relates to political voice and power. His assumption that rational choosers would 
value liberty over all assumes that survival needs are being met. If  a person is 
starving or too impoverished to realize even minimal political participation, then the 
worth o f liberty is in question. If we assume, as Rawls suggests, that his theory 
applies only to situations in which people do have access to primary goods necessary 
for equal political participation, then we are left to conclude that his theory will not 
help us with the monumental problems o f international justice in a world where 
many do not have access to basic goods necessary for survival. If real world 
problems o f  inadequate resources and unequal political power are the starting point 
o f our deliberations, Rawls’s conception o f  freedom is vulnerable to the accusations 
o f being merely formal or irrelevant to serious cases o f injustice.
Rawls further developed his theory in his next book, Po/i/ica/L/Aera//sm. 
Fending o ff criticisms o f his original theory, he refined his theory o f  justice as 
fairness as a political rather than a comprehensive theory. In this second monograph, 
Rawls does not substantially revise his notion o f freedom as such; although he did 
emphasize again that his interest is in political freedom. The tension between the 
value o f  liberty and equality is his focus. He wrote.
15
We may think o f this disagreement as a conflict within 
the tradition o f  democratic thought itself, between the 
tradition associated with Locke, which gives greater 
weight to what Constant called ‘the liberties o f  the 
m odem s,’ freedom o f thought and conscience, certain 
basic rights o f the person and o f property, and the rule 
o f  law, and the tradition associated with Rousseau, 
which gives greater weight to what Constant called 
‘the liberties o f the ancients,’ the equal political 
liberties and the values o f  public life?^
It is this riff between liberties o f the ancients and modems that justice as 
faimess tried to reconcile. He wrote, justice as faimess tries to adjudicate 
between these contending traditions...” *^ Thus he argued that the principles that 
govern basic institutions would be freely chosen by equal persons. The contract that 
binds together a society negotiates a balance between freedom and equality that is 
the best possible balance. The concept o f overlapping consensus provides a basis for 
peaceful coexistence within society even when members do not share comprehensive 
views. More than just a concession for getting along, or a tolerated mode o f 
operation, overlapping consensus builds on the common ground shared among 
comprehensive views. In this way, the profound convictions o f  persons grounded in 
comprehensive views fuels the consensus that bonds the society. He thought that the 
tension between the value o f equality and that o f  liberty was balanced in this way 
because people would be govemed by institutions shaped by principles that all 
reasonable, equal, and free persons would choose. He wrote;
Rawls, PL, 4-5.
Ibid., 5.
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But publicity ensures, so far as practical measures 
allow, that citizens are in a position to know and to 
accept the pervasive influences o f the basic structure 
that shape their conception o f themselves, their 
character, and their ends... that citizens should be in 
this position is a condition o f their realizing their 
freedom as fully autonomous, politically speaking.^^
Overlapping consensus makes room for passionate pursuit o f  liberation, liberty, and
freedom o f  conscience in this way, since these are common values across many
comprehensive views. But what o f the limits or boundaries o f society united through
overlapping consensus?
In Po/ifica/Liâera/ism, Rawls drew a distinction between a democratic 
society as distinct from a community and an association. He said that democratic 
societies are “complete and closed.” ®^ By the term “complete” he means that the 
democratic society is autonomous and inclusive o f  all areas o f life. By the term 
“closed” he means that persons in the democratic society do not voluntarily decide to 
join it, as opposed to an association. Persons do not freely choose their society, but 
are bom in it. Rawls did use this distinction in an attempt to defend the priority o f 
the first principle. He argued that liberty must have priority over all other goods 
because the grounds on which liberty is secured provide all other possibilities o f 
other goods. It was important to his view to maintain that a democratic society exists 
only to secure liberty for persons. In this way, a democratic society is
Ibid., 68.
Ibid., 40.
17
distinguishable from an association that is based on a common end or aim. More 
detailed examination o f  this distinction between an association, society, and 
community, is included in chapter three.
Rawls noted that some past societies were held together by a common value 
such as a religion, dominion, empire, or g l o r y . I n  that respect they understood 
themselves as what he calls an association. It is possible for people to be united by a 
comprehensive notion o f  the good agreeing upon the nature o f  the good and its 
justification. However, liberalism assumes that comprehensive doctrines o f  the good 
cannot be proven or demonstrated conclusively. Therefore, since rival 
understandings about the nature o f the good must coexist, a process for resolving 
conflicts is needed. Liberals like Rawls suggest that a political doctrine rather than a 
comprehensive doctrine can unite people by achieving agreement about the best 
process or method for resolving conflicts. In earlier societies united by a 
comprehensive conception o f  the good, decisions were govemed according to the 
comprehensive doctrine. Because o f  this shared view o f the common good, 
distribution o f resources might have been justified according to the understanding o f 
how various persons or classes related to that idea o f the good. In contrast, 
democratic societies have no such common end. The political is a process o f justly 
securing liberty.
Rawls distinguished between the political, the familial and the personal. Some 
critics have wondered if he was lopping o ff areas o f life that present serious
Rawls, PL, 4L
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challenges to his theory here. Most notably, Thomas Pogge and G. A. Cohen have 
argued that family life and economic life cannot be divorced from political life as if 
they were outside the purview o f justice. Rawls wants to remain neutral on notions o f 
the good, but he must take a stand in the debates over the problematic distinction 
between the personal versus the political and the public versus the private. The work 
o f Martha Nussbaum included similar concerns by insisting that familial and 
economic systems be subject to the same questions o f justice. While affirming 
Rawls’s achievement o f providing helpful theory for peaceful coexistence within and 
between societies with different comprehensive views o f the good, 1 see no advances 
in Po/i(ica/Liberalism to the problems o f  freedom and the worth o f liberty.
The method o f criticism o f Rawls’s theory is grounded in the concept o f  positive 
liberty. Rawls’s failure to appreciate the consequences o f positive liberty relate to 
criticisms o f  his work based on issues o f resources, community, and labor. Positive 
liberty emphasizes the relationship between freedom and material resources, freedom 
and community, and the employment o f  freedom in labor or creative production. In 
contrast, the negative concept o f  freedom emphasizes individuation rather than 
community, self-sufficiency rather than dependence on property, and a right to 
acquisition rather than the process o f  creation and self-ownership. When addressing 
the problem o f  poverty at the global level, Rawls reduced freedom to an inadequate 
and merely negative concept. By looking at the relationship between freedom and 
resources, freedom and community, and freedom and labor in Rawls’s work, some 
problems with his notion o f freedom become clear. The freedom he defended is
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either merely formal or leads to a level o f  redistribution that requires limitations o f 
negative freedom. Therefore, these three issues o f resources, community, and labor, 
correspond to the subsequent three chapters in this study. However, before these 
aspects o f  Rawls’s theory are examined, the notion o f positive liberty is more fully 
developed in Chapters one and two. Chapter one examines the influence o f  Kant’s 
positive freedom on the Law o f  Peoples. Chapter two considers the influence o f 
Isaiah Berlin and others on the subject o f positive freedom. Then that concept o f 
positive liberty is applied to the relationship between freedom and material 
resources, freedom and community, and freedom and labor.
Freedom and Resources
With respect to the relationship between freedom and resources in Rawls’s work, 
I will begin by analysis o f his writing on the subject o f material goods. This is 
followed by an examination o f  a possible distinction between liberties that can be 
compatible with inequalities in resources or wealth versus those that cannot. For 
example, imagine a rich person and a poor person living in a society that highly 
values liberty. What types o f freedom do they hold equally? Both can access public 
goods and services if they so choose. If both were at a party offering free drinks, 
gambling tokens, and cigarettes, both would be free to participate or not. There are a 
number o f situations in which the two have equal freedom. On the other hand, acts 
requiring economic resources demonstrate inequalities in the worth o f the respective 
freedom o f  these two persons. What sense does it make to say that both o f these
20
people can live where they choose, work as they choose, or participate fully in 
controlling the social and political structure? Clearly, the basic liberties o f the person 
with more economic resources allow greater freedom. This is what Rawls called,
“the worth o f liberty.” Norman Daniels, in his article, “Equal Liberty and Unequal 
Worth o f  Liberty,” questions whether or not political equality can coexist with social 
and economic inequalities. He argued that a system that allows the wealthy more 
influence in selecting candidates, influencing public opinion, influencing elected 
officials, and even influencing court procedures is no system o f equal political 
liberty.^^ When Rawls considered the worth o f liberty he recognized that although 
all persons would have the same freedom, those with greater authority and wealth 
would have greater “means to achieve their aims.”^^  Yet, justice as faimess requires 
that persons have equal opportunity to influence the policies and principles under 
girding the constitution and legislation controlling them. For this reason, Rawls said 
that in a just system, those who have less means to achieve their aims should be 
compensated by the system. Even the basic good o f  self-respect relies on resources. 
Joshua Cohen demonstrated that “resource” bases o f self-respect are required for 
meaningful personal development.^'* Catriona McKinnon further developed this same 
critique o f Rawls based on the premise that the requirement for resources necessary
Norman Daniels, “Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth o f Liberty,” in Jfeac/ing 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 281.
Rawls,TJ, 204.
34 Joshua Cohen, “Democratic Equality,” £t/jics. 99 (July 1989), 737.
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for self-respect leads to greater egalitarianism than Rawls originally envisioned/^ 
These types o f  criticism o f  Rawls have been developed from his earliest writing. As 
Norman Daniels pointed out, “economic factors, and perhaps other factors (like 
ideology) are explicitly excluded from among the constraints <3^/&///M?of liberty.”^^  
Daniels asked whether it makes sense to speak o f something as a liberty when it 
cannot be exercised.^^ Daniels concludes that Rawls’s theory will not justify a wide 
variety in social systems, but will lead to “a more far-reaching egalitarianism” than 
Rawls intended.^* I agree, and see the same type o f argument in Catriona 
M cKinnon’s recent article which argues for “unconditional basic income as the 
policy best suited for realizing Rawls’s ideal o f e q u a l i ty . . .M c K in n o n ’s 
conclusions will be examined further in the conclusion o f this essay.'*^
Chapter three more fully develops this analysis o f the relationship o f resources 
to freedom. Beginning with the intuitive claim that there are some cases o f injustice
Catriona McKinnon, £/dera//s/n and /he De/ense ofPo////ca/ Cons/ruc/iv/sm 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 80.
Daniels, 260.
”  Ibid., 259.
Ibid., 280.
McKinnon, 144.
Shaun Wilson, TheS/rugg/e Over fVorh: The ‘Endof fVorh ’and£/np/oymen/ 
Op/ions for Fos/dndus/ria/Socie/iesÇf^ 'n York: Routledge, 2004), 104. Wilson 
noted Rawls’s rejection o f state’s need to grant minimum income to people who 
chose not to work. Wilson detailed how advocates o f basic income sought to go 
beyond Rawls.
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in the disparity between rich and poor on an international level, I examine Rawls’s 
law o f  peoples as a guideline for political justice in light o f these problems. 1 argue 
that the law o f  peoples requires a global difference principle to address injustice 
caused by both inequalities in wealth and in the worth o f liberty on a global scale. 
Then, the analysis offered by Martha Nussbaum on Cicero’s concept o f  a law o f 
peoples is reviewed as the basis o f a criticism o f Rawls. Her essay on Cicero 
anticipated some criticism that could be made o f Rawls. Her own critique o f  Rawls is 
best demonstrated in relationship to her work on the capabilities approach. This work 
links human freedom with physical resources. Nussbaum argued that “the major 
powers o f  a human need material support.”'^ ' Her study o f women in poverty 
illustrates how people must be seen in their social context. Theories o f  justice must 
be based in awareness “o f  the obstacles that the context offers to the struggle for 
liberty, opportunity, and material well-being.”'*^  Nussbaum’s critique o f  Rawls 
centers on the idea that his theory does not take into account appreciation o f  the way 
in which needs for resources vary. She argued that his theory “doesn’t sufficiently 
respect the struggle o f each and every individual for flourishing.”'*^  The hope that 
Rawls’s theory can be reformed and expanded to apply to international systems rests 
on the demonstration that Rawls’s notion o f primary goods is not “particularly
'*' Martha Nussbaum, fVomenanc/NumanDeve/opmen/.- The Capabi7i//es 
Approach York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 73.
Ibid., 69.
43 Ibid.
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western.”'*'* Nussbaum’s criticism o f Rawls provides the type o f  corrective that could 
incorporate the positive liberty tradition.
Freedom and Community 
The second weakness in Rawls’s analysis o f freedom relates to community.
Once again, we see that positive freedom adds another dimension to the picture, 
bringing a higher resolution image. Freedom from restraint is one thing, but freedom 
to cooperate, to form covenants and systems with others is another type o f  freedom. 
He underestimates the erosive influence o f extreme individualism and the potential 
liberating power o f group action. Private property and public property systems can 
coexist. For example, it is possible to have libraries that are used, produced, and 
maintained by the community as a whole. At the same time privately owned books 
for personal use can be justified. The tragedy o f  stacks o f privately owned books 
going unused in a dusty, personal library is as disturbing as the possibility that the 
commonly owned books in the public library will not be well-cared for. The fact 
that a bookseller’s potential to make money on books is probably diminished by 
promoting public libraries, does not outweigh the freedom gained by a book reader 
who may have no resources to buy books. As long as there are public libraries, 
freedom o f  speech, expression, and self-development is protected. Liberal thinkers 
have sometimes failed to realize the potential o f community action for expanding 
freedom. The insistence on promoting freedom to pursue business ventures has 
obscured the potential to promote freedom by limiting economic activity. For
'*^  Ib id .
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example, it is not uncommon to hear arguments that environmental regulations 
should be relaxed in order to promote business development. Yet, arguments could 
be made that limits on economic activity designed to protect the environment or 
workers’ rights actually promote other types o f freedom. The ban on child labor 
promoted freedom o f  more children to go to school. Prohibitions against 
deforestation protect freedom to experience natural resources like endangered plants 
or animals. These are examples o f the way that limitations o f freedom through 
cooperation and relationship can actually free individuals. It illustrates the positive 
sense o f freedom that is sometimes in conflict with negative freedom.
Rawls failed to recognize the profound reliance o f freedom on community. In 
the positive sense o f  freedom, the ability to fully develop a self requires ability to 
live in relationship to social and political systems or communities. No individual can 
be free to create the harmony o f  the symphony.''^ In isolation, no individual can 
achieve what cooperation and community can produce. But, social systems are 
constructions. They are conventions developed through shared expectations and 
understandings. Distinctions between private and public areas o f  life, geographic 
borders between nations, conventions o f monetary value and ownership are all 
culturally constructed systems that no individual can completely reinvent in 
isolation. The notion o f accountability between persons who interact raises issues o f 
obligations, mutual respect, and just relations whether they are viewed as being part 
o f the same society or in different societies. The idea that a society involves
Rawls suggests this metaphor o f  an orchestra in PL, p. 321.
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contracts or agreements does not explain accountability to those outside the society. 
The relationships between different societies and between individuals in different 
societies raises additional questions. In other words, how does justice as faimess 
guide relationships on an international level? Certainly, there are interactions that 
cross borders. The differences in power and liberty among various players in those 
international interactions preclude Justice as faimess, since the background 
conditions are not in place. There can be no fair negotiations at that level since the 
worth o f  political liberty is unequal at the intemational level.
In conditions o f starvation, hierarchical states could be pressured to trade its 
political liberty for food. Their sovereignty to maintain the political system they 
value is in conflict with their need for financial aid from the intemational 
community. In one sense, they would be faced with the choice o f  being dominated 
politically by intemational economic force or starving. This type o f scenario raises a 
serious challenge for Rawls. Given his cut o ff point in aid to burdened nations, such 
a scenario could occur. This is an illustration o f unequal power o f nations on an 
intemational level, resulting in unequal worth o f  liberty for nations. So how can 
justice be applied to these intemational interactions? Can the mutual respect, 
obligations, and just relations implied at the domestic level within a society be 
extended to an international community? The problem o f  how nations or other 
aggregates o f persons can be viewed as the subjects o f liberty raises further 
questions. Berlin criticized Fichte for the analogy between the individual and the 
nation because this leads to the loss o f focus on individual freedom and individual
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conscience/^ However, Kant made a similar move in “Perpetual Peace,” claiming 
that a nation is a society o f men with existence as a moral person/^ The problems o f 
attributing liberty to aggregates o f  persons is considered more fully in chapter four.
If participation in the society is motivated by mutual advantage at the domestic 
level, then can a similar motivation guide intemational interactions? Only if  some 
type o f  community between either nations or citizens o f different nations is 
recognized can justice as faimess be helpful at the intemational level. Otherwise, 
what persuasive power could Rawls’s theory have to convince wealthy nations that a 
relatively weak nation should have a choice about its form o f govemment? 
Recognizing the tendency for wealthy nations to control the intemational scene, the 
later work o f  Rawls applied his theory to the development o f laws o f nations. On an 
intemational level, Rawls’s theory operates with an enlightenment naivete that there 
will be motivation to do what is agreed to be just through the persuasive power o f 
reason. O f course, the problem o f motivation is a challenge for each level o f  Rawls’s 
theory. He thinks it can be addressed through cultivation o f liberal citizenship. 
However, within local societies the dynamic o f sympathy and mutual accountability 
functions in ways that are harder given the distances involved in international 
relations. His theory seems to be embedded in a worldview in which people contract 
to be part o f a nation because the alternative is worse. The tradition o f  contractarian
Isaiah Berlin, Freedom and//s Befraya/{ Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 70.
Kant, Berpe/ua/Peace, 108.
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thought looks different in our own time, when the nation state system is affected by 
regional and international institutions and actors. For these reasons, Rawls’s theory 
cannot simply be applied to national governments, but must be applied to 
corporations and intemational economic and trade associations as well. The 
challenges are around issues o f compliance and enforcement, which may cause the 
justification o f liberty to collapse. In Fo/i/ica/L/âera/ism, Rawls recognized that his 
theory may not have universal or intemational application. In The Law o/Feop/es, 
he does not fully overcome this challenge related to the relevance o f state borders to 
his theory. Chapter four expands this positive notion o f freedom in relationship to 
cooperation and intemational community, as proposed by Thomas Pogge in his 
criticism o f  Rawls. To be sure, many other cosmopolitan thinkers have offered 
arguments similar to Pogge’s suggestions that Rawls’s Law o f  Peoples be expanded 
and revised. Charles Beitz and Patrick Hayden would be among the list o f  examples 
o f cosmopolitan criticism.'^* From among this menu o f  options, 1 have chosen to 
review Pogge’s critique because Rawls him self seemed to take it most seriously.'’^  
Liberal thinkers differ in ways o f balancing liberty with other values. When it 
comes to embodiment in a particular system o f govemment, liberty’s importance 
may be eclipsed by vying concems for stability or comparative strength in the global 
system. One question that must be addressed is whether liberal theory will be
Patrick Hayden, John F oh’/s . Towards a Jus/ fFor/d Order
University o f  Wales Press, 2000), 179. See Also Beitz.
See LP 118, n. 53. Rawls mentions possible agreement with Pogge pending 
agreement on the cut-off point in assistance.
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adequate to the issues o f  globalization. Or, to be more precise, which form o f 
liberalism will be adopted and extended in the quest to address problems o f  
globalization. Coercion at an intemational level must be weighed against other 
injustices. Consent o f the govemed makes sense within a nation state o f  citizens 
who are unified by some sort o f constitution. But, can these notions o f  faimess cover 
relations among nations? Given the widely divergent notions o f the good among 
various civilizations, peaceful coexistence requires some respect for tolerance and 
impartiality. Yet, some claim their comprehensive theories o f justice are 
incompatible with the degree o f toleration and freedom suggested by liberal theory.
If liberal theory cannot produce an adequate notion o f the good, should liberal theory 
be abandoned in exchange for a comprehensive theory as communitarians suggest? 
This study seeks to reform liberal theory rather than replace it. The claim that 
freedom is to be universally valued can be fortified by offering a more robust 
conception o f  freedom that is relevant to the reality o f  globalization. Thus, my 
suggestion is that some type o f  procedural, liberal system is preferable to a 
comprehensive theory o f  justice. The liberal system that best ensures freedom in this 
global economy must accommodate not only the negative, but also the positive sense 
o f freedom.
Thomas Pogge also draws attention to the need for further scrutiny about 
systems o f wealth distribution and human flourishing. He noted the distortion that 
the position o f  privilege and wealth can have on the consideration o f  questions o f 
universal justice and economic freedom. He wrote.
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When they think about how to structure world trade 
(Bretton Woods, the Uruguay Round, and the World 
Trade Organization), they do try to anticipate how 
alternative global trading regimes would affect 
intemational trade flows and worldwide economic 
growth. Only in their attempts to explain global 
poverty is our global economic order strangely 
neglected. The tunnel vision o f economists rubs o ff on 
the rest o f  us. We regret that so many countries have 
bad institutions and governments, but we do not ask 
further why this may be so. In particular, we do not 
ask how we ourselves might be involved in this sad 
phenomenon^*^.
Freedom and Labor
The third point is that freedom in the positive sense relates to creativity and 
labor. An intuitive notion o f faimess indicates that persons ought to be free to reap 
where they sow. However, the complexity o f economic production in the global 
economy makes it difficult to clarify precisely who has a fair claim to products o f 
labor. This clarification is difficult enough even within one domestic setting.^' Rawls
^"^Thomas Pogge, J?ea/izingJiaw/s{yCnai<:.di, New York; Gomel 1 University Press, 
1989), 358.
^'Karl M arx’s classic polemic on the problem o f exploitation o f  labor was directly 
related to his appreciation o f  freedom. In volume three o f Cap//a/, 820. He wrote,
“In fact, the realm o f freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined 
by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature o f  things it 
lies beyond the sphere o f  actual material production... Freedom in this field can only 
consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their 
interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead o f  being 
ruled by it as by the blind forces o f  Nature; and achieving this with the last 
expenditure o f energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their 
human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm o f necessity. Beyond it 
begins that development o f human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of
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failed to apply his principles o f justice to the complexities o f labor, thus neglecting 
important realities relating freedom to labor. In liberal theory, transfer o f  property 
will be just if it is not coerced, but is conducted freely. However, inadequate 
attention to the reality o f  severe poverty limits liberal reflection. Consider this 
example o f exchange o f  property from an imaginable act o f labor. A young woman 
works in a cigar factory. It is the only job she can get to feed herself and her 
children. She exchanges the value o f her work for the wages she earns. Since she 
and her children would starve without her wages, what sense does it make to say that 
she is not coerced? I cite this as an act o f labor resulting from unjust contractual 
agreements. Technically, it is a contract between free parties. However, if there are 
no alternatives that insure survival needs are met, then the freedom o f the laborer is 
merely formal and not meaningful.
Rawls has said that his theory o f  justice only applies when background 
conditions o f non-starvation are met. However, on an intemational level, he does not 
adequately address the cases o f individuals in burdened societies. If such cases exist, 
then they are problematic for Rawls’s global theory o f justice. All too often, 
discussion o f  political philosophy are conducted in contexts where it is inconceivable 
that the young woman would really starve without the wages, or that she could not 
switch to another job if  she chose. In fact, there are too many places in the world 
where those are serious realities. The degree to which an act is free is surely relative.
freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm o f necessity as its 
basis.”
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She is clearly not as free in the choice to work as a person who has an alternative for 
employment o f  other income. It would be a mistake to acknowledge only two 
options, such as either I .) She freely chooses to work or 2.) She is coerced. After all, 
she is free to starve, so if  she chooses to work one might call this a just transfer o f 
property. Freedom is a matter o f degree. Perhaps a distinction should be made 
between transfers that are made freely between mutually powerful agents and 
transfers between persons with different levels o f power. Rawls reflects some 
awareness o f these issues but does not go far enough in applying his theory to the 
political dynamics o f labor and capital.
In acts o f  labor, the conditions o f transfer are often controlled by a more 
powerful party. In Rawls’ theory this inequality is thought to be justifiable because 
the advantage o f  the investors arise from a risk they took that allows the whole 
system to benefit. However, this does not justify workers having little control or 
power over their working conditions. The amount o f power they should have over 
decisions in the work place is both an economic and a political question to be 
determined in light o f  quality o f life issues as well as efficiency. The transfer o f 
property involved in this act o f labor is not beyond the need for ethical scrutiny 
simply because the workers “freely” work there twelve hours a day, six days a week 
for wages o f $72 a month. Rawls inadequately examines the conditions o f labor, and 
workers ability to influence those conditions. The positive sense o f freedom would 
suggest that taxation o f  the factory owner’s income or the laborer’s income is not the 
only theft or harm involved in this example o f labor. The relationship between the
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notion o f  positive freedom and the writings o f  Hegel and Marx must be addressed at 
this point. Both Hegel and Marx criticized liberal freedom as being merely formal. 
The suspicion and disdain for positive freedom, exemplified by Isaiah Berlin results 
from the way in which Hegel’s dialectical notion o f freedom was used as a tool for 
totalitarianism. Marx criticized Hegel for this very rea so n .N o n e th e le ss , Marx 
shared Hegel’s critique that freedom is merely formal in many cases where 
capitalism is protected through liberal institutions. I agree with M arx’s statement 
that, “ In capitalist society spare time is acquired for one class by converting the 
whole life-time o f  the masses into labour-time.” "^* Marx was correct in passionately 
decrying this as a serious problem. The best redress o f  the problem remains unclear. 
My goal in this study is to explore characteristics o f the best solutions to this 
problem developed by both Rawls and some o f his friendly critics. Production as 
well as trade must be included in the spheres to be reformed according to our theory 
o f justice. In other words, liberalism that accepts as inevitable the degrading and 
deplorable conditions o f many workers, conditions that are aptly described as 
economic slavery, does not promote an adequate theory o f justice. Marxists are not
G.W .F.Hegef Lec/ures on /he PMosophy qf//is/ory{^ç,xVe\Q'j\ University o f 
California Press, 1990),474. “In thus asserting the formal side o f Freedom -  this mere 
abstraction— the party in question makes it impossible firmly to establish any 
political organization.”
Marx, Capi/a/, 25.
54 Ibid., 581.
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the only ones to suggest that a society can develop in ways that liberate people/^ In 
this study I seek to analyze Rawls’s theory to consider the extent to which it can 
meet the challenge o f  liberating people in the area o f  labor as in other areas.
A similar point that demonstrates a weakness in Rawls’s notion o f freedom is the 
relationship between freedom and labor. In order for a just system to protect the 
equal worth o f  political liberty, two things are necessary. Sheltering the political 
process from financial influence is one thing. But it is also necessary that economic 
power not eclipse political power in the workplace or market. The worth o f  liberty 
in control o f  labor is also a political issue. If a worker in private industry has little or 
no control over working conditions then her liberty is restricted. If a person’s ability 
to earn basic necessities is contingent upon relinquishing power, then her liberty is 
restricted on a morally irrelevant basis. If  corporations are unchecked by political 
control, indeed, if corporations manipulate the political systems themselves, then 
freedom is threatened even though coercion in the strict sense o f negative freedom 
may be difficult to pinpoint. For example, if  a corporation sets the policy o f 
pursuing cheap labor and resources, they are free to avoid governmental controls and 
the power o f  organized labor by frequently relocating across national borders. The 
freedom to dominate markets is the power to dominate others. Sometimes it is too
Bertrand Russell, / ’o/zZ/ca'/A/ea/s(Hevj York; Barnes and Nobles, Inc., 1963), 
28. He
promoted the aim o f developing an economic system that would “aim at liberating 
creative impulses and diminishing possessive impulses.” He suggested that this 
would be accomplished best through something like “guild socialism” combining 
“economic freedom” with “ industrial self-government. p.41.
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great to be regulated by political process. This analysis is developed more fully in 
Chapter five in the discussion o f G.A. Cohen’s criticism o f  Rawls. At first, it might 
seem strange to select Cohen’s critique o f Rawls since Cohen represents a socialist 
challenge to Rawls’s liberalism. However, a striking overlap will be demonstrated 
between Rawls’s theory as it developed over time, moving more toward the left, and 
the concems o f  Cohen. Once again, this overlap is explained in terms o f the value o f 
positive freedom. Cohen’s emphasis on self-ownership has been analyzed by other 
Rawlsian critics, including Carol Pateman who revisited the connection between 
self-ownership and autonomy as a potential weakness in Rawls.^^ However, Cohen’s 
more complete analysis provides the best demonstration o f the potential role o f 
positive freedom in developing the Rawlsian argument.
This study begins with a real world problem: liberal theory as it has developed 
has resulted in policies that promote negative freedom but sometimes limit positive 
freedom. For example, the pressure from the World Bank and IMF to privatize 
utilities and services is based on free market assumptions but does not respect state 
sovereignty o f  nations that want to provide such services through a public sector. In 
many such cases, states are over-powered by multinational agencies or corporations 
that are freed from accountability in the global market. Words about freedom and 
liberation abound in current news stories. Naming an offensive “Enduring Freedom” 
or defining a military mission as “liberating the people” illustrate the use o f  these
^^Carole Pateman, “Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization 
and a Tale o f  Two Concepts,” Journalo/Fo//lica/Philosophy, 10, No. 1, (2002), 51. 
Also, Tully (1993), Gorr (1995) and Ryan (1994).
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ancient and honored concepts in contemporary rhetoric. The use o f  such rhetoric 
would be unacceptable to Rawls. However, close scrutiny o f intemational economic 
relations raises questions about the commitment liberals like Rawls have to 
meaningful freedom. When the freedom o f  investors and developers is in conflict 
with other types o f freedom Rawls’s theory may not be much help unless it is 
revised. The modem concepts o f  freedom that are crucial in political theory were 
formed in the crucible o f  the transition from feudalism to the nation state system. 
Language and concepts about the role o f freedom in political life have not kept pace 
with the radical changes in the world. Globalization requires renewed interest in 
freedom, particularly in relationship to economic power. Critics o f  Rawls have 
argued that incompatible values reside in the liberal tradition, explaining how the 
problem o f toleration at the intemational level only accentuated a problem inherent 
in liberalism itself.^^ There are choices to be made in the future o f  liberalism. This 
study attempts to clarify some o f  those choices related to concepts o f  freedom.
The reality o f severe poverty is the starting point and continual reference 
point for this study. Political philosophy is not immune from the tendency to flee 
from this painful and agonizing reality. If we can overcome our resistance and 
continually keep awareness o f  this problem at the center o f  our political philosophy 
we might gain altemative perspectives on ancient questions o f justice and freedom. 
This project focuses on Rawls’s law o f  peoples as the culmination o f his theory in
Tan, Kok-Chor Tan, “Liberal Toleration in Rawls’s Law o f Peoples. 108
(January 1998), 295. Also John Gray.
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political philosophy as the object o f  analysis. What new insight might come from 
approaching Rawls’s theory asking for solutions o f  the problems o f global hunger 
and poverty? The liberalism o f John Rawls has been selected because it is among the 
important conceptual paradigms that constitute liberal political theory. His work 
exemplifies the liberal tradition characterized by individual rights, consent o f the 
govemed, equality o f  opportunity, impartial govemment, and universal value o f 
freedom. The idea that govemment should be neutral and allow individuals freedom 
to personally pursue different notions o f the good unites liberal thinkers. In contrast 
to communitarians or others who would promote a comprehensive notion o f  justice, 
liberal thinkers seek systems that promote more freedom. In a world o f  competing 
civilizations, liberal thought attempts peaceful coexistence and freedom to pursue 
disparate notions o f  the good. However, discrepancies between liberal theory 
promoting freedom and the actual extent o f real freedom for the economically poor 
raise questions about the meaning o f freedom itself. Rawls’s intemational theory has 
been faulted for “failure to devote any sustained attention to transnational trade,” and 
“silence on matters o f  rectification.” *^ It is consistent with the work o f  Rawls to 
insist that the pursuit o f  justice is not merely an abstract question, but a practical 
problem that we must attempt to address.^^
Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitanism and the Law o f  Peoples,” Journa/o/Fo//f/ca/ 
Phi7osophy, 10, No. 1, (2002) 188-189.
Martha Nussbaum, “Conversing with the Tradition: John Rawls and the History 
o f Ethics,” EMcs 109 (January 1999), 430.
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CHAPTER ONE 
POSITIVE LIBERTY DEFINED
I argue that the distinction between basic and nonbasic rights ought 
not to be interpreted as priviledging one category o f  rights (e.g., 
negative rights to act without interference) over other categories o f 
rights (such as positive rights to capacities, resources, and 
opportunities for action). Finally, an adequate theory should be 
complete, in that it includes all categories o f rights that are necessary 
for the full exercise o f  any human right (Ingram, 360)....The U.S. 
State Department’s continual refusal to endorse the UN’s 
Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(1966)... thus parallels the theoretical obtuseness o f both Rawls 
(despite his belated recognition o f basic subsistence rights) and 
Habermas (despite his belated recognition o f social and cultural 
rights). O f course, there is a priority ranking among rights -  the State 
Department has got that right -  but it is not a priority o f  “negative” 
freedom over “positive freedom.
—David Ingram.'
Positive liberty is a meaningful concept that contains roots o f major 
criticisms leveled against Rawls. In subsequent chapters the application o f  this 
fortified notion o f  freedom to Rawls’s work will illustrate my argument defending 
that claim. First however, this chapter offers thorough explication o f  the concept o f 
positive liberty apart from its relationship to Rawls’s theory. What do 1 mean by the 
term “positive freedom?” After reviewing and evaluating alternatives, I adopt a 
modification o f  the definition developed by T. H. Green. For Green, positive liberty 
is “the liberation o f the powers o f all men equally for contributions to a common
' David Ingram, “Between Political Liberalism and Postnational 
Cosmopolitanism: Towards An Altemative Theory o f Human Rights.” Fo/iVica/ 
Theofy. 31, No. 3, (June 2003), 373-374.
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good.”  ^ Positive freedom must be understood as freedom realized through material 
conditions o f  freedom, social support for freedom, and acts o f  the will, work, and 
construction requiring self-fulfillment or self-realization. However, the problematic 
inclusion o f  the term “common good” renders Green’s full definition unworkable.
By modifying Green’s theory slightly an acceptable concept o f  positive freedom may 
emerge. My working definition o f positive freedom suggests positive freedom be 
understood as liberating power o f self-construction in concert with liberating social 
and material relationships.
Positive and negative freedom are closely related and interconnected, not 
absolutely distinct. I do not disagree with M acCallum’s claim, described further 
below, that all freedom can be diagramed triadically, and thus has the same formal 
structure. However, I think MacCallum fails to capture crucial substantive aspects o f 
the differences between positive and negative freedom. I will argue that Berlin left 
unresolved ambiguities in John Stuart M ill’s concept o f freedom, and that a strictly 
negative concept o f freedom is inadequate for liberal political theory. The lively 
debate that continues despite the work o f M acCallum’s contribution or Berlin’s 
caution can be sorted out in light o f three aspects o f freedom: freedom dependent on 
enabling economic conditions, freedom in relational or social systems, and freedom 
as acts o f will for self-determination. This analysis o f positive liberty is worth 
reconsidering because it accounts for overlap in various criticisms o f  Rawls’s work.
 ^T.H. Green, Lec/ures on /heFr/ncip/es o/Fo/it/ca/06//ga//on. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. p. 200.
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Isaiah Berlin’s articulation o f two different aspects o f freedom provides a
good starting point, although his is not the first or the last word on the subject o f
positive freedom. Berlin’s essay, “Two Concepts o f Liberty,” continues to have
formative influence regarding the concept o f positive liberty. Rawls referred to the
essay in his comparison o f  the freedom o f the ancients versus the freedom of
modems.^ However, careful review o f  Berlin’s essay raises questions concerning his
reading o f  J.S. Mill and unresolved questions related to economic and social aspects
o f freedom. 1 offer three claims related to Berlin’s concepts o f  liberty. First, 1 argue
that Berlin clearly recognized two types o f freedom, although he urged caution about
positive freedom. Thus, Berlin differed from MacCallum who thought that the
triadic concept dissolved important differences and the need for a positive concept o f
liberty. In fact, a close reading o f Berlin reveals that he anticipated M acCallum’s
type o f  critique when he said.
The essence o f  the notion o f liberty, both in the 
‘positive’ and the ‘negative’ senses, is the holding off 
o f something or someone— o f others who trespass on 
my field or assert their authority over me, or o f 
obsessions, fears, neuroses, irrational forces— intruders 
and despots o f one kind or another.'*
In other words, Berlin noted what MacCallum later illuminated more fully. Both 
types o f  liberty havey&/7%7/similarities. Nonetheless, despite these formal
 ^Rawls, PL, 299 n. 16.
'* Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts o f  Liberty, Four Essays on L/ôerfy. New York; 
Oxford University Press, 1969, 158.
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similarities, Berlin developed two conflicting notions o f  freedom. These are not 
meant to be strictly independent or sharply distinct concepts, but overlap in various 
ways. Nevertheless, Berlin did not argue as MacCallum did that there is really only 
one type o f  liberty. Rather, he thought both concepts needed clarification.
Secondly, 1 will argue that Berlin did urge that only a negative concept o f  liberty 
should be promoted through political systems. He urged caution regarding positive 
liberty because o f  the historical propensity to enlist that concept in rhetorical defense 
o f totalitarianism. However, although Berlin noted the reality that economic 
dynamics can be enabling conditions for freedom, he left those problems unresolved. 
So my third claim related to Berlin’s analysis o f these two concepts is that he did not 
fully settle the questions that motivate the call for a positive concept o f  liberty. After 
reviewing Berlin’s definitions o f  the two concepts, I proceed with this analysis o f his 
claims.
Berlin admitted that liberty is not only the freedom from restriction, but also 
“the freedom which consists in being one’s own master.”  ^Granting that there are 
many ways to think about freedom, Berlin named two senses o f  freedom: the 
negative sense and the positive sense o f  freedom or liberty. The negative aspect o f 
freedom is the simplest to grasp. Absence o f restraint or interference from others is 
freedom in the negative sense. For example, we have freedom to assemble a group 
because the state does not prohibit this. We have freedom from capricious or 
invasive intrusions from the state in cases where the constitution protects these
^ T C ,  131.
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liberties. Berlin said, “You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are 
prevented from attaining a goal by human beings.”  ^ However, as Berlin pointed out, 
there is a second aspect o f  freedom in addition to negative freedom. Positive 
freedom is more difficult to explain or illustrate. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored 
because it can conflict in some important ways with negative freedom. What Berlin 
did not do, was to argue that there is no such thing as positive freedom. Despite his 
caution that positive freedom was a dangerous concept, and that only negative 
freedom should be promoted as a political value, he did acknowledge a rich, ancient 
tradition o f positive freedom.
Berlin understood positive freedom as freedom to develop a self. It is the
source o f control. Self-differentiation, self-development, and self-mastery are all part
o f this aspect o f  freedom. Berlin spoke o f being one’s own “master.” In seeking to
illustrate positive liberty as distinct from negative liberty, Berlin wrote,
1 wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by 
reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not 
by causes which affect me, as it were from outside. I 
wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer -  deciding, 
not decided for self-directed and not acted upon by 
external nature or by other men as if  I were a thing, or 
an animal, or a slave.”^
6 Ibid., 122. 
 ^ Ibid., 131.
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This contrast between positive freedom as self-determination versus the status o f
slavery will be developed further in relationship to the continuing debate over
positive freedom. Berlin acknowledged this sense o f  freedom related to being an
individual. This idea is developed further in his later essay, “From Hope and Fear Set
Free,” published in 1964, where he wrote:
I do not, o f  course, wish to deny that when we say that 
a man is free— or freer than he was before— we may 
be using the word to denote moral freedom, or 
independence, or self-determination. This concept, as 
has often been pointed out, is far from clear: the central 
terms— willing, intention, action, and the related 
notions— conscience, remorse, guilt, inner versus outer 
compulsion, and so on— stand in need o f analysis, 
which itself entails a moral psychology that remains 
unprovided; and in the meanwhile the notion o f moral 
independence— o f what is, or should be, independent 
o f what, and how this independence is achieved—  
remains obscure.*
Although one might assume that this moral freedom is distinct from political 
conceptions o f  freedom, that demarcation is far from clear. The ambiguity between 
individual or personal moral freedom as separate from social or political freedom is a 
point o f vulnerability for Rawls. Berlin noted that “a frontier must be drawn between 
the area o f private life and that o f  public authority.”  ^ How or where to draw that line 
between private, personal freedom and public, political freedom is the question.
* Isaiah Berlin, “From Hope and Fear Set Free, ”ProperS/uc^o/Manh'fi(/, (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), 108-109.
Berlin, Two Concepts, 124.
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What is clear is that Berlin recognized two separate and meaningful concepts o f 
freedom in classical Western thought.
Secondly, Berlin’s arguments were directed against those who suggested that
positive freedom was the only real freedom. His liberal defense o f  negative freedom
was overstated for that reason. He said that freedom includes self-control, self-
determination, independence, although freedom should not be confined to self-
determination. He recognized the reality that social and economic resources shape
individual freedom. Berlin wrote.
To be free is to be able to make an unforced choice; 
and choice entails competing possibilities— at the very 
least two ‘open’ unimpeded alternatives. And this, in 
its turn, may well depend on external circumstances 
which leave only some paths unblocked. When we 
speak o f the extent o f  freedom enjoyed by a man or a 
society, we have in mind, it seems to me, the width or 
extent o f the paths before them, the number o f open 
doors, as it were, and the extent to which they are 
open/^
Delving more deeply into the history o f  ideas, Berlin understood the loyalty 
and passion that sometimes motivate advocates o f positive liberty. Berlin noted the 
Kantian roots o f the concept o f  positive liberty. The term “positive freedom” seems 
to have first been developed in Kant’s CriZ/çue o/Fure/Reason. There freedom was 
described as a pure transcendental idea, “By freedom, by contrast, in the
Ibid., 110.
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cosmological sense o f the term, I mean the power to begin a state on one’s own.” ' ' 
Kant wrote,
And this freedom o f  pure reason can be regarded not 
only negatively, as independence from empirical 
conditions (for the faculty o f  reason would thus cease 
to be a cause o f appearances). Rather, this freedom 
can be designated also positively, as a faculty o f  reason 
to begin on its own a series o f events.'^
Kant’s liberalism rests on the premise that both free will and positive reason are
meaningful realities. The Kantian concept o f  positive freedom will be reviewed
further in Chapter Two in connection with Kant’s hope for perpetual peace.
However, Berlin acknowledged the challenge o f  reconciling Kant’s moral freedom
with political freedom.'^
The propensity for positive freedom to be enlisted in defense o f
totalitarianism is Berlin’s main concern. Berlin noted the development o f  positive
freedom from Kant through Hegel who built on Kant’s idea o f the self manifesting
free will. Hegel developed that idea further saying that the self in the moment o f  self-
consciousness discovers his identity in the act o f labor.'’’ Marx connected acts o f
labor to this idea o f self-realization through the collective activity o f  labor which
"  Kant, CPR, 726.
Kant, CPR, 732.
Berlin, Two Concepts, 147.
Hegel, Fhi/osop/jy o/Nis/ory, 474.
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generates language, customs, and economic institutions.'^ This connection o f the 
idea o f  positive freedom with Marxism motivated Berlin’s polemic against positive 
freedom.'^ This unsavory historical and political use o f the concept o f positive 
freedom contributed to the liberal avoidance o f the concept. If positive freedom is 
identified with the will o f  “true” self that can be in conflict with immediate desires, 
then acts designed to free a person from her own immediate desires can be viewed as 
acts o f liberation. Berlin was concerned with using the concept o f  positive liberty in 
order to justify “coercing others for their own sake.” '^ Cautioning against T.H. 
Green’s definition o f  positive freedom Berlin said, “Green was a genuine liberal, but 
many a tyrant could use this formula to Justify his worst acts o f oppression.” '*
The controversial nature o f the concept o f positive freedom derives in part 
from a lack o f  conceptual clarity, and in part from the use o f the term in service o f 
totalitarian regimes. It was that potential use o f the term positive liberty to justify 
authoritarianism that troubled Berlin. In other words, according to Berlin, some 
thinkers have made a sleight o f  hand move. They began by claiming that freedom in 
the positive sense allows humans to be masters o f themselves, but then they claimed 
that the “real se lf ’ could be identified with a social whole. In such cases the
Karl Marx, Capifa/. À Cr/7/çueo/Po/it/ca/Economy. (New York: Charles H. 
Kerr and Co. Random House, 1906), 197.
Berlin, Two Concepts, 118.
Ibid., 133.
'* Ibid., 133, n. 1.
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individual will is then forced to submit to the dominant self o f higher nature, which 
is the common good. The problem, o f course, lies in determining who gets to define 
the public good. Berlin says that in such cases it is an illusion to suggest that true 
freedom results from an individual self in submission to a common good. Although 
persons may want to sacrifice individual freedom for a common good, why not admit 
that this reduces personal freedom? Why not claim that at times individual liberty 
should be curtailed to insure the liberty o f  others? Some advocates o f positive 
liberty claim that the way to maximize individual liberty is really to discipline it to 
the common good. Some process for the self-expression o f  the community as a 
whole must be in place to facilitate positive liberty. Liberalism seeks to provide a 
process for individuals or nations to make decisions and find voice as a group.
Berlin’s criticism o f  the concept o f positive freedom was also a response to 
the way it was developed by August Comte. Comte’s “positive religion” claimed to 
be the religion o f humanity based in voluntary cooperation o f the “fully social” 
individual.'^ He espoused the idea that a perfect collective “harmonized by love” 
was possible. The claim that “collective self-affirmation turns into individual self- 
sacrifice” sounds positively frightening today.^° Nevertheless, Comte thought that 
positive politics could follow the scientific, medical model o f “healthy normality”
Andrew Wemick, Augus/ Comte and (he Re/igion o//fumanity. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 2001), 136.
Ibid., 213.
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arriving at criteria for determining when to use coercion to achieve compliance.^' 
Berlin warned about this dangerous tendency to use the concept o f positive freedom 
in that way.
For these reasons, Berlin advocated promoting only the concept o f  negative 
freedom in political systems in the tradition as J.S. Mill as Berlin understood that. 
The development o f liberalism was shaped by this overdeveloped sense o f  negative 
freedom and underdeveloped sense o f positive freedom. Perhaps Berlin thought that 
only “negative freedom” is pure freedom itself as an ultimate value. He observed 
that what is called “positive freedom” is often used as a means to another value. For 
example, he noted that equality and other values can conflict with freedom. Berlin 
wrote, “Neither political equality, efficient organization, nor social justice is 
compatible with more than a modicum o f individual liberty.”^^  Reconciling these 
competing values is the trick, especially when those values are necessary for certain 
types o f freedom. Rawls attempted to provide a procedural notion o f justice wherein 
freedom is the highest value because it is a means to any good. Thus, freedom is 
both inherently valuable and valuable as a means to the pursuit o f  any other value.
The murky issues o f self-esteem, cultural construction o f  meaning, and 
access to political voice are all part o f what Berlin called positive liberty. However, 
although Berlin mentioned the connection between economic power and freedom, he
Ibid., 57.
Berlin, Two Concepts, 151. 
Berlin, TC, 334.
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did not fully develop the role o f  economics in positive freedom. He reluctantly 
acknowledged ways in which the negative concept o f liberty was prone to be merely 
formal, but he still rejected advancing anything except negative liberty. Despite 
applauding Berlin’s commitment to guard against totalitarianism fostered by rhetoric 
o f those who use the concept o f positive freedom to dominate, I think Berlin failed to 
fully answer questions o f the relationship between freedom to be a “doer” and 
enabling conditions like economic resources. Berlin noted but left unanswered 
problems related to freedom requiring economic resources as enabling conditions.
He acknowledged a broad list o f  obstacles to freedom including “ lack o f food or 
shelter or other necessities o f  life.” '^'
In that way Berlin is like Rawls who recognized background conditions 
including economic resources necessary for freedom. Yet Berlin stated that a lack o f 
ability, like the human’s inability to fly like an eagle, is not a lack o f f re e d o m .T h e n  
Berlin admitted that if  the lack o f  ability is produced by a creation o f  human will or 
human structures, then inability is more like a restraint. The lack o f  clarity arises in 
cases that include inabilities resulting from human choices rather than natural, 
material condition. Berlin said.
What troubles the consciences o f  Western liberals is ...
that the minority who possess it (freedom) have gained
Ibid.
Berlin, TC, 336.
49
it by exploiting or, at least, averting their gaze from, 
the vast majority who do not?^
He noted this problem, but did not resolve it. Similarly, Berlin mentioned the
problem o f  what he called “oppression.” He said that oppression or “economic
slavery” is “being kept in want by a specific arrangement” that is unjust.^’ Berlin did
not fully develop a response to this problem either. He admitted that there were these
problems o f  negative freedom leading to oppression or economic slavery, but he did
not resolve the issues. Berlin admitted that there is a hierarchy o f human needs in
which freedom is not as high as the physical necessities for survival. He said that
“clothes or medicine” might be higher priorities than personal liberty.^* When
decisions must be made about whether a society will promote freedom more than
equality, the voice and power o f  the poor is often unrepresented in the process. Both
the poor and the affluent have the same freedom if freedom is only defined according
to the negative freedom concept. Rawls hoped to resolve this problem by equalizing
the worth o f liberty. Berlin left the problem unsolved. If the poor decided, they
might decide differently than would the affluent. Yet the affluent always control the
power to make that decision.
Berlin acknowledged the complex relationship between the freedom o f some and 
the oppression o f  others. He said, “ If the liberty o f myself or my class or nation
Ibid., 338.
Ibid., 336.
Ibid., 337.
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depends on the m isery o f  a num ber o f  o ther hum an beings, the system which
promotes this is unjust and immoral.”^^  It is true that this statement comes just after a
claim that liberty is not ability or equality. He wrote:
But nothing is gained by a confusion o f terms. To 
avoid glaring inequality or widespread misery I am 
ready to sacrifice some, or all, o f  my freedom: I may 
do so willingly and freely; but it is freedom that I am 
giving up for the sake o f  justice or equality or the love 
o f my fellow men. I should be guilt-stricken, and 
rightly so, if I were not, in some circumstances, ready 
to make this sacrifice. But a sacrifice is not an 
increase in what is being sacrificed, namely freedom, 
however great the moral need or the compensation for 
it. Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not 
equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human 
happiness or a quiet conscience.^”
This illustrates the liberal separation between freedom and ability. However, 
Berlin left out the reality o f conflicting freedoms here. There are cases that pit one 
person’s freedom against another person’s freedom. Freedom may be sacrificed for 
gains in other freedoms. When he says, “everything is what it is” he seems imply 
that freedom is a thing that can be in conflict with other things but not other cases o f 
freedom. The problem is that if  the liberty o f some must be limited in order to secure 
liberty for others, then we must determine what principle should be the criterion for 
this limiting o f  liberty. Sometimes a criterion used to limit liberty is a claim about a 
“higher good” than liberty. Equality is one candidate for a “higher good” which
Ibid.
Ibid., 125.
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could justify limits to liberty.^' Nevertheless, abstract disagreements between the 
virtues o f equality and those o f  liberty lack compelling resolution and result in 
stalemate. A problem that Berlin did not fully address is the extent to which liberty 
must be limited in order to provide equal worth o f liberty to all. Berlin did mention 
the challenge o f  prioritizing liberty against other values. For example, Berlin wrote, 
“shame at gross inequality” is as basic a human experience as “desire for liberty.”^^  
For this reason, Berlin wrote, “We are rightly reminded by R.H. Tawney that the 
liberty o f the strong, whether their strength is physical or economic, must be 
restrained.”^^  Berlin concludes that because all values are not compatible, and we 
must ultimately choose, pluralism is preferable.^"* That is to say, all persons should 
be free to define the good for themselves. This conclusion is like Rawls’s but leaves 
unanswered questions about the extent o f redistribution required to equalize the 
worth o f liberty.
Inadequate attention to the economic resources as enabling conditions for 
freedom in Berlin’s work coincide with his over-generalization o f  M ill’s concept o f 
freedom. Don A. Habibi provides a detailed analysis o f Berlin’s misreading o f Mill, 
in his 2001 monograph, John S/uarf M/// and The £/hic o//fi/man Grow/h. Habibi 
claimed that although Berlin attributed a negative conception o f liberty to Mill,
Dworkin, Sovereign Tir/ue.
B erlin , 346.
”  Ibid.
Ibid., 347.
52
“Berlin’s portrayal o f  Mill is inadequate and ultimately m is ta k e n .F u r th e rm o re , 
although the interpretation o f Mill as a proponent o f negative liberty persists, Habibi 
referenced a number o f  other scholars who consider Mill as an advocate o f positive 
liberty.^^ Thorough evaluation o f M ill’s writing is beyond the scope o f this work. 
However, it is often acknowledged that Mill leaned toward socialism with increasing 
objection to capitalism in his later life. Gertrude Himmelfarb demonstrated M ill’s 
“concessions toward socialism and communism” in successive editions o f Po/Uica/ 
Economy}^  She noted changes in the third edition (1852) where Mill added the line, 
“ It remains to be discovered how far the preservation o f this characteristic (liberty) 
would be found compatible with the Communistic organization o f society. No doubt 
this, like all other objections to the Socialist schemes, is vastly exaggerated.” *^ And 
furthermore, Himmelfarb reflected the significance o f  these lines from M ill’s 
autobiography:
The social problem o f the future we consider to be, 
how to unite the greatest individual liberty o f action 
with a common ownership in the raw material o f the 
globe, and an equal participation o f all in the benefits 
o f  combined labour. ^
Don A. Habibi, Don A. JohnSfuar/M///anc//heE/h/c o///uman Grow/h. 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 123.
Ibid., n. 35
Gertrude Himmelfarb, OnLiher/y andLihera/ism: The Case o/JohnS/uar/ 
Mid. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 126.
Ibid., 127.
Ibid., 137.
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If this analysis is correct, that Mill moved toward the left as his thought 
developed, and then he would be similar to Rawls in that respect. Berlin’s reading o f 
Mill seems to have missed what Habibi and others note as the way in which M ill’s 
stress on individuality and human growth overlap with the positive notion o f 
freedom as self-determination. Rawls noted the influence o f M ill’s concept o f 
individuality in relationship to his own notion o f autonomy.'*” His attempt to 
delineate a clear line between personal and political autonomy persists as a problem.
To identify positive freedom, Berlin suggested the question, “Who 
determines what 1 do?”'" Although Berlin cautioned against the use o f positive 
freedom as a guise for authoritarianism, he recognized the complexity o f freedom 
beyond the strictly negative conception. Berlin argued that negative freedom was the 
only freedom the state should defend, but did not solve the problems he raised 
related to the social construction o f provisions to make freedom meaningful for the 
poor. Berlin also left unanswered the problems o f oppressive systems that force the 
poor to work without real opportunity to influence the conditions or terms o f  their 
work. But the most important question left unanswered is the problem o f  how to 
respond to inequalities in the worth o f liberty. Liberalism continues to hammer out 
answers to the questions o f conflict between negative and positive aspects o f 
freedom. In order for a person to have freedom, systems must exist that provide for
Rawls, LP, p. 146.
Berlin, TC, 132.
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the expression o f  the indlvIduaPs will. At the same time, the liberty o f  one person 
circumscribes the scope o f another person’s liberty. Positive freedom must be 
understood as freedom realized through material conditions o f freedom, social 
support for freedom, and acts o f  the will, work, and construction requiring self- 
fulfillment or self-realization.
After Berlin; The Ongoing Debate over Positive Freedom
Rawls acknowledged Berlin’s influence on this thinking about freedom, 
but chose not to address the concept o f positive freedom himself*^ This direction 
was set from early on in his writing when he cited the influence o f  Gerald 
MacCallum’s analysis about the two concepts o f freedom.'*^ Having reviewed 
Berlin’s writing on positive versus negative freedom, I move forward to review 
various reactions to Berlin, including M acCallum’s. My goal is to explore 
alternative evaluations o f MacCallum’s moves as well as to acknowledge the lively 
debate that continues regarding positive freedom. In his article, “Negative and 
Positive Freedom,” Gerald MacCallum argued that Berlin’s attempt to distinguish 
between negative and positive conceptions o f liberty does not hold up. He argued 
that there is only one conception o f liberty, and it is always “triadic” All statements
Rawls, PL, 299, n. 16.
Rawls, TJ, 201.
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about freedom refer to the freedom o f  x from y to do The nature o f the obstacle
represented by y or the description o f  the goal o f freedom represented by z may be
defined differently, but the positive and negative categories are not helpful,
according to MacCallum. Rawls followed MacCallum on this point as indicated in
his footnote on his initial explanation o f  his own conception o f freedom.'*^
MacCallum was following the work o f  Felix Oppenheim who attempted to apply
rigors o f  behavioral analysis to the concept o f freedom. In his 1961 work.
Dimensions o/Freedom, Oppenheim wrote.
As an effective weapon in the ideological power 
struggle, liberty assumes a different meaning according 
to the speaker’s position within the power hierarchy.
As a fruitful concept in scientific discourse freedom 
must have a universal and valuationally neutral
46meaning.
Rawls followed Oppenheim in separating the term liberty from the worth o f  liberty. 
But, Rawls did not attend with enough care to Oppenheim’s insights regarding the 
role o f  influence and power in relationship to freedom. Oppenheim wrote, “ ... the 
economically powerful can make it impossible for the poor to pursue certain courses
47
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o f action and necessary for them to accept disadvantageous bargains.”'** Although 
Rawls certainly intended to correct this type o f injustice, his dismissal o f  positive 
freedom contributed to later criticism. In his chapter on social freedom, Oppenheim 
said, “ I do believe that those who speak o f freedom in a political context refer most 
often -  but often unknowingly— to freedom as a relation between actors.”'*^
Although I agree that is frequently what people mean when they speak o f  freedom, 1 
think there is a type o f power o f  the individual to develop a self that is set aside in 
Oppenheim’s work. This is the same mistake Rawls makes regarding his definition 
o f freedom. Rawls’s own attempts to solve these complexities regarding freedom 
and the use o f freedom are examined more fully below.
Despite MacCallum’s attempt to eradicate the distinction between positive 
and negative freedom, scholarship related to difference between positive and 
negative freedom continues. Therefore, an overview o f the enduring interest in 
positive freedom in current literature deserves some attention. Numerous voices 
rejecting M acCallum’s argument will be reviewed here in an effort to seek a clearer 
definition o f  positive liberty. One problem in sorting through this literature is that 
there are multiple definitions o f positive freedom. My first point is simply that 
although Rawls was convinced by MacCallum’s and Oppenheim’s dismissal o f the 
distinction between two types o f  freedom, many scholars remain unconvinced on this
Ibid. 
Ibid., 109.
57
point. This only indicates that positive freedom has not been totally discarded as a 
potential building block for political theory.
In contrast to those that reject Berlin’s distinction, some thinkers continue to 
defend and develop the difference between positive and negative freedom. I do not 
assume that each o f  these writers uses the term “positive freedom” in precisely the 
same way. Yet, I assert that this ongoing debate over positive freedom can be sorted 
out with the help o f  three aspects o f positive freedom: economic power as enabling 
conditions, social or relational freedom in systems, and acts o f well for individual 
self-development.
This unresolved question about the agent or subject who is free generates
various feminist critiques o f  the distinction between positive and negative liberty.
Nancy J. Hirschmann rejects Berlin’s distinction in her work on revisioning freedom.
She acknowledged that “negative liberty plays a prominent part in the ideological
and political landscape o f  the West.” °^ However, she claimed that both positive and
negative concepts are gender biased models. She wrote.
Positive libertarians such as Rousseau and Hegel 
similarly denied women’s rationality, requiring them to 
adopt very particularized and structured roles within 
the family as a means o f guaranteeing the stability o f 
the state.^'
50 Nancy J. Hirschmann, Jievis/on/ng/hePo/ïlica/ipà) Nancy J. Hirschmann and
Christine Di Stefano, (Boulder, Colorado, 1996), 54. 
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This illustrates the tendency to consider Rousseau and Hegel the paradigmatic 
models o f advocates o f positive liberty. However, the emphasis on economic power 
as a condition o f freedom is part o f  the positive liberty tradition that is unrelated to 
gender issues. Hirschmann did not deny a real distinction between positive and 
negative freedom, but criticized the historical use o f both concepts. Hirschmann said, 
“Positive liberty has developed as more o f a leftist (though sometimes rightist) 
reaction to liberalism’s individualistic tendencies.”^^  She admitted that not just 
women, but also the poor, have been excluded from both the exercise and the 
opportunities o f  fre e d o m .W h ile  I agree that concepts o f  positive liberty can be 
used without concern for gender justice, I will argue that positive liberty conceptions 
are more likely to advocate on behalf o f the poor. If economic implications o f 
positive freedom are developed, then Hirschmann’s critique o f  positive liberty would 
be deflated.
Peter P. Nicholson also argued against M acCallum’s move. Nicholson 
defended the distinction between positive and negative freedom not only as Berlin 
developed the concepts, but drawing on earlier roots in the work o f T.H. Green. 
Nicholson argued that “MacCallum’s application o f his analysis to the debate about 
negative versus positive freedom, however, is problematic in Green’s case.’’^ '* He
Ibid., 54.
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acknowledged that Green’s concept o f  real freedom could be expressed in triadic
terms, but this only shows that it has the “same formal structure” as negative
freedom. Nicholson claimed that a “fundamental difference between the two senses
o f freedom” exists because real freedom, as a moral concept, is qualitatively
different. The shared triadic form is irrelevant to the distinction Green was after.
This may show that real freedom has the same formal 
structure as negative freedom (“<g/a person Jrom 
coercion by other persons /«s'do as he likes”), but it 
fails to capture Green’s essential meaning.
MacCallum’s very success in reducing real and 
negative freedom to a single form signals his omission 
o f the pivotal difference between them, for this is one 
o f content, not form. The main point, so far as Green is 
concerned, is that negative freedom is a legal concept 
and denotes an area in which the individual is given 
the opportunity to act as he chooses and in particular to 
do what is morally wrong as well as what is morally 
right. Real freedom, on the other hand, is a moral 
concept and denotes the individual’s doing, or having a 
character which is disposed to do, what is morally 
right.^^
Although Green’s conception o f  positive liberty has been criticized for lack o f 
clarity, Nicholson and others continue to insist that something important is left out if 
freedom is reduced to merely its negative aspect.^^ Like Nicholson, Avital Simhony 
also analyzed T.H. Green’s view o f  freedom and similarly concluded that “negative
Ibid., 124.
Ben Wempe, T.//. Green’sTAeo/y ofFosi/iveFreedom. {(Z\\dtx\çi\XQ.%V\\\Q, 
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freedom has to be supplemented by enabling conditions.”^^  These enabling 
conditions relate to economic power and its relationship to political voice.
Significant consequences o f these two competing notions o f freedom include
polarity over economic policy. Robert Goodin demonstrated that “The classical
debate over the impact o f the welfare state on freedom turns on the distinction
between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ freedom.” *^ Goodin argued that the terms should
both be used in tandem, and criticized Rawls for discarding the notion o f  positive
freedom. Goodin wrote,
Positive liberty determines, in Rawls’s (1972, sec 32) 
terms, the ‘worth’ o f  negative liberty. Rawls himself 
takes this as an excuse for ignoring positive liberty, 
since it is not, strictly speaking, an aspect o f  liberty at 
all. But the real effect o f this move is surely to 
upgrade rather than downgrade those things that go 
into making liberty valuable. I can see no plausible 
reason for championing or cherishing worthless 
liberties.^^
Although Goodin admitted M acCallum’s point, he maintained the importance o f  
integrating both conceptions o f freedom.
Despite these rejections o f M acCallum’s claim to have done away with 
Berlin’s two concepts o f  liberty, there are others who would agree with Rawls that
Avital Simhony, “Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom: T.H. Green’s View 
of Freedom ” / ^ û / / / / c a '/ 21, No. 1 (February 1993), 54.
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MacCallum’s solution works. For example. Tara Smith, in her 1995 work, Mora/ 
Jifghts andFo/itica/Freedom, agreed, that there is no need for a positive conception 
o f liberty. In fact, she vehemently argued that resistance to the notion o f positive 
liberty was required to “safeguard freedom.” She wrote, “ I must show why this 
bifurcation o f freedom is unwarranted. In order to safeguard freedom, it is crucial 
that we understand exactly why the notion o f positive freedom is invalid.” ”^ Despite 
the urgency o f  her concern to prove the notion invalid, her argument fails. The only 
argument she provided is circular because o f the way in which she defined freedom. 
She wrote, “Freedom is the absence o f  others’ use o f force against a person’s will.” '^ 
Since that is what Berlin called negative freedom, this already precludes the concept 
Berlin intended to express in his term “positive freedom.” However, Smith did make 
a helpful distinction by pointing out that there are two major strains within the 
discussion o f  positive freedom. She called these “Enabling Conditions” and the 
“ Ideal Deployment” models o f  positive freedom Some advocates o f  positive 
freedom claim that true freedom conforms with some normative criteria expressing 
the higher self or true self. In other words, they use the rhetoric o f  promoting 
freedom while actually attempting to deploy or promote another ideal. For example, 
in repressive regimes it has been argued that no one is truly free until they are made
^  Tara Smith, Mora/FighfsandFo/idca/Freedom. (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995), 165.
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to conform to the ideals o f the state. This would be what Smith called the ideal 
deployment type o f  positive freedom. This type o f  argument made Berlin wary, just 
as it made Smith reject the notion o f  positive liberty altogether. Smith identified but 
did not develop the other type o f  positive liberty, which she called enabling 
conditions o f  positive liberty. This is the type o f positive liberty that most clearly 
related to economic conditions. Some advocates o f positive freedom stress that 
certain conditions are required in order to allow a person to exercise freedom. For 
example, certain levels o f  nutrition and economic stability are required in order to 
make voting rights real. Although Smith dismisses the validity o f opportunity 
conditions because these do not fit with her own definition o f freedom as “to control 
one’s own actions from others’ use o f physical force,” her term, “Enabling 
Conditions” is useful. I disagree with her conclusion that positive liberty is not a 
valid concept, but I will use her distinction between enabling conditions and ideal 
deployment.
Unfortunately, some types o f  “ideal deployment,” foster total itarians. 
Disrespecting the autonomy o f a person, while at the same time encouraging her to 
serve a common good that does not include her own good, has been accomplished 
using rhetoric drawing on the concept o f positive liberty. It is no wonder the 
reaction against positive liberty o f  that type advocates radical individualism with a 
primary concern for self. Nevertheless, there may be some way to guard against 
ideal deployment in service o f  dominance while actually promoting the exercise o f
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autonomy underwritten by access to resources. This possibility is illustrated in the 
historical development o f  the language o f freedom in contrast to slavery.
The link between economic power and positive liberty is developed by a
number o f thinkers inclined toward socialism. Peter Self, in his 1991 discussion o f
socialism, attested to the polarization between those who promote positive liberty
and those who promote negative liberty. The tendency to reduce the definition o f
liberty to only include negative liberty, and then to ignore problems o f positive
liberty related to poverty concerned Self. He wrote:
Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) well-known distinction between 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ liberty has been perverted by 
extreme liberals (libertarians) into the argument that 
only the negative form o f  liberty is real and that it 
should be restrictively interpreted as the absence o f 
direct coercion.^^
Maria Dimova-Cookson provided an argument related to concern for the 
freedom o f  the poor in her essay, “A New Scheme o f Positive and Negative 
Freedom.” Insisting that there is an important substantive difference between 
negative and positive freedom she wrote, “The concept o f positive freedom 
expresses the idea that those who have the resources to lead a better life should use 
these resources to improve the well-being o f others.”^^  Her attempt is to reconstruct
^^Peter S e lf “Socialism, "in (ed.) Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit. J  
Companion fo Conlempora/yFo/if/ca/P/n7osop/iy. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 340.
^  Maria Dimova-Cookson, “A New Scheme o f Positive and Negative Freedom,” 
Fo/i7ica/T/ieory, 31, No. 4, (August 2003), 524.
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T H. Green’s argument making a distinction between “ordinary and moral” types o f
goods that we pursue resulting in the two distinct types o f freedom. She wrote;
One can be negatively free only in a society o f 
conscientious citizens who respect each others’ right to 
choose freely. Respecting other people’s rights is a 
moral act and, therefore, an exercise o f  positive 
freedom. To press this point further, if negative 
freedom is as important as Berlin believes, then we 
have to do more for it than simply restrain from 
interfering with the others: both juristic and negative 
freedoms are increased by positive action. In other 
words, diminishing intervention does not increase 
negative freedoms as much as providing actual help, 
that is, acting as an agent o f  positive freedom.
Motivated by questions o f  distributive justice as related to
freedom, she was not troubled by the Rawlsian concern with
remaining neutral on conceptions o f the good. She wrote:
Whether we are agents o f positive or negative freedom, 
we are dealing with very much the same issue: we are 
demonstrating awareness about the unequal 
distribution o f resources in a society and the belief that 
this could be mended by some form o f redistribution.^^
The economic and material conditions necessary for the realization o f
freedom justify limitations on some types o f freedom in order to promote others,
according to her view. She said:
Berlin is right to claim that the advocacy o f positive 
freedom is linked to moral pressure onto others. The 
defense o f  Green is that this moral pressure is narrowly 
targeted and justified. The concept o f  positive freedom
Ibid., 525.
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is based on the understanding that the amount o f 
(juristic) freedom we have (i.e., the amount o f power 
to do things) depends on the social arrangement, and 
we are in a position to change these arrangements 
through legislative reforms. ^
For example, imagine a woman who works ten hours a day in a free trade zone
factory. She leaves her five children with her sister and her two children in the shack
they all share. In this home constructed o f tin, cardboard, and scraps o f  wood, they
sleep on boards with no pillows or sheets. They eat rice and beans cooked on a fire
outside. With no running water in the house they wash outside and use a latrine.
The wages o f  less than two dollars a day barely cover food costs. Any extra funds
are saved for things like medicine or shoes. In the negative sense o f liberty she is
free. On the other hand, their living conditions look amazingly similar to slave
quarters. Poverty shapes the positive sense o f freedom o f her children who are
unable to attend public school because they do not have money for fees or supplies.
In her neighborhood, a cluster o f comparable shacks, families do not even name
newborns until they are one year old, because so many infants die in early months o f
life. Despite the emotional reactions raised by this type o f example, if there are such
cases, they pose a serious problem for proponents o f only a strictly negative concept
o f freedom. Ability to influence labor conditions, wages, and the significant role o f
work in human life depends on a positive sense o f  freedom that cannot be understood
apart from economic systems.
Ibid., 521.
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The structural and institutional provision for freedom depends on the
cooperation o f individuals concerned with mutual respect for the good o f  others.
Whereas Rawls argued that such cooperation is purely rational, Dimova-Cookson
viewed it as “moral” rather than merely practical. She wrote:
In the case o f  positive freedom, the agent exercises his 
freedom in his capacity as a ‘producer’ o f moral goods; 
in the case o f  negative freedom, the agent is a 
‘recipient’ o f  such goods^*.
In this way, her distinction between negative and positive liberty is even sharper than
the one drawn by Berlin.
The charge that Rawls’s work is overly individualistic is the subject o f 
numerous criticisms o f his work. Although those are beyond the scope o f  this work, 
the understanding o f the self and o f  the good cannot be totally divorced from a 
conception o f freedom. The notion o f positive freedom assumes that concern for 
one’s freedom and opportunities is inseparably linked with being in a world in which 
the freedom and opportunities o f  others are also valued. The theme o f  community or 
collective life in Rawls’s writing must be examined to consider his vulnerability to 
criticisms based on the positive conception o f freedom. Thus, the relationship o f 
freedom to resources, community, and labor are important to understanding the 
positive notion o f liberty.
It has been argued that as a group sometimes disadvantaged economically, 
women have had less freedom in the positive sense even if they had the same
Ibid., 524.
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political freedoms for free speech or voting. In her essay entitled, “Enquiries for 
Liberators,” Janet Radcliffe Richards argued that women’s experience provides one 
illustration o f  the way that “different social arrangements” create advantages for 
different groups.^^ Thus, she claimed that not only absence o f  direct coercion, but 
access to power determines freedom. She argued that “people are free to the extent 
that they are in control o f  their own destinies.”™ Although she did not use the terms 
positive and negative freedom, she contended that “within a social context freedom 
and power are virtually the same.” '^ This emphasis on freedom as more than the 
absence o f  restraint suggests that a strictly negative concept o f freedom is inadequate 
to capture the political meaning o f  the term freedom. Richards wrote, “Your freedom 
is restricted by society to the extent that different social arrangements might have 
made it possible to do more o f  what you wanted.”’^
Lawrence Crocker agreed that there was something important in the 
distinction between positive and negative liberty. He, too, criticized MacCallum’s 
argument. Crocker wrote:
About two claims I am pretty sure that MacCallum is
wrong. The first is that there are not different kinds o f
Janet Radcliffe Richards, “Enquiries for Liberators,” Socia/Fo/ifica/ 
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liberty. If legal liberty has a more restricted set o f 
preventing conditions than social liberty, as it does on 
nearly all accounts, why not say that legal liberty is 
one kind o f liberty and social another? The kidnap 
victim is free to escape with respect to legal freedom, 
since there is no law against escape, while perhaps, not 
being free to escape with respect to broader freedom.
The point here is that the triadic form o f  freedom is all well and good, but there is 
still something important in that the distinction between positive and negative 
liberty. The social and economic conditions o f meaningful freedom are what Rawls 
knew had to be addressed for what he called the worth o f  liberty to be real.
Rawls addressed the issue o f slavery a number o f  times. Not surprisingly, he
denounced slavery as an unjust institution. He cited the work o f Orlando Patterson
equating slavery with “social death.” "^* Rawls said.
To take an extreme case, slaves are human beings who 
are not counted as sources o f claims, not even claims 
based on social duties or obligations, for slaves are not 
counted as capable o f  having duties or 
obligations...This contrast with slavery makes clear 
why conceiving o f citizens as free persons in virtue o f 
their moral powers and their having a conception o f the 
good goes with a particular political conception o f 
justice.^^
Lawrence Crocker, Pos///veLiberty. (Boston: Martinus N ijhoff Publishers. 
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The richer content o f  the concept o f positive freedom as social construction can be 
seen more clearly in relationship to the writing o f Orlando Patterson on freedom. 
Patterson’s sociological analysis o f freedom begins with the claim that the notion o f 
freedom developed in connection with the realities o f  slavery, economic systems of 
labor, and the earliest development o f democracy. He said that the Greek notion o f 
freedom can be traced through the development o f the language. He wrote, “There is 
clear philological evidence o f a growth in the appreciation o f the free status o f  the 
citizen with the growth o f  slavery and the resident alien population during the sixth 
c e n t u r y . W h a t  it means to be a not-slave is to have economic power. To be free 
is not just to be left alone, but is also to have access to necessities for constructing a 
life.
In an essay entitled, “Two Concepts o f Liberty Through African Eyes,” 
Chisanga N. Siame offered a parallel analysis o f  the importance o f  the positive 
concept o f  liberty based on the experience o f slavery in Africa. Once again, status is 
at the center o f  liberty. Siame argued that in Africa the idea o f freedom developed in 
contrast to the reality o f slavery. The pre-colonial ChiBemba word for slavery 
referred to those who had “slipped socioeconomically to a level considered sub-free 
and indeed sub-“human.”^^  The economic power o f  independence protected the 
status o f  persons. “To be independent therefore simply means to be free, which in
Orlando Patterson, Freec/om. (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 79.
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turn means to be fully human as opposed to having a servile or sub-“human” 
status.”’* Siame concluded that Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative 
liberty is important, but that Berlin’s dismissive criticism o f positive freedom was 
unfair. Siame wrote, “By understanding the meaning o f ‘freedom’ in a Zambian 
context, we may conclude that Berlin was wrong in maintaining that only ‘negative 
freedom’ is true freedom.”’  ^ The limits o f our freedom are constructed through 
social systems. Positive freedom required voice and power in shaping those systems. 
Slavery is the opposite o f  self-determination.*® Reiterating that freedom is a matter o f 
degree rather than an either/or quality o f life, it helps to consider the extreme case o f 
slavery as the opposite o f freedom. If it can be shown that cases o f  extreme poverty 
amount to something very like slavery, then such cases need to be addressed by 
theories o f  justice.
Imagine a farmer who wants to continue farming land that has been in his 
family for generations. Care o f the land involves a relationship with this precious 
natural resource. Farming was historically referred to as “husbandry” because it 
involves far more than mere production. Too often farmers have been forced by 
economic circumstances to sell their land. Yet, no direct coercion is involved. There 
is no infringement o f  their freedom in the negative sense o f freedom. There are forms
’* Ibid., 56.
Ibid., 66.
*° On freedom as self-determination see James Bohman “Republican 
CosmopoWianism,’' Jdur/ia/q//’o////ca//’////osop/iy, 12, No. 3 (2004), pp. 336-352.
71
o f inability that are not the result o f  coercion. But, this example is different than an 
unavoidable case o f  lack o f  ability. If the farmer wanted to be a doctor but was not 
smart enough, or wanted to be a movie star but was not handsome enough, or wanted 
to be a public speaker but was not articulate enough, we would accept that his lack o f 
ability as an inevitability that must be accepted. But in the case o f  his desire to 
continue farming the land, we know that his economic problems are the result o f  
complex financial systems that have been constructed through historical decisions 
and can be remedied through economic adjustments. His freedom in the positive 
sense requires financial resources possible through a socially constructed system. 
Again the negative freedom and positive freedom are in tension. So despite 
commitment to free markets, we subsidize farming in the United States to support 
farmers in their freedom to continue farming. Positive freedom requires economic 
resources and social cooperation. It also requires self-determination as acts o f 
human will.
In his essay, “W hat’s Wrong With Negative Liberty?” Charles Taylor sought 
to balance the concern for individual self-realization with the need for collective self- 
realization. Regarding the distinction between positive and negative liberty, Taylor 
wrote, “ I believe it is undeniable that there are two such families o f  conceptions o f 
political freedom abroad in our civilization.”*' He traced the theories o f Rousseau 
and Marx as fitting in the category o f  positive freedom, but also included the views
*' Charles Taylor, “W hat’s Wrong with Negative Liberty.” The /c/ea o f Freec/om 
(Oxford) 1979), 175.
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“which owe something to the ancient republican tradition, according to which men’s 
ruling themselves is seen as an activity valuable in itself, and not only for 
instrumental reasons.”*^  Taylor argued that the concept o f  positive freedom 
corresponds to what he called an “exercise concept” whereas negative freedom is the 
conception that is an “opportunity concept.” A person can exercise freedom through 
development o f self and personal agency. On the other hand, the opportunity for 
freedom o f self-expression can be limited or negated by restrictions on freedom. In 
some ways this distinction parallels the distinction that Nussbaum made between 
functioning and capability, described in more detail in Chapter three. Taylor’s 
interest in positive liberty dealt primarily with issues o f self-concept rather than 
economic realities. When he examined freedom as an expression o f 
“frustration/fulfillment o f our purposes”*^  he seemed to assume the fulfillment o f 
property resources required for basic survival. Further examination o f  the property 
resources required and the ways in which those resources can be provided must be 
included in the proposals for promoting freedom. We might wish that Taylor had 
developed this further. Positive freedom, as freedom exercised, involves action o f the 
will. This supports my claim that both concepts o f freedom are useful.
John Gray agreed that an important distinction between positive and negative 
conceptions o f  freedom does exist. He rejected M acCallum’s argument that the
Ibid., 175-176.
Ibid., 191.
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triadic structure o f  freedom does away with the substantive tensions between various
types o f  freedom. Gray wrote.
Finally, it seems hard, if  not impossible, to 
accommodate within MacCallum’s triadic analysis the 
conception o f individual freedom as possessing a 
certain social status, which Berlin later discusses in 
another context.*"*
Gray continued to develop this distinction in his own later writing. He
defined positive liberty as autonomy, and criticized Rawls for failing to adequately
address conflicts among types o f  freedom. Gray wrote:
The value o f  negative liberty must therefore be 
theorised in terms o f its contribution to something 
other than itself, which does possess intrinsic value. In 
truth, it seems clear that the chief value o f negative 
liberty is in its contribution to the positive liberty o f 
autonomy. By autonomy is meant the condition in 
which persons can be at least part authors o f  their lives, 
in that they have before them a range o f  worthwhile 
options, in respect o f which their choices are not 
fettered by coercion and with regard to which they 
possess the capacities and resources presupposed by a 
reasonable measure o f success in their self-chosen path 
among these options.*^
But the path chosen by the self is conditioned, limited, and also made possible by the
society’s choices. Even a person’s abilities can be restricted or expanded by the
policies o f the community in which they live. Gray appreciated the insight o f
*"* John Gray, L/ôera//sms. ( New York: Routledge, 1989), 49.
John Gray, Beyond//?eNew/i/ghf. (New York: Routledge, 
1993), 78.
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Rousseau and Hegel that freedom is realized through the state. In other words,
freedom is constructed. Gray wrote:
Autonomy is not free-standing. It is a complex 
achievement, encompassing (among a good many 
other necessary ingredients) the absence o f  coercion, 
the possession and exercise o f skills in choice-making 
and an environment which contains an array o f options 
that are worth choosing. Judgments o f  autonomy stand 
on a view o f the good life. They are always grounded 
in beliefs about what makes life worth living.*^
Although Gray does not think a proper balance o f positive and negative liberties can
be clearly determined through liberalism, he did recognize the distinction between
the two conceptions o f freedom. Thus, Gray disagreed with MacCallum that there is
no significant difference between positive and negative freedom. The following
example illustrates Gray’s point.
Consider a family from the Marshall Islands who want to return to their 
island that was evacuated in the I940’s so that atomic testing could be conducted. 
Their community leaders made a deal with the United States. There was no direct 
coercion in the exchange. At least the representatives o f  the people on the island 
were free to enter this agreement. But it seems the people did not have the 
information that the islands would be uninhabitable for decades. The people who 
were evacuated in 1946 and were returned in 1974, only to be told in 1976 that they 
would have to leave again. New evidence showed that levels o f radiation were still 
dangerously high. The freedom to continue their ways o f  life on their island may not
^  John Gray, Two Faces o/L/6era//sm. (New York: The New Press, 2000), 100.
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be fulfilled in the foreseeable future at all. The people o f Bikini Atoll in the 
Marshall Islands were addressed by a US military governor on Sunday, February 10, 
1946 after church services. Drawing on the authority o f Christian scripture to 
convince them o f  the “necessity o f  relocation” the governor compared the island 
people to the “children o f Israel whom the Lord saved from their enemies and led 
unto the Promised Land.” They were told that their island was needed for testing that 
would “ lead to peace and freedom for all humankind.”*’ Less than two weeks after 
this address, the people had been moved to another island. The positive sense o f 
freedom, the freedom to be a culture o f  island people, to be subjects, not objects was 
in direct conflict with the freedom to enter in to this economic exchange. 
Determinations about what makes life worth living are both individual and social or 
cultural. Autonomy requires resources as well as collective power.
What has traditionally been accepted as a separation between political
freedom and economic freedom, or a distinction between personal and political
freedom becomes problematic. In order to more fully explicate the complexity o f
positive freedom, consider the definition o f freedom offered by T. H. Green.
If the ideal o f true freedom is the maximum of power 
for all members o f human society alike to make the 
best o f  themselves, we are right in refusing to ascribe 
the glory o f  freedom to a state in which the apparent 
elevation o f the few is founded on the degradation o f 
the many. ..I f  I have given a true account o f  that 
freedom which forms the goal o f social effort, we shall
87 Robert C.Kiste, The Bih'nians: Â S/udy in Forcée/Migration. (London:
Cummings Publishing, Co.,Inc., 1974), 27-28.
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see that freedom o f contract, freedom in all the forms 
o f doing what one will with one’s own, is valuable 
only as a means to an end. That end is what I call 
freedom in the positive sense: in other words, the 
liberation o f the powers o f  all men equally for 
contributions to a common good.**
Green’s definition o f positive freedom as “the liberation o f  the powers o f all” has
consequences not only for political institutions, but for economic and interpersonal
relationships as well. Sometimes there is internal conflict as well as external conflict
influencing a person. Freedom from addiction is one example o f positive freedom. T.
H. Green, in his essay, “Liberal Legislation,” presented an example o f  how giving up
one liberty might lead to becoming more free in general. He wrote about the citizens
o f England debating over liquor laws. He said that laws had already been passed to
regulate labor, child abuse, and building construction, and in each case people were
prevented from some liberty, but “the result was a great addition to the real freedom
of society.”*^  He went on to argue that liquor laws could likewise promote freedom
in society. He wrote.
There is no right to freedom in the purchase and sale o f 
a particular commodity, if  the general result of 
allowing such freedom is to detract from freedom in 
the higher sense, from the general power o f men to 
make the best o f themselves.^"
An obvious problem is the impossibility o f  reaching agreement over the question o f
what constitutes a person’s àes/. If this definition o f positive freedom can be made
Green, 200.
*" Ibid., 212.
Ibid., 210.
77
to work it would have to specify terms and conditions for a person’s àes/to be 
determined by that person’s own free exercise o f judgment.
A more contemporary example based on Green’s argument might be related to 
drug or alcohol screening in school or workplace. There is a kind o f  calculus that 
can be done comparing the reduction in the individual’s freedom to pursue altered 
states o f  consciousness with the public’s freedom that is secured by safety and 
sobriety in public space. But, the second aspect o f  freedom is not merely about the 
conflicting freedoms o f  the one and the many. It might be said that preventing a 
person from riding a motorcycle without a helmet is only the beginning o f  liberating 
their full potential.
What examples can we offer to illustrate the potential tension between these 
two notions o f freedom? Drug or alcohol addiction is one example o f an obstacle to 
positive liberty. However, it could be argued that it is a case o f private or personal 
freedom not a matter o f  political freedom at all. Although some have suggested that 
the difference between positive and negative freedom is related to the distinction 
between internal and external freedom or public and private spheres o f liberty, 
several examples illustrates that such distinctions are slippery. In contrast to the 
seemingly personal or private example o f  drug addiction, the example o f wealth 
addiction might be an example that begins to push at the borders o f  what is 
understood to be political freedom. Cultural messages suggesting that material 
wealth and material pleasures are the surest form o f  the good life present a danger 
not unlike the totalitarianism control o f tyrannical regimes. The criticism o f
78
American culture from Islamic and other perspectives argues that the seduction o f 
western materialism is as powerful a tool for brain-washing as any other. Wealth 
addiction may be a disease like drug addiction. It has been said that a eonsumer who 
continually fuels the economy by purchasing goods may become addicted to the 
pleasures o f  materialism just as a drug addict is addicted to the fix. Driven by a 
voracious appetite to use material wealth for dominance, prestige, and self-esteem, 
such consumers need more and more immediate gratification through compulsive 
spending. The consumer begins to feel incapable o f  living within her means. 
Mounting debt, excessive environmental damage, and expanding expectations o f 
necessities result. Just as in Green’s example o f the drunk, in this case the whole 
society is affected. When taken to excess, conspicuous consumption diminishes 
creativity and freedom to live in harmony with nature. The freedom to exploit 
natural resources, compete for the cheapest labor, and dominate markets to secure 
the best deal all have global consequences. The freedom o f  the entrepreneurs to 
convince buyers that they need a product can be in conflict with the common good. 
The freedom o f consumers to pursue the purchase o f products they believe they need 
can be in conflict with their own best interests. From warning labels on cigarettes, 
medications, and power tools, we see the interest o f  the state in regulating safety and 
environmental impact o f the market. Action in the market place often has political 
consequences. The line demarcating what is political action as opposed to other 
actions that are apolitical is far from clear.
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These illustrations demonstrate that negative freedom can be in direct 
conflict with positive freedom. The child o f a wealthy family is free to choose among 
many fine universities. But, the prestigious universities who lack cultural diversity 
due to prohibitive tuition costs may unknowingly limit the freedom o f  their students 
to experience the fullest range o f learning. Constraining limits in innovation and 
sensitivity result inadvertently because o f  the economic system that both shapes and 
perpetuates elite education. On the other hand, if  the child o f a wealthy family 
chooses to experience vastly different cultural perspectives by selecting a university 
where more average, and thus more diverse students share education, this wealthy 
student may sacrifice certain privileged freedoms like entrance in elite circles while 
at the same time increasing personal freedom to create a self. On the other hand, the 
poorest families may not be free to choose university education at all. There is no 
law preventing them, but lack o f  confidence, personal support, and financial 
resources may prevent them. Is this lack o f  freedom the result o f  a precondition, 
which is natural or conventional? In other words, is the lack o f freedom caused by 
political choices that could be changed? A person barely surviving by working 
several jobs and living hand-to-mouth is not free in comparison with a person who 
inherited a fortune and lives o ff investment income. Is the struggling worker really 
free to participate in political process to change the system? In a certain type o f 
redistributive economic system, this type o f freedom could be equalized. So this 
arrangement is historically constructed and not natural in the sense o f being 
inevitable. The lack o f  freedom could be avoided.
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One hallmark o f  a liberal society is the freedom from interference in many 
areas o f  life. This is no small improvement over feudal systems or despotic 
monarchies. As feudalism ended and the nation state emerged, the individual 
freedoms were recognized as liberties states should defend. The liberal tradition 
developed the negative notion o f freedom without adequately considering the 
positive notion. More recently, the writings o f  John Rawls offer a clear example o f 
liberal political philosophy that champions freedom. Benjamin Constant’s “freedom 
o f the ancients” consists in “active and constant participation in collective power” 
contrasted with modem “private independence.” Although Rawls never 
mentioned positive liberty again after his early dismissal o f its importance, he did 
struggle in later works to clarify his position in relationship to Constant’s republican 
freedom. Although Constant’s notion o f public freedom differs somewhat from the 
notion o f  positive freedom, the two concepts are related. Rawls’s theory could have 
been strengthened by expanding his understanding o f  freedom to include the positive 
notion o f  liberty. In each o f  the examples o f  positive freedom described above, the 
dynamics o f  access to material resources, community power, and self-development 
or act o f  the will through labor are central. These are aspects o f positive freedom 
that the concept o f negative freedom leaves out. Therefore, in order to analyze the 
possibilities that a critique o f  Rawls from the application o f the concept o f positive
Benjamin Constant, “The Liberty o f the Ancients,” (1819), 275-276.
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liberty could develop, I will examine the relationship between freedom and material 
resources, freedom and community, and freedom and labor in Rawls’s writing.
Positive freedom must be understood as freedom realized through material 
conditions o f  freedom, social support for freedom, and acts o f the will, work, and 
construction requiring self-fulfillment or self-realization.
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CHAPTER TWO 
POSITIVE FREEDOM IN PERPETUAL PEACE
Just as we view with deep disdain the attachment o f savages to their 
lawless freedom— preferring to scuffle without end rather than to 
place themselves under lawful restraints that they themselves 
constitute, consequently preferring a mad freedom to a rational one -  
and consider it barbarous, rude, and brutishly degrading o f humanity, 
so also should we think that civilized peoples (each one united into a 
nation) would hasten as quickly as possible to escape so similar a 
state o f  abandonment.
-Immanuel Kant'
Thus categorical imperatives are possible because the Idea o f  freedom 
makes me a member o f an intelligible world.
-Immanuel Kant.^
The penultimate line o f  TAeZaw o f/’eo/?/esreaWxrms Rawls’s philosophical
kinship with Kant. As the strategic capstone o f his last major work, Rawls wrote this
concluding line:
If a reasonably just Society o f Peoples whose members 
subordinate their power to reasonable aims is not 
possible, and human beings are largely amoral, if not 
incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask, 
with Kant, whether it is worthwhile for human beings 
to live on earth.^
I Kant, Perpe/ua/Peace, 115.
 ^Kant, Pounda/ions o//he Me/aphysics 0/ Mora/s. Trans.Lewis White Beck. 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990),71.
 ^ Rawls, LP, 128.
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The international application o f  Rawls’s theory o f justice bears unmistakable 
resemblance to Immanuel Kant’s essay, “Perpetual Peace.” Despite some important 
differences, these two writings should be read in tandem. Before reviewing the 
influence o f Kant on Rawls’s theory, a brief review o f Kant’s notion o f  freedom is 
required. More specifically, the connection o f Kant’s notion o f positive freedom to 
his argument in “Perpetual Peace” is the target o f  the review in this chapter. The 
larger body o f  Kant’s writing will be referenced here only as it is necessary to 
explicate the concept o f  freedom in “Perpetual Peace.” I will argue that Kant’s 
notion o f  positive freedom is a crucial element in his political theory. This notion o f 
positive freedom reveals the paradoxical nature o f  freedom that is accentuated at the 
level o f international relations. Next 1 will review the influence o f  “Perpetual Peace” 
on Rawls while noting important differences between their international theories. 
Then finally, 1 will argue that these issues related to Kant’s ideas about freedom and 
the nature o f moral personhood are not adequately resolved in Rawls’s final work.
At this point a brief foray into Kant’s earlier writings will help illuminate the 
argument.
In his essay, “ Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” 
published in 1784, Kant argued that external laws actually maximize freedom. His 
fifth thesis therein stated that civil society can achieve the greatest freedom that can 
coexist with the freedom o f  others by making possible freedom under external laws. 
For Kant this is no purely abstract, metaphysical speculation, but is an urgent 
political issue directly related to peace and stability in the world. He wrote, “The
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greatest problem for the human species, whose solution nature compels it to seek, is
to achieve a universal civil society administered in accord with the right.”'* Kant’s
answer to this crucial problem rests on a distinction between two types o f freedom.
The first type o f  freedom is wild, unrestricted, “savage, barbarous freedom.”  ^ Later,
he referred to this as “negative” freedom.^ However, a greater freedom is possible if
negative freedom is restricted through the coercive power o f civil society. He wrote:
Necessity compels men, who are otherwise so deeply 
enamoured with unrestricted freedom, to enter into this 
state o f coercion; and indeed, they are forced to do so 
by the greatest need o f all, namely, the one that men 
themselves bring about, for their propensities do not 
allow them to coexist for very long in wild freedom.^
Coexistence is the reason for restricting freedom. Kant does not deny that such 
unlimited freedom would be possible if people were totally isolated and did not live 
interconnected lives. Yet the benefits o f living arrangements that connect people 
increase the ability to exist. Kant assumes that meaningful lives in an intelligible 
world require cooperation among persons. Coexistence fosters individual existence. 
In order to coexist, a sacrifice o f  individual freedom is required. Kant thought that
'* Kant “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,”] 3. 
 ^ Ibid., 35. “savage, brutal freedom.”
 ^Kant, Founda/fons of/he Me/aphys/cs o/Mora/s, 63.
 ^Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” 33.
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humans accept the coercive power o f  civil society because it is reasonable to do so. 
Kant wrote,
Man is an animal that, if  he lives among other 
members o f  his species, has need o f a master. For he 
certainly abuses his freedom in relation to his equals, 
and although as a rational creature he desires a law that 
establishes boundaries for everyone’s freedom, his 
selfish animal propensities induce him to exempt 
himself from them wherever he can ... Thus, begin 
wherever he will, it is not to be seen how he can obtain 
a guarantor o f  public justice who will himself be 
just...*
This is true not only on the level o f individuals in relationship to civil society, but
equally true at the international level in relations between nations. Kant argued that
reason suggests that civil states should for a federation or a league. Like moral
persons, states have the ability to follow the suggestion o f  reason,
.. .to leave the lawless state o f savagery and enter into 
a federation o f peoples. In such a league, every nation, 
even the smallest, can expect to have security and 
rights, not by virtue o f its own might or its own 
declarations regarding what is right, but from this great 
federation o f peoples.^
Therefore, Kant argued that reason leads to a cosmopolitan society governed by 
“right” reason.
Ibid., 33-34.
 ^ Ibid, 34.
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He continued to develop this argument in Foundations o/ihe Metaphysics o f 
Mora/s, published in 1785. He said, “The concept o f freedom is the key to the 
explanation o f the autonomy o f the will.” ’*’ In this argument, freedom is not an 
empirically observed reality, but a transcendent form o f  experience. The argument is 
based on pure practical reason. This attempt to demonstrate a justification for the 
inherent value o f  freedom rests on an impulse to see meaning in the world. Kant 
wrote, “Thus categorical imperatives are possible because the Idea o f freedom makes 
me a member o f  an intelligible world.” ' ' The coherence o f intelligible experience 
relies on the freedom o f the will in Kant’s theory. Apart from positive freedom all 
experience is meaningless including negative freedom.
Although Kant agreed with empiricists that all knowledge begins and ends in 
experience, he claimed that the principles o f  organization o f experience cannot be 
experienced empirically. Furthermore, he argued that our experience would not have 
the coherence it has if such principles did not exist. So Kant claimed that a priori 
universal forms point to a transcendental consciousness explaining the structure o f 
the mind common to all individuals. We cannot know the ‘things-in-themselves’, but 
we can recognize operations o f the transcendental consciousness organizing 
experience. Time and space are examples o f such forms o f intuition that explain the
10 Kant, Foundations o/the Metaphysics o/Mora/s, 63.
"  Ibid., 71.
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coherence o f  experience. Freedom is another organizing form required to explain 
our experience.
Kant’s concept o f positive freedom only makes sense in light o f  his insistence
on the reality o f  free will. He wrote,
As will is a kind o f  causality o f living beings so far as 
they are rational, freedom would be that property o f 
this causality by which it can be effective independent 
o f  foreign causes determining it, just as natural 
necessity is the property o f the causality o f  all 
irrational beings by which they are determined to 
activity by the influence o f foreign causes. ...The 
preceding definition o f  freedom is negative and 
therefore affords no insight into its essence. But a 
positive concept o f freedom flows from it which is so 
much the richer and more fruitful. ... freedom is by no 
means law less... Rather, it must be a causality o f  a 
peculiar kind according to immutable laws.'^
It is because reason “transcends anything that sensibility can give to consciousness” 
that we affirm our free will, and thus the need to limit our negative freedom.'^ This 
argument will not be compelling to those who do not accept the postulate o f  freedom 
o f the will, or some notion o f  reason’s transcendental reality. But, Kant’s argument 
does explain how civil society’s need to limit individual freedom paradoxically 
increases people’s freedom at the same time. The meaningfulness o f the concept o f 
positive freedom rests on some notion o f  the power o f reason. Kant wrote, “For this 
reason a rational being must regard itself qua intelligence (and not from the side o f
Ibid.
Ibid., 69.
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his lower faculties) as belonging to the world o f understanding and not to that o f  the 
senses.” ''* Positive freedom is a contracted freedom, a reasonable freedom that 
requires limiting negative freedom even with coercive measures. For example, the 
negative freedom to seize property must be limited to achieve the positive freedom 
of civil society. Only reasonable beings would freely agree to such limitations o f 
their freedom.
Thus, Kant found a way to reconcile freedom and coercion through the 
concept o f  positive freedom because the concept o f justice requires universal 
reciprocity. This solution to the paradoxical nature o f freedom continues to satisfy 
some thinkers who therefore value the concept o f positive freedom. For example, 
Kevin Dodson explained the duality o f  autonomy and authority in Kant’s thought in 
this way:
The notion o f a right embodies this duality. A right is 
not only the freedom to act in a certain way; it is also 
the authorization to use coercion to prevent someone 
from hindering me in performance o f that action... The 
positive and negative conceptions o f freedom are again 
indissolubly united, for my freedom to engage in a 
specific action always involves a corresponding 
freedom from external interference with the 
performance o f that action. Thus, ‘right’(or ‘justice’) 
and the ‘authorization to use coercion’ mean the same 
thing.'^
14 Ibid., 70.
Kevin Dodson, “Autonomy and Authority in Kant’s Rechtslehre,” Fo/if/ca/ 
rheoryl'S, No. 1 (February 1997) 99.
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Dodson maintained that Kant’s reconciliation o f both positive and negative freedom 
are necessary to make sense o f  the terms right and justice. Paul Guyer presented a 
similar argument in his 2000 monograph, Kant on Freedom, Law, andL/app/ness.
He said that acting on the categorical imperative both conforms to universal law and 
also “preserves and enhances freedom.” '^ These claims that restriction o f 
unreasonable freedom actually promotes reasonable freedom hinge on the notion o f 
existence o f a meaningful concept o f positive freedom. Kant’s political theory 
makes no sense apart from this concept o f positive freedom. Furthermore, this 
concept o f  positive freedom for the individual person living in civil society correlates 
to construction o f  peace in the international application o f Kant’s theory.
Kant most fully presented the application o f his philosophy to the level o f 
international politics in his essay, “Perpetual Peace”, published in 1795. For Kant 
the great political problem was how to remain autonomous while living in 
community. His solution to this problem depended on his insight that freedom has a 
paradoxical nature because the seeming threat to freedom, namely living in 
community with others, is also the necessary condition for a greater freedom. 
Freedom’s paradoxical nature is more clearly revealed in the relationship between 
nations. Kant thought that nations have moral agency analogous to that o f individual 
subjects. Kant argued that coercive pressure between nations can be justifiable 
because it limits negative freedom, but expands positive freedom. He wrote;
Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, andLLappmess. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5.
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As nations, peoples can be regarded as single 
individuals who injure one another through their close 
proximity while living in the state o f  nature (i.e., 
independently o f external laws). For the sake o f  its 
own security, each nation can and should demand that 
the others enter into a contract resembling the civil one 
and guaranteeing the rights o f each.'^
Civil society secures freedom for the individual at the domestic level. The 
international parallel is that a civilized league o f nations will secure the global peace.
The distinction between “mad freedom” versus “rational freedom” is a 
cornerstone o f  Kant’s argument in “Perpetual Peace”.'* The federation o f  free states 
recommended by Kant would be peaceful because states act reasonably. Being 
reasonable means being willing to accept coercive limits to freedom in order to 
exchange negative freedom for positive freedom. The quality o f life possible through 
the establishment o f a league o f peace replaces the “savage” or “ lawless” freedom 
with a “contracted” freedom.'^ Thus, in the international application, the duty to 
construct a more stable freedom is analogous to the duty o f  an individual moral agent 
to act in accordance with reason. Given the history o f war and international strife, the 
consequences o f achieving positive freedom are dramatic.
Kant’s hope that achieving perpetual peace is possible depends on his 
particular understanding about reason, right, nature, and moral personhood. Kant’s
17 Kant, Perpeiua/Peace, 115.
'*Ibid., 115.
Ibid., 117.
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international project depends on the idea that reason has sufficient reality to curb
politics. He said that nature includes a state o f war among nations.
Nonetheless, from the throne o f its moral legislative 
power, reason absolutely condemns war as a means o f 
determining the right and makes seeking the state o f 
peace a matter o f  unmitigated duty. But without a 
contract among nations peace can be neither 
inaugurated nor guaranteed.^”
Reason’s efficacy in securing peace depends on human will to construct systems o f
toleration and stability. Kant said that the only way for reason to provide peace is
through the requirement that nations give up their “savage (lawless) freedom.”^' In
the same way, through contractual agreement, rights are established. Without the
concept o f the original contract “a people has no r i g h t s . T h u s ,  reason is
inseparable from Kant’s notion o f right. In fact, “the possibility o f international right
in general” depends on a contract among nations establishing a political right
compatible with freedom.
Kant’s optimism was grounded in his conviction that people have a 
“dormant moral aptitude to be governed by right.” '^' So, in “Perpetual Peace,” Kant 
suggested that nations could behave like rational agents, curtailing their wild, savage
Ibid., 116.
Ibid., 117.
Ibid., 108.
Ibid., 138.
Ibid., 116.
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freedom in order to achieve a stable peace. This would be more than a mere 
practical compromise based on mutual self-interest, but would be based on reason 
grounded in transcendental idealism. Practical reason makes peace possible and 
attainable. Nevertheless, Kant noted that there is a tendency to avoid being limited 
by civil society in this way. He cited the “depravity o f human nature” as seen in 
each nation’s desire to be “unfettered” . K a n t  acknowledged the dynamic o f 
national interest that is sometimes irrational. He said that nations are inclined to see 
“their majesty to consist in not being subject to any external legal constraint.”^^  
Furthermore, he noted that war “requires no particular motivation, but appears to be 
ingrained in human nature and is even valued as something noble...often war is 
begun only as a means to display courage.”^^  Unfortunately, in the brief space o f 
Kant’s essay on peace, he did not fully address questions o f how a federation o f 
nations should respond to nations who do not submit to the requirements o f  peaceful 
coexistence. It is this question that Rawls tackled.
Kant’s Influence on Rawls 
The influence o f Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” on Rawls’s Law o/Feop/es \^  
readily apparent. Rawls tried to further develop Kant’s ideas by pursuing the 
specific question o f  how peaceful, well-ordered peoples might be justified in using 
coercive force against others whose freedom threatens the international peace. Both
Ibid., 116.
Ibid., 115.
Ibid., 123.
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are arguments for a contract based on reasonable motives for coexistence. Both claim
that such a commitment to peace can be founded on something more than mere
stability motivated purely by self-interest. Kant claimed that the difference between
a truce and a treaty o f  peace was that the former allowed mental reservations that
would lead to future war, while the latter could actually “nullify all existing causes
for war” .^ * When Rawls tenaciously maintained that peace could be more than mere
modus vivenc//\ that stability for “right reasons” was preferable, he was continuing
this Kantian project.^^ Rawls directly addressed the influence o f  “Perpetual Peace”
on The Law o/Peop/esdi number o f times. In each case he attempted to distance his
theory from the transcendental idealism o f Kant. For example, Rawls wrote;
Since my presentation o f the Law o f Peoples is greatly 
indebted to Kant’s idea o f the foeduspaci/icum and to 
so much in his thought, I should say the following: at 
no point are we deducing the principles o f right and 
justice, or decency, or the principles o f  rationality, 
from a conception o f  practical reason in the 
background.^®
A footnote at that point in the text acknowledged that parts o f Po/idca/Libera/ism 
are “misleading in this respect.”^' Rawls hoped to establish new moorings for
Ibid., 108.
Rawls, LP, 45.
Ibid., 86.
Ibid., 86, n.33.
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meaningful discourse on ethics, leaving behind all traces o f Kant’s transcendental 
idealism.
This comparison between Perpetual Peace wà The Law o/Peop/es\% 
focused on the role o f  freedom in each. The main differences between the two works 
are disagreements about transcendental idealism, a teleological^^ view o f  history, and 
concepts o f  moral personhood in relationship to human nature.^^ Important 
similarities include a desire for foundations o f  international peace that are more than 
mere modus vivendi and the hope that reason provides the means o f  reaching that 
goal. After examining these differences and similarities between the two works, I 
will argue that Rawls has not adequately solved the international problem o f  freedom 
and coercion without retaining some Kantian concepts that he hoped to reject. Kant’s 
concepts o f reason, right, and moral personhood are too entangled with Kant’s 
teleological notion o f  history to serve as the neutral foundations Rawls wanted. Was 
Rawls able to tease out some elements o f Kant’s project for international peace 
without getting bogged down in Kant’s comprehensive idealism? I will argue that 
Rawls’s theory fails without maintaining at least some minimal adherence to Kantian
Although Kant famous ethical system is deontological, nevertheless his 
transcendental idealism included the claim that nature and history move toward an 
end. Thus his teleological view o f  nature and history are essential to his theory.
Elisabeth Ellis, Kant’sPo/it/cs. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 43. 
Ellis noted that removing the “teleological straitjacket” from Kantian constructivism 
makes possible Rawls’s work and also clears the way for “the preconditions o f 
autonomous citizenry.” Ellis did not comment on The Law qfPeop/es.
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positive freedom. The first step toward evaluating the extent o f Rawls’s success 
requires examination o f  the ways in which he departed from these Kantian concepts.
One difference between Kant’s cosmopolitan vision and Rawls’s Law o f  
Peoples is the method offered for the two arguments. Rawls was determined to avoid 
Kant’s transcendental idealism. In Po//n'ca/Libera/ism^‘àyN\'s> distanced his theory 
from Kant’s reliance on a normative concept o f autonomy. He wrote, “The first 
difference is that Kant’s doctrine is a comprehensive moral view in which the ideal 
o f autonomy has a regulative role for all o f  life. This makes it incompatible with the 
political liberalism o f  justice as fairness.” '^* In Tbe Zmr q/'Peop/esKdLw\s stated that 
his method was different than Kant’s since he did not deduce principles o f  right and 
justice from a conception o f practical reason.^^ Rather, Rawls argued that the three 
component parts, “the ideas o f reasonableness, decency, and rationality” are 
normative ideas that lead to “principles and standards o f right and justice.” Rawls 
claimed that these principles and standards “will hang together and will be affirmed 
by us on due reflection.”^^  Rawls’s attempt to ground the argument in a reflexive 
equilibrium and overlapping consensus rather than deduction from practical reason is 
a clear deviation from the methods Kant used to ground his argument. However, 
when Rawls took this different path it resulted in a question over his confidence that
PL, 99.
LP, 86.
Ibid., 87.
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the principles reached through his method would “hang together.” In Kant’s theory 
the teleological view o f history is the basis for the assurance that reasonable ends can 
be harmonious. But, without Kant’s transcendental idealism, Rawls must admit that 
the compatibility o f  different reasonable principles is not certain. He admitted that 
“there can be no guarantee” that these principles will hang together and be affirmed 
after reflection, because he does not share Kant’s transcendental idealism.^^
The methodological differences between Kant and Rawls did not necessitate 
every difference between the two projects. Some differences in their analysis are 
based in differing views o f human nature and political assumptions. Kant’s 
transcendental idealism involved assumptions about the nature o f history as a 
meaningful process in which ends can be identified. Rawls rejected that view o f 
history as part o f Kant’s comprehensive notion. Another difference demonstrates 
Rawls’s response to the realist critique o f Kant’s work. Kant spoke o f  nations as the 
unit o f  analysis in the level o f international relations discourse. Kant wrote that “a 
nation is a society o f  men” and the existence o f  a nation should be respected just as 
that o f  a “moral person.” *^ When Rawls declined to utilize the nation state as the 
building block o f the international peace, he took a path different from Kant’s. The 
influence o f  the realist critique o f Kant’s liberal utopian vision for peace is 
demonstrated in Rawls’s attempt to avoid the nation as the unit o f  analysis. Rawls
Ibid.
Ibid., 108.
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spoke o f peoples and societies rather than nations. In contrast, Kant used the terms 
“nations” and “peoples” interchangeably.^^ Rawls spoke o f liberal democratic 
“peoples” but did not fully specify the extent to which peoples could be held 
responsible for actions as corporate agents. Rawls tried to avoid the realist critique 
based on national interest by suggesting that peoples could form a contractual law of 
peoples to secure international peace. The nature o f these aggregates called peoples 
will be further examined in chapter four related to human nature in community.
Here it is sufficient to note that Rawls avoided K anf s claim that nations, like 
persons, are moral agents. In order to avoid K anf s transcendental idealism, Rawls 
steered clear o f  applying K anf s notion o f  moral personhood to aggregates o f  
persons.
Rawls took seriously the critique that a liberal notion o f the good was likely 
to infect any cosmopolitan notion o f  the right. Rawls wanted to restrict the concept 
o f right to a meaning purged o f  metaphysical claims about virtue. However, Rawls’s 
hope was to retain a concept o f justice with Kantian roots. Despite his rejection o f 
certain elements o f  K anf s work, Rawls shared important commitments that 
motivated K anf s work. The main overlap involves a desire that reason can resolve 
conflict. In other words, in contrast to the view that “might makes right” or that 
power does not give way to reason, Rawls stands with Kant in the tradition that 
hopes for peace that is more than a precarious balance o f powers. This is the basis o f
Ibid., 115.
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Rawls’s insistence that the motivation for international cooperation can be more than
mere modus vivendi. Rawls said,
Stability for the right reasons describes a situation in 
which, over the course o f  time, citizens acquire a sense 
o f  justice that inclines them not only to accept but to 
act upon principles o f justice .... We also conjecture, 
second, that the just society o f liberal peoples would be 
stable for the right reasons, meaning that its stability is 
not a mere modus vivendi but rests in part on an 
allegiance to the Law o f Peoples itself.'*'^
This possibility that toleration can be motivated by more than modus reflects
Rawls’s adherence to Kant’s project in “Perpetual Peace.” The view o f  human
agency and o f  the power o f  reason reflected in this hope remains controversial.
Various criticisms o f The Lau' o/Peop/es ztvAsx around this question o f  whether or
not Rawls succeeded in establishing a credible argument for anything more than
modus Vivendi. After examining similarities between Kant and Rawls related to their
views o f  reason and moral personhood, I will review some o f the recent criticisms
focused on this point.
Rawls shared with Kant an acceptance o f reason as an authoritative power 
capable o f  arbitrating disputes. A major point o f agreement between Rawls and Kant 
is the claim that reason can lead to prevention o f war. Kant thought that since reason 
condemns war, people have a duty to seek peace. Rawls thought that reasonable
Ibid., 45. 
Ibid., 116.
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people would not go to war because the causes o f  war could be eliminated. Rawls 
said.
The idea o f a reasonably just society o f well-ordered 
peoples will not have an important place in a theory o f 
international politics until such peoples exist and have 
learned to coordinate the actions o f  their governments 
in wider forms o f political, economic, and social 
cooperation. When that happens, as I believe, 
following Kant, it will, the society o f these peoples 
will form a group o f satisfied peoples. As I shall 
maintain, in view o f their fundamental interests being 
satisfied, they will have no reason to go to war with 
one another. ^
Rawls exhibited a confidence in reason that assumes something significant and 
controversial about human nature. Following Kant, Rawls thought that reason was 
the key to the concepts o f right or justice as fairness, even in the political sense. 
When Rawls advocated stability for the “right reasons” was he using the term “right” 
in the Kantian sense? Before attempting to answer that question, I turn to 
complexities within K anf s own use o f these terms. Further examination reveals the 
lack o f agreement about precisely what Kant him self meant by the term right or duty. 
At this point the ambiguity between Kant’s concept o f virtue and his concept o f  right 
must be addressed.
Rawls’s insistence that the right can be separated from the good may be a 
deviation from Kant or it may be consistent with Kant’s later thought. Kantian 
scholars disagree on this matter. Jeffrie G. Murphy argued that Kant is often 
misinterpreted related to the role o f human motive in ethics. Murphy wrote, “Kant
Ibid., 19.
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contrasts such actions which are, in addition to being in accordance with duty, done 
from a respect for duty.”'*^  Although the second kind o f  action is a moral action in 
Kant’s scheme, Murphy argued that the first type must also be moral regardless the 
agent’s motive/'* The matter o f  stability for right reasons relates to the complex 
relationship between the sphere o f law and the sphere o f  morality. It remains unclear 
whether or not the notion o f  a right or due action can be independent o f  the agent’s 
motive in performing the action. M urphy’s interpretation o f Kant rests on the 
understanding that “Kant makes it a necessary and sufficient condition o f  a morally 
good will that it is a will which acts in accordance with duty for the sake o f duty.”'*^  
Thus, it would be possible to act in accordance with duty from an improper motive. 
This provides space between acts that are right and acts that are virtuous in Kant’s 
later writing. Kantian scholars are divided over such interpretations o f  the terms like 
right, duty, and virtue. It would have been helpful if Kant had consistently 
distinguished between his “theory o f virtue” and “his theory o f right”."*^  If 
M urphy’s interpretation is correct, Rawls could retain Kant’s notion o f  “right” 
without implying Kantian claims about comprehensive concepts o f duty grounded in 
transcendental idealism.
Jeffrie G. Murphy,” Kant’s Concept o f a Right Action,” Kan/Seu(/ies Today. 
Ed. Lewis White Beck. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Press, 1969), 472.
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Nonetheless, Kant’s concept o f moral personhood is inseparable from his
idea o f morality. “Existence as a moral person” is a reality that prohibits treating a
person in the same way as a thing.^^ The recognition o f others as ends in themselves
is either granted or not. It can be shown to be reasonable, but those who question the
authority o f  reason will not be convinced. If persons are recognized as moral agents,
valuable ends in themselves, then the consent for political ground rules makes sense.
Then, by extension, nations, like moral persons ought not to be treated as merely
means to an end. Kant’s confidence in moral personhood cannot be defended
without reference to some comprehensive doctrine o f the good. Kant asserted this
principle, but left many unconvinced. He wrote:
For the moral principle in man never dies out, and with 
the continuous progress o f  culture, reason, which is 
able pragmatically to apply the ideas o f right in 
accordance with the moral principle, grows through its 
persistence in doing so, and guilt for transgressions 
grows concomitantly."**
Furthermore, Kant viewed the causes o f  war to be linked to depravity and 
evil in human nature."*^ The exact justification for these broad claims about evil and 
morality is rooted in Kant’s transcendental idealism. Only with such Kantian notions 
o f reason, right, nature, and personhood could Kant suggest that any constitution
Kant, Perpétua/Feace^  108.
48 Ibid., 134.
Ibid.
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could be “completely Rawls sought to avoid Kant’s comprehensive notions
of the good. However, readings o f Kant’s later work, like that o f Jeffrie G. Murphy, 
suggest that Kant sometimes used the term “right” in a more political sense. 
Therefore, it is possible that Rawls found some basis for seeking neutral grounds for 
practical, political foundations in Kant’s writing.
In “Perpetual Peace”, Kant acknowledged the need for pragmatic, political
notions o f  right despite inability to reach pure knowledge o f moral right. He wrote;
As hard as it may sound, the problem o f organizing a 
nation is solvable even for a people comprised o f 
devils ( if  only they possess understanding). The 
problem can be stated in this way: ‘So order and 
organize a group o f  rational beings who require 
universal laws for their preservation— though each is 
secretly inclined to exempt himself from such laws -  
that, while their private attitudes conflict, these 
nonetheless so cancel one another that these beings 
behave publicly just as if  they had no evil attitudes.’
This kind o f problem must be so/vaâ/e. For it does not 
require the moral improvement o f man; it requires only 
that we know how to apply the mechanism o f nature to 
men so as to organize the conflict o f  hostile attitudes 
present in a people in such a way that they must 
compel one another to submit to coercive laws and 
thus to enter into a state o f  peace, where laws have 
power.
Absent an indisputable comprehensive notion o f the good, we might hopeHasX some 
practical solution to problems o f conflict could be found to establish coexistence. But 
why would we assume that such a problem is solvable? Despite our desire to resolve
Ibid., 114.
Ibid., 124.
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such problems, one possibility is that /%? solution to international conflict can be 
reached other than a highly reactive and tentative balance based on mo /^us v/vendi. 
However, Kant’s teleological view o f nature allowed him to assume that a more 
robust, practical solution was possible. He thought that nature would channel self- 
interest into a harmonious blend o f coexistence. Unfortunately, Kant noted that even 
the “devils” in his scheme have to have “understanding.” Kant’s notion o f  nature 
itself includes recognition o f reason as a compelling value. Thus, Kant viewed 
nature as the guarantor o f perpetual peace, since conformity to reason leads people to 
coexist.^^ Rawls attempted to build on this Kantian insight that reasonable elements 
o f human nature ineline people to cooperate and avoid war, even absent “good” 
motives.
At first it might seem that Kant’s emphasis on right as distinct from moral 
virtue would be the concept o f  right that Rawls sought to develop in his political 
liberalism. The problem then is how to achieve more than modus v/vend/d& a basis 
for stable peace.^^ In Rawls’s theory, as in Kant’s, assumptions are made that reason 
has power and persons have value. Critics o f Rawls have suggested that drawing on 
Kant’s concepts more fully would strengthen Rawls’s argument. For example,
Kevin Dodson recommended that Kant’s “connection between the establishment o f
Ibid., 120.
Kok-Chor Tan. “Liberal Toleration in Rawls’s Law o f Peoples. Æ'/J/hr 108 
(January 1998), 285. Tan argued that Rawls fails to achieve anything more than 
modus vivendi that way.
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civil society and the institution o f property” offers the key to solving the conflict 
between autonomy and authority/"* Similarly, Brian Shaw argued that Rawls should 
have recovered Kant’s argument for property as a basis for his political theory/^ 
However, a simpler solution with less reliance on comprehensive claims is possible. 
Rather than recovering Kant’s argument for property, Rawls could have adopted 
Kant’s notion o f  positive freedom.
If  Rawls had explored Kant’s notion o f  positive freedom more tenaciously, 
perhaps a middle way between justice ethics and care ethics would result. Samuel 
Fleischacker questioned Rawls’s definition and use o f  “reason” and claimed that 
disagreements over what counts as reason render Rawls’s theories unhelpful.^^ The 
tension between contemporary debates between ethics based injustice, virtue, or care 
ends in a paralysis o f  inability to resolve basic questions. Rawls insisted that ethics 
pay attention to the question o f  how to be practical or political in addressing real- 
world problems. I am suggesting another way to reasonably synthesize justice 
theories with care theories.^’ If  Rawls retained only the thinnest possible version o f
Dodson, 93.
Brian J. Shaw, “Rawls, Kant’s Doctrine o f  Right, and Global Distributive 
Justice,” Journa/o/Fo/iiics, 67, No. I (February 2005), 221.
Samuel Fleischacker, T/i/rdConcep/ofZiderty .^ (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1999), 202.
Daniel Engster, Mary W ollstonecraft’s Nurturing Liberalism: Between an 
Ethic o f Justice and American Fo/if/ca/Science Review. 95, No.3 (September
2001), 577.
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Kant’s positive freedom then justice as fairness would be tied to mutual respect for 
the autonomy. Consideration based on mutual respect is a kind o f care, although it is 
not a care based in sentiment. Rawls was trying to craft new arguments to anchor 
Kant’s political project o f  reconciling freedom and coercion both within civil society 
and on the international level. He missed an important opportunity by dodging 
Kant’s concept o f positive freedom.
The controversy over a basis for ethics in political theory revolves around 
disagreements over concepts o f moral agency. What weight or reality does a concept 
of moral agency have? The commitment to respecting a common morality based on 
the principle “that each person must respect the agency o f every other” relies on a 
Kantian conception o f  moral personhood.^* Human nature must allow mutual 
respect for the constructed freedom in civil society if human life is to be meaningful. 
The concluding line o f The Law o/Feop/es refers Kant’s conviction that if  life is 
worthwhile it is in relationship to human’s ability to be just. However, without 
Kant’s confidence in transcendental idealism, Rawls genuinely questions “whether it 
is worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth.”^^  Moral agency depends on the 
human will to use freedom to construct meaningful, worthwhile reality. This labor 
o f the will, this freedom to fabricate meaning is positive freedom. Finally, Rawls 
adhered to Kant’s idea that if  life is worthwhile, it is due to human moral agency.
Terry Nardin, “The Moral Basis o f  Humanitarian Intervention,” £/h/cs ancL 
Lnterna/iona/A^/rs 16, No. 1 (2002), 64.
Rawls, LP, 128.
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How does Rawls’s conception o f  personhood compare with Kant’s? Kant’s 
concept o f  the individual cannot be severed from his convictions about free will.
The freedom o f  the individual to craft a meaningful life is the microcosm o f  Kant’s 
vision o f how nations relate at the international level. Transcendental Idealism is the 
over-arching explanation o f why it all fits together. Independent o f  Kant’s 
comprehensive claims, Rawls has trouble reconciling public and private freedom.
So, Rawls claimed that a meaningful distinction can be drawn between political 
freedom and moral freedom. In “The Idea o f Public Reason Revisited,” Rawls 
claimed that autonomy takes two forms: political autonomy and “purely moral” 
autonomy. This latter type o f  autonomy he likened to M ill’s idea o f individuality.^’’ 
Rawls argued that because it does not satisfy the constraint o f reciprocity, this latter 
type o f  autonomy is not a “political value.”^' Much rests on whether or not this 
distinction holds up. Rawls thought o f individuals as private entities that are free to 
develop comprehensive views o f the good. However, these same individuals must set 
aside this work o f  crafting meaning when interacting in the public realm o f 
interpersonal acts. More reflection needs to be done on whether this line between the 
political and the personal in Rawls is the same as the public versus private distinction 
prevalent in contemporary discourse. Rawls maintained that the good is a matter for 
the personal realm, while the right applies in the interpersonal or public realm. In this 
way, Rawls differed from Kant, who emphasized free will as the building block o f
Ibid., 146.
Ibid.
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freedom among nations, and so reconciled the individual’s experience o f  meaningful 
existence with the possibility o f  global cooperation.
Attention to the individual’s experience as the locus o f freedom raises 
problems for Rawls at the international level since Rawls argued that the well-being 
o f individuals was not the focus o f the Law o f  Peoples. In contrast to the 
cosmopolitan view, the Law o f  Peoples is not concerned with the well-being o f 
individuals.^^ The value o f individual freedom is difficult to reconcile with the 
freedom o f peoples, much less the freedom o f nations in Rawls’s system. The value 
o f freedom is always inseparable from the individual possessing the freedom. 
Freedom has no intrinsic value apart from the will o f  those who may exercise it. The 
value o f  freedom is always manifesting in the freedom belonging to a person. Alan 
Hamlin formulated this point asking, “If freedom is valued intrinsically, who values 
it?”63 jj cou ij be argued that even if a person did not value her own freedom, 
the observation o f  her servitude could be a problem for others who do value freedom. 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering that the value o f freedom is connected with its 
instantiation in the life o f persons. As Hamlin said, “Presumably the benefit o f  
freedom is a benefit to the person whose freedom it is.” "^* The conflict between
Ibid., 120.
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various persons seeking to exercise their freedom requires resolution, so political 
freedom is never freedom in total isolation.
Kant accepted as obvious the superiority o f  civilized, limited freedom over 
savage freedom. However, the option o f remaining outside o f  contractual 
agreements, o f  choosing savage freedom by isolating must be considered here. 
Although perhaps it is inconceivable that a human could totally isolate and reject 
relationship with others altogether, it is not difficult to imagine an island o f  people 
being self-sufficient and completely removed from international relations. 
Therefore, a legitimate question arises. Is there any moral duty to participate in 
international relations, or is self-interest the best argument for cooperation? It seems 
likely that a group that envisions either isolation or the possibility o f  dominance 
would not be motivated to cooperate since cooperation entails limits on freedom. 
Kant’s claim that by limiting savage freedom one actually increases freedom is 
paradoxical and not especially obvious at the level o f international relations. Thus, 
difficulty o f  making a case for participation in a contractual arrangement including 
limitations o f  freedom that simultaneously increase freedom is more challenging at 
the international level. When considering cooperation between nations, it is easier to 
imagine either attempts at universal domination or total isolation as options nations 
might consider pursuing. In Rawls’s international theory, it remains unclear why 
some people with unusually great power or resources might not choose to isolate 
rather than submitting to the Law o f Peoples. What else besides self-interest based 
on mutual advantage would motivate the submission to bonds o f cooperation
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required for positive freedom when another option would be to remain in wild 
freedom? The answer Rawls seems to offer is only that peoples are reasonable and 
the causes o f  war can be eliminated. This question exposed the provisional nature o f 
Rawls’s project. Rawls’s scheme requires a notion o f  moral personhood that relies 
on coherent reality o f  right reasons. Can Justice as fairness hold up on an 
international level wholly detached from comprehensive notions o f the good for the 
individual?
The evaluation o f  Rawls’s project in the Zaw q/'/'eop/es on his
success in demonstrating that there are reasons other than mere modus vivendi to 
cooperate. The extent to which Rawls convinces on this point may depend on his 
connection to Kant. Those who are amenable to Kant’s reasoning are more likely to 
be convinced that Rawls should have retained more from Kant’s theory. For 
example, Brian Shaw argued that Rawls needs Kant’s concept o f personhood 
because the very concept o f  personhood entails moral characteristics.^^ Shaw 
agreed on this point with Bemd Ludwig who argued that Kant’s concept o f 
y?ecA/s/eAre “cannot be detached” from his Transcendental Idealism because it is the 
metaphysic that is the foundation o f the concept.^^ According to this line o f thought, 
if  it is meaningful to expect justifications o f our actions or the actions o f others then
65 Shaw, 243.
^^Bemd Ludwig, “Whence Public Right? The Role o f Theoretical and 
Practical Reasoning in Kant’s Docfnne o//i/g/iC  (ed.) Mark Timmons, /Canf’s 
Meiap/iysics o/Mora/s:/nterpren'veEssays. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 170.
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it must be so because o f the moral nature o f  human subjects as rational agents. Shaw 
also acknowledged overlap with Katrin Flikschuh’s argument that economic agency 
provides an account o f Kant’s metaphysics o f  freedom as an idea o f  reason. She 
wrote:
Although we can have no knowledge o f transcendental 
freedom, we must assume its reality for practical 
purposes. The possibility o f practical freedom thus 
depends on the idea o f  transcendental freedom. In his 
moral writings, Kant frequently articulates the 
negative/positive distinction with reference to the 
noumenal standpoint from which agents assess and 
determine the actions o f their phenomenal selves.^’
Rawls did not adequately resolve the way in which a person’s freedom to construct
meaning relates to the nature o f moral personhood. These claims boil down to a
criticism that Rawls did not sufficiently develop his own view o f  moral personhood
in contrast to Kant’s. In a similar argument, Elizabeth Allison also defended Kant’s
radical conception o f  freedom as indispensable to his moral theory, based on a
definition o f  the will as a “law unto itself.” *^ She wrote:
Take anyone who claims the right to be free from a 
certain restraint by other human beings. She thus 
presupposes that she herself and a fortiori her fellow 
human beings are free agents, possible subjects o f 
imputation and thus responsible for their actions.
Otherwise it would be as pointless to claim any right o f
Katrin Flikschuh, Kant andMoc/ern Fo/i/ica/Philosophy, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 50.
^^Henry E. Allison, Ic 
University Press. 1996), 136.
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111
that kind, as it is pointless to claim any right against a 
lion or even to expect such a claim from a tree.^^
Either Rawls needed to admit more overlap with Kant, or Rawls needed to 
provide an alternative justification for his confidence in reason as a means o f  curbing 
freedom. O ne’s conception o f personhood and human nature shapes the evaluation 
o f these claims. These scholars, many o f  them students o f Rawls, drew on resources 
in Kant to move political theory forward beyond the contribution o f Rawls.
In the same way, O ’Neill suggested “building on less exclusively empiricist
conceptions o f  reason, freedom, action and J u d g m e n t . M y  attempt to present
positive freedom as a “ less exclusively empiricist notion o f freedom” stand in the
tradition she advocated. Noting the trend in ethics and politics away from
universalism she wrote:
My own view, however, is that if  we are to have an 
account o f  Justice that is relevant for a world in which 
state boundaries are increasingly porous to movements 
o f goods, capital, ideas and people, and in which state 
sovereignty is increasingly circumscribed, we shall 
need to work on setting out a reasonable form o f 
universalism for ethics and politics.^'
O ’Neill examined Kant’s influence on Rawls and encouraged new readings 
o f Kant with an eye to his political theory. In fact, she claimed that Cr/f/que o/Fure
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Jieason \% essentially a political text/^ If she is correct, Kant’s grounding for the
authority o f  reason is not purely metaphysical, but political. To illustrate her
argument, she cited this passage from Cri//que o/Fure /Reason.
For reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is 
always simply the agreement o f  free citizens, o f whom 
each one must be permitted to express, without let or 
hindrance, his objections or even his veto.
Reason is sometimes thought to be a reality that is given as part o f existence, but this 
suggests that reason itself might be a convention, subject to political freedom. What 
it means to say that Kant’s import is political rather than moral gets at the heart o f 
Rawls’s effort to divorce him self from Kant’s metaphysics while gleaning a basis for 
persuasive ethics from Kant’s work. New work is being done now reflecting on the 
ways that Rawls’s work can be viewed as a reconstruction o f Kant’s conception o f 
external right as a political rather than moral theory.^"* This idea that Kant’s 
contribution was primarily political rather than moral harkens back to Rawls’s claim 
that a line can be drawn between the political justice as fairness and the 
comprehensive notions o f  the good.
In T/ie Law o/Feop/es, Rawls was adamant to defend the idea that toleration 
is more than a modus vivend/. In order to achieve this goal, Rawls must satisfy these
Kimberly Hutchings, Kan/,Cn'dçue andFo/i/ics. (New York: Routledge, 
1996),7-8.
’^O’Neill p. 15 (quoting CPR, a 738 /b 766). The translation from Paul 
Guyer is slightly different (CPR a739/b767, 643.)
Paul Guyer, Kan( on Freedom, Lom', andf/app/ness, 267.
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questions related to the construction o f meaningful life on the part o f the individual
and the role that reason or meaning plays in public or interpersonal life. The concept
of positive freedom provides a link between the freedom o f  an individual to pursue a
meaningful life and the political freedom required to construct a life that sustains that
pursuit. Kant’s notion o f positive freedom as autonomy is needed for Rawls’s
project. In Andrews Reath’s, “Legislating for a Realm o f Ends,” he wrote,
“Autonomy has a positive aspect, and without specifying the kind o f  meaningful
activity that the agent is free to engage in , it remains an empty concept.”’  ^ This is
the solution Reath proposes to the conflict between freedom and civic constraint:
While the negative component o f the schema (the 
“independence condition”) removes the agent from 
certain kinds o f social influence, its positive 
specification will make it clear that autonomy is only a 
possibility for agents located within sets o f practices 
that structure their activity and interaction with other 
agents.’^
This explains why the concept o f an autonomous moral agent is linked with 
that o f  the realm o f ends. Similarly, it demonstrates why Rawls cannot claim to have 
demonstrated more than modus vivendi without a Kantian distinction between wild 
freedom and reasonable or meaningful freedom.
’^Andrews Reath, “Legislating for a Realm of Ends,” in (ed.) Andrews Reath, 
Barbara Herman, and Christine M. Korsgaard, Rec/aim/ng/he///story of£//i/cs: 
ÆssrysfôrJohn Jfaw/s. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 217.
Ibid.
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To illustrate this point further, consider the claim that the reasonableness 
Rawls depends on already implies a Kantian notion o f personhood. David Reidy 
claimed that Rawls regarded peoples as “corporate moral agents, as persons in the 
moral sense o f  the term.”’’ It is clear enough that Rawls’s liberal democratic 
convictions “commit him to an international politics o f mutual respect and 
persuasion, voluntary exchange and interaction, rather than manipulation and 
coercion, among free and equal well-ordered peoples.”’* However, this leaves 
unanswered the problem o f  justifications for coercion o f persons who are outside the 
covenant o f  the Law o f Peoples. Must they be respected as moral agents and treated 
as ends in themselves? In other words, when peoples are in societies that cooperate 
in contractual bonds o f  reciprocity and mutual agreement, they are acting as moral 
agents. However, Rawls does not give us enough information about how peoples 
relate to individuals in burdened or outlaw nations. In contrast, Kant assumed that 
since each nation had the moral autonomy analogous to that o f a moral person, each 
nation was worthy o f  equal, mutual respect. The recognition o f that autonomy 
assumes the constructing o f  positive freedom that is contracted at the international 
level. The realist critique o f Kant and o f liberalism questions that assumption. If 
there is more than the motivation o f mutual self-interest then Rawls needs the
”  David A. Reidy, “Rawls on International Justice: A Defense,” Po/i'n'ca/ 
Theory, 32, No.3 (June 2004), 294.
’* Ibid., 312.
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universal notion o f  positive freedom based in a notion o f personhood. The most 
thorough analysis o f  these inadequacies in Rawls is offered by John Gray.
Gray’s Critique
Gray’s critique o f Rawls is rooted in a critique o f  Kant. Kant, Rawls, and 
Gray would all agree that no one comprehensive idea o f the good can be known as 
the best. Kant’s distinction between pure and practical reason depends on this 
conviction as does Rawls’s claim that his is a political not a comprehensive theory o f 
justice. Whether or not normative comparisons o f  ways o f life are grounded in any 
reality is a separate question. In other words, the good may be real despite our 
inability to know it. Given our inability to arbitrate ethical conflicts based on 
knowledge o f  the good, we are left with the question o f  how to live together in this 
world o f rival values. Gray’s significant contribution illuminates the inescapable 
tensions among values that are often lumped together as “ liberal” values. His 
criticism o f Rawls is on target when he notes that Rawls included as primary goods, 
values that lead to irreconcilable differences. Gray is correct in challenging Rawls’s 
on an “Enlightenment faith in the harmony o f values.”’  ^ In that way. Gray unmasks 
the Kantian influence underlying Rawls’s assumptions. However, the efficacy o f the 
modus vivendi that Gray proposes as the solution for the future o f  liberalism does 
not look much different from what Rawls proposed in The Law o f Peoples. What is
John Gray, Two Faces o/£i6era/ism. (New York: The New Press, 2000), 5. 
See also, 134, “primary goods being chain-linked with one another.”
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different is Rawls’s insistence that the peace be based on more than mere modus 
vivendi. In this, Rawls adheres to Kant’s tradition.
Gray published Two Faces o/L/dera/ism \n 2000, one year after T/ie Law o / 
Feop/es'^ zs, first published. Gray’s criticism o f Rawls is primarily based on Po//n'ca/ 
Libera/ismzssA earlier works and hence, makes no reference to the international 
application in The Law o/Teop/es. In Two Faces o/Libera/ism. Gray suggests that 
there is duplicity within the liberal tradition between viewing toleration as a pathway 
to one true best way o f  life versus viewing toleration as a strategy o f  peace. Gray 
cites Locke, Kant, Rawls, and Hayek as proponents o f the idea o f one best way. In 
contrast, Hobbes and Hume are his examples o f  “peaceful coexistence.”*” If Gray is 
correct that he can find examples o f thinkers who claim that “the persistence o f  many 
ways o f  life is a mark o f imperfection,” then his argument holds. I will only analyze 
Gray’s claim insofar as it is a criticism o f Rawls. First o f  all, the term “way o f life” 
needs clarification. Gray seems to mean something like culture or civilization by 
this term. Persistent determination to avoid promoting any way o f life based on one 
comprehensive doctrine as best motivated all o f  Rawls’s work. This is most clear in 
The Law o/Teop/es, where Rawls refused to join cosmopolitans in promoting 
universal claims about human rights. As far as Gray’s criticism o f Rawls goes, his 
theory about two faces o f  liberalism seems like a false dichotomy because Rawls’s 
main claim about the best way is that it is a way o f  toleration o f  many ways o f 
flourishing. Gray said liberals promote either one best way o f flourishing or mere
*” Ibid., 2.
117
toleration. He did not adequately disprove the possibility that toleration might be the 
best practical way given the impossibility o f pure knowledge o f the good. In other 
words, his dichotomy leaves out the idea o f  a pragmatic, limited, political claim 
about the best way as opposed to the idea o f one way being best in a purely moral 
sense.
Rawls did not acknowledge Gray’s criticism in any way in T/ieLaw o f
Feop/es, but his insistence on preserving voice for decent non-hierarchical peoples
could be viewed as an agreement with part o f  Gray’s concerns. In fact, Gray’s
criticism o f Rawls is based on a misrepresentation o f Rawls’s project. Rawls did not
advocate one best way o f  life.
If it should be asked whether liberal societies are, 
morally speaking, better than decent hierarchical and 
other decent societies, and therefore whether the world 
would be a better place if  all societies were required to 
be liberal, those holding a liberal view might think that 
the answer would be yes. But this answer overlooks 
the great importance o f maintaining mutual respect 
between peoples and o f each people maintaining its 
self-respect, not lapsing into contempt for the other, on 
one side, and bitterness and resentment on the other.*'
Rawls’s question was how to make a case against intolerance. In other 
words, when modus vivendi breaks down because o f agents unwilling to operate by 
the terms o f  peaceful tolerance, what are the limits o f  tolerance? Gray’s analysis is 
accurate and helpful in disarming liberals who would claim that one best way o f  life 
should be promoted. But, Rawls is not one o f those liberals. Gray does not help us
*' Rawls, LP, 122.
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with dilemmas o f conflicting ways o f life. Telling us that they should all have 
mutual toleration is not particularly beneficial when we come to a specific conflict 
between clashing ways o f  life. Gray’s answer at that point is that a contextual, 
legislative process must be the procedure for resolving such conflicts.*^ This is not 
much different than Rawls’s answer. Gray criticized Rawls for relying too heavily 
on constitutional function rather than legislative institutions, but perhaps the choice 
between those paths would also be contextual and variable given different historical 
and cultural settings.
The serious problem in Gray’s theory gets at the problem that motivates all o f  
Rawls’s work. First, consider these contradictions in Gray’s writing. He says, “We 
do not need common values in order to live together in peace. We need common 
institutions in which many forms o f life can coexist.”*^  However, he does not explain 
how we can develop and maintain common institutions in the absence o f common 
values. Furthermore, later Gray claims that human rights are prerequisite for modus 
vivendi. He said that human rights “can be honoured by both liberal and nonliberal 
regimes. Understood this way, universal human rights are not an obstacle to modus 
vivendi between different regimes but a condition for it.’’*"* This directly contradicts 
the earlier claim that common values are unnecessary. In the statement closest to
82 Gray, Two Faces o/Libera/ism. (New York: The New Press, 2000), 86.
Ibid., 6.
Ibid., 115.
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Rawls’s project in the Law o/Feop/es, Gray argued that in some cases enforcing 
universal rights justifies international intervention. “Enforcing universal rights may 
mean overriding a sovereign state.”*^  Discernment about the justification o f any 
particular intervention would be based on contextual judgment. This argument for a 
“worldwide regime o f rights” is not unlike what Rawls proposed.
Gray said, “The case for modus vivendi is not that it is some kind o f 
transcendent value which all ways o f life are bound to honour. It is that all or nearly 
all ways o f  life have interests that make peaceful coexistence worth pursuing.”*^  
Although Rawls would not argue that one single way o f life is best, he would agree 
that some kind o f transcendent value or consensus on overlapping values is required 
for peaceful coexistence. Notice that Gray does not say that all ways o f life benefit 
from peaceful coexistence. He adds the concession, “nearly all.” Gray does not 
address the issue o f those exceptions to the reasonable acceptance o f modus vivendi 
as a means to peace. It is precisely these exceptions that are Rawls’s primary 
concern in The Law o/Peop/es. When are tolerant peoples justified in using 
coercion against unreasonable, intolerant, or unjust actors? What are the limits o f 
tolerance? These are Rawls’s questions, and Gray does not help much with these 
problems.
Gray and Rawls may differ on the reality o f  human nature. However, Rawls 
needed to tell us more about his understanding o f the relationship between individual
Ibid.
Ibid., 135.
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autonomy and political autonomy if  he would succeed in defending more than a 
moc/us v/vendi moX\sd!i\on for cooperation between peoples. Gray said, “Being an 
autonomous agent is not, as Kant and his latter-day disciples seem to suppose, the 
timeless quintessence o f humanity. It is a particular way o f being human, and for 
that reason it has a history.”*^  How could one defend or negate such a claim? 
Various theories o f  truth could offer different possibilities. What is clear is that 
Rawls did not adequately resolves these questions about his own view o f persons as 
autonomous agents. Before concluding this comparison o f  H/eZaw o f/’eop/esWxth 
Kant’s “Perpetual Peace,” a few brief side comments point to one additional 
similarity between the two. These are matters o f  economic dynamics among 
persons.
Economic Issues in Perpetual Peace
Kant did not fully address issues o f  economic freedom and regulation in 
“Perpetual Peace.” The gross disparity in wealth, as exemplified by a comparison 
between say Haiti and the United States today, was not acknowledged. This might 
be a result o f  Kant’s thinking o f some nations as “savage” in contrast to civilized 
nations. There are only a few remarks in “Perpetual Peace” that can be related to 
questions o f  justice in economic distribution. He did claim a cosmopolitan right o f 
“universal hospitality” that includes the right to visit any land based on common
Ibid., 123.
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ownership o f  the globe.** He also spoke o f “nature’s provisional arrangements” in 
reference to the availability o f some natural resources even in remote and marginally 
habitable regions.*^ He expressed disapproval o f  the “inhospitable conduct” o f 
civilized nations towards “foreign lands and peoples,” involving commercial 
ventures that were the “same as conquering them.” Kant described that economic 
conquest as “terrifying injustice.” ®^ He did exhibit an optimism that international 
trade and international peace would go hand in hand. He thought that the “spirit o f  
trade” could not coexist with conditions o f war, and therefore that those interested in 
development o f  commerce would advocate peace.^' His caution regarding foreign 
debt indicates an awareness o f the problems o f  concentrated economic power as a 
threat to freedom and peace. He warned about the potential o f foreign debt to result 
in an imbalance o f power between nations. In fact, he stated that forbidding foreign 
debt would be a condition o f perpetual peace. Similarly, Kant noted that one 
nation’s excessive military spending could threaten international peace. He said that 
the “power o f  money” is the “most reliable instrument o f war.” *^ Since the “hoarding
Kant, Ferpetua/Peace, 118.
*‘" Ibid., 121.
Ibid., 119.
Ibid., 125.
Ibid., 109.
Ibid., 108.
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of treasure” may be viewed as “preparation for war,” Kant recognized the 
requirement o f  some general economic regulation.^"* Unfortunately, Kant did not 
fully address the analysis o f  economic issues in relation to international peace. For 
example, the limits o f a duty o f  economic aid to foreign nations is not addressed.
Kant’s concept o f positive freedom is grounded in free will. It emphasizes
the possibility o f detachment from all influences besides the free will. As a polemic
against determinism, Kant’s arguments promoted an understanding o f humans able
to overcome external conditions. That is to say, poverty is no justification to avoid
one’s obligations. Circumstances o f  poverty or wealth were irrelevant to the ability
to do one’s duty. The articles o f  perpetual peace would apply to all nations
regardless o f  their level o f wealth. The articles primarily relate to conduct o f war
rather than regulation o f commerce. The comments included on economic matters
do not answer questions about the extent o f a nation’s duty to aid other impoverished
nations. The closest Kant came to addressing this question was in a statement that
duty should not be reduced to mere benevolence. He wrote:
Both the love o f man and the respect for the rights o f 
man are our duty: the former is only conditional, while 
the latter is unconditional, absolutely imperative duty, 
a duty that one must be completely certain o f not 
having transgressed, if one is to be able to enjoy the 
sweet sense o f having done right. Politics readily 
agrees with morality in the first sense (as ethics) for 
both surrender m en’s rights to their rulers. But with 
regard to morality in the second sense (as doctrine o f 
right), before which it must bend the knee, politics 
finds it advisable not to enter into any relation
94 Ibid., 109.
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whatsoever and, unfortunately, denies all reality to 
morality and reduces all duties to mere benevolence 
(W ohlwollen)/^
We can only conjecture about the extent o f a duty o f international wealth 
redistribution that Kant would recommend. It seems likely that he would claim the 
duty o f international economic aid would be a demand o f  justice rather than a 
superogatory duty.^^ As a precondition o f life, economic resources must be linked 
with Kantian positive freedom.
Kant’s positive freedom is not about economic enabling conditions o f 
freedom. If we return briefly to a distinction noted in the previous chapter, the 
clarification offered by Tara Smith as the positive freedom of enabling conditions 
versus that o f ideal deployment, we must say that Kant’s positive freedom involves a 
type o f  ideal deployment. However, the ideal being promoted is simply the claim 
that individuals are the source o f  right. In one way this is not the promotion o f  an 
ideal or value but rather a claim about the basis o f any value. To promote this value 
o f individual self-determination is to promote the thinnest possible notion o f the 
good short o f  utilitarianism. As rational beings, persons are the locus o f  value, 
meaning, and right. That is why rationality is inseparably linked with free will. The 
consequence is a claim that humans have universal rights and obligations in respect
95 Ibid, 139.
^  Onora O ’Neill offers a Kantian criticism o f libertarian move reducing 
redistribution to a superogatory charity as opposed to a requirement o f  justice. 
Bounds o/Justice, 128.
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to one another. Kant’s concept o f positive freedom is only one building block in the 
construction o f  his larger moral theory. Since Kant’s transcendental idealism and 
teleological view o f  history go too far to be compelling, we might be tempted to 
reject his concept o f  positive freedom as well. However, this would leave us with 
only a utilitarian basis for ethics. If  we extract Kant’s notion o f positive freedom as 
rational acts o f free will and then link this with enabling conditions like resources, 
we would approach a meaningful concept o f  freedom with universal appeal.
A recent criticism o f Rawls offered by Roberto Alejandro suggests that 
“Rawlsian justice is deontology with a utilitarian bent,” because o f the way the 
difference principle maximizes material benefits.^’ Alejandro’s work was published 
prior to The Law o/Feop/es, and does not engage the international project.
However, his criticism could be extended to the Law o f Peoples in this way. If  the 
basis for a duty o f  assistance is based only on modus vivendi justifications, then it 
amounts to a utilitarian argument. O f course, Rawls sought to avoid this, reiterating 
that the duty assistance had to be based on more right reasons, not just modus 
vivendi. The question o f  the cut o ff point for a duty o f international aid and the 
refusal to apply the difference principle on the international level jeopardize that 
argument. This will be the subject o f my argument in subsequent chapters. Rawls
Roberto Alejandro, TheLim/(s o/Fonr/sian Jusf/ce. (Baltimore, Maryland: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 63.
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has been criticized for focusing on Kant’s ethics at the expense o f his politics.^* This 
can be illustrated in Rawls’s failure to heed Kant’s warning that duty should not be 
“reduced to benevolence.” ^  Rawls does actually propose a duty o f assistance that 
can be reduced to mere benevolence. Why did Rawls stops short o f arguing for the 
same “universal hospitality” that Kant a d v o c a t e d ? T h e  reason must be related to 
the unresolved questions about individual moral agency and value that Rawls sought 
to avoid.
In recent decades, Kant’s Perpe/ua/Feace\va& been viewed in international 
relations theory as utopian liberalism that had been discredited by the realist 
critique.'”' Given the reaction against utopian liberalism, and especially utopian 
political thought in the Kantian tradition, Rawls showed exceptional nerve in 
suggesting that this Kantian tradition should be reclaimed. Time will tell whether or 
not Rawls’s attempt to regenerate the possibility o f  realistic utopia influences 
mainstream international relations theory. Reviewing the Lcnrs o/Peop/esïox the 
international relations academic circle, Chris Brown stated that Rawls was clearly
Elizabeth Ellis, 181. Kan/ ’sPo/i//cs:Prov/siona/Theo/yjbran Uncer/ain 
fVor/d, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2005), 181. See also 
O ’Neill.
Ibid., 139.
' “ ibid., 118.
101 See E.H. Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr. Realist critique o f utopian liberalism.
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“on a different wavelength from most international-relations scholars.” In that
field where ethics is sometimes dismissed as irrelevant, Rawls’s project challenged
assumptions that power is the legitimate focus o f inquiry rather than justice. In his
review o f  Rawls, Brown wrote:
One o f the most important impacts o f Rawls on 
international relations and the study o f international 
ethics might be to relegitimate the construction o f 
utopias— always assuming that they are “realistic 
utopias,” and that the mistake o f  taking “what might 
be” as a description o f “what currently is” is not 
repeated.
On this point, I agree with Brown, and hope that Rawls’s influence on international 
relations will continue to grow. Without a persuasive framework for global dialogue 
on ethics, the world is left vying for power or seeking to balance power to achieve 
tenuous peace. Rawls attempted to reclaim and recast aspects o f  Kantian theory that 
might withstand both the realist critique and his own standard o f  metaphysical 
neutrality. In order to succeed in demonstrating that there is a possibility for peace 
based on more than modus vivendi, Rawls needed to retain a bit more o f Kant’s 
theory. The following chapters develop this argument, that Kantian positive freedom 
could link critiques o f Rawls based on resources, humans in relationship to each 
other, and labor.
Chris Brown, “John Rawls, ‘The Law o f People,’ and International Political 
Theory,” E/hicsanc/In/erna/fona/À j^/rs\ \  (2000) 132.
Ibid.
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CHAPTER THREE 
FREEDOM AND RESOURCES
We allow that there are certain things that are so bad, so deforming o f 
humanity, that we must go to great lengths to prevent them. Thus, 
with Cicero and Seneca, we hold that torture is an insult to humanity; 
and we now go further, rejecting slavery itself. But to deny people 
material aid seems to us not in the same category at all. We do not 
feel that we are torturing or raping people when we deny them the 
things that they need in order to live— presumably because we do not 
think these goods are in the same class. Humanity can shine out in a 
poor dwelling, and we tell ourselves that human dignity has not been 
offended by the poverty itself. Poverty is Just an external: it does not 
cut to the core o f  humanity. But o f course it does. The human being 
is not like a block or a rock, but a body o f  flesh and blood that is 
made each day by its living conditions. Hope, desire, expectation, 
will, all these things are shaped by material surroundings.'
There is a deep complementarity between individual agency and 
social arrangements. It is important to give simultaneous recognition 
to the centrality o f individual freedom and to the force o f social 
influences on the extent and reach o f individual freedom. To counter 
the problems that we face, we have to see individual freedom as a 
social comm itm ent... Development consists o f the removal o f 
substantial unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little 
opportunity o f  exercising their reasoned agency.^
' Martha Nussbaum, “Duties o f Justice, Duties o f  Material Aid: Cicero’s 
Problematic Legacy,” Journal o/Po//n'ca/PMosopky. 8: No. 2 (2000), 191.
 ^ Sen., 1999, xii.
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“You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prevented from attaining a 
goal by human beings,” said Isaiah B erlin / Therefore, inabilities are not cases o f 
unfreedom unless the inabilities are results o f human action. The fact that 1 cannot 
jum p over the moon does not mean I am not free to do so. Inability and unfreedom 
are two different things, at least according to the strictly negative definition o f 
freedom. Rawls accepted this distinction that separated freedom from ability. As a 
result, his theory is vulnerable to the criticism that it inadequately addresses the cases 
in which ability is the result o f  human action. Despite some clear cases in which 
inability is not the result o f  human will, there are ample cases that blur the 
distinction. For example, the fact that I cannot buy bread without money results from 
some combination o f  both natural conditions and socially constructed economic 
systems. Limits on capabilities to secure necessary goods for survival, pursue 
education, or choose a particular type o f employment are not determined purely by 
nature. Clearly, there are many ways that even a person’s abilities are determined by 
cultural, political, and social structure. The specific question I put to Rawls’s theory 
in this chapter concerns how to resolve the conflict between freedom o f  the 
entrepreneur to invest in the global economy and the consequences for the freedom 
of the worst o ff members o f humanity. I claim that the relationship between freedom 
and physical resources is inadequately developed in Rawls’s thought.
 ^Berlin, TC, 122.
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Rawls hoped this potential problem o f freedom being merely formal in liberal
theory could be overcome through his attention to equalizing the w w /^ o f political
liberty. In the domestic case this works assuming that substantial redistribution takes
place. However, in the international application o f his theory, freedom may be
meaningless or merely formal freedom, without the application o f the difference
principle. If  Rawls had explored positive freedom further, he would not have been
able to exempt the application o f  the difference principle in the Law o f  Peoples. Just
as the worth o f  money depends on the local contractual agreements about legitimate
currency, so the worth o f  freedom is likely to depend on such agreements in Rawls’s
international theory. Rawls sought to avoid injustices resulting from accidents o f
nature, while preserving consequences o f personal choice. However, since his theory
assumes basic subsistence needs be met as a background condition for procedural
justice, his theory is irrelevant to important problems. After mounting this criticism
based in a concept o f positive freedom, I explore similarities between my ideas and
those o f Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum criticized Rawls because he failed to
adequately appreciate the ramifications o f capabilities as a measure o f  freedom.
But Rawls’s approach, even though more promising as 
a basis for international thinking than Rawls himself is 
willing to suggest, nonetheless has some serious 
difficulties. By measuring who is better off and who 
worse o ff in terms o f resources, the Rawlsian model 
neglects a salient fact o f life: that individuals vary 
greatly in their needs for resources and in their abilities 
to convert resources into valuable functionings."*
Nussbaum, WHD, 68.
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In her book, Women and/fuman Deve/opment: fhe Capabi/d/es Approach, 
Nussbaum wrote that her concepts o f  “preference, choice, desire, and capability” 
need further analysis/ In this chapter I will further the work o f clarifying those 
concepts and their relationship to the concept o f positive liberty. Just as Nussbaum 
rejected Rawls’s attempt to leave family matters outside the scope o f Justice that his 
theory addressed, even so, Nussbaum’s critique points to the inclusion o f  economic 
matters as being inseparable from Rawls’s theory o f Justice. Rawls's theory is 
vulnerable to critiques related to the relationship between freedom and property 
resources as enabling conditions shaping ability. Rawls’s decision to distinguish 
between liberty and the worth o f  liberty will be analyzed as the key to a distinetion 
between formal versus substantive freedom. First, I turn to a brief review o f  the ways 
that material resources relate to freedom according to Rawls.
Freedom and Other Primary Goods
\n A Theo/y o/Jusn'ce, Rawls developed the relationship between freedom
and resources. He always acknowledged that basic goods, including material
resources were essential in order to secure liberty. He wrote:
Now the assumption is that though m en’s rational 
plans do have different final ends, they nevertheless all 
require for their execution certain primary goods, 
natural and social. Plans differ since individual 
abilities, circumstances, and wants differ; rational
 ^Nussbaum, “Duties o f  Justice, Duties o f Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic 
Legacy,” 299.
132
plans are adjusted to these contingencies. But 
whatever one’s system o f ends, primary goods are 
necessary means.^
The most basic means necessary for a rational plan are material goods 
required to sustain life. Freedom to execute a rational plan presupposes that these 
required goods be available. Therefore, provision for humans’ need o f  property 
resources is assumed as part o f  the background conditions o f justice as fairness. 
Property resources are on the list o f  primary goods, but not all primary goods are 
material resources. Primary goods are those goods that everyone is presumed to 
want. Whatever values a person may have or whatever life plan a person wishes to 
pursue, primary goods are those goods that would always be desired by everyone. 
The assumption is that these goods are either valuable in themselves or as a means to 
other ends. Rawls provided this list o f  primary goods:
1). rights and liberties
2). opportunities and powers
3). income and wealth ^
These primary goods would be justly distributed according to the difference 
principle so that inequalities would have to benefit the least well o ff members o f  the 
society. Notice that liberty is listed as a primary good. There is a tension between 
promoting a good like wealth versus promoting a good like liberty. By including 
both on this list, the problem o f  prioritizing their value relative to each other is
 ^Rawls, TJ, 93.
 ^ Ibid., 92.
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obscured. In other words, at times liberty must be restricted in order to promote 
production o f  wealth. In contrast, there are times when wealth or income production 
are limited in order to protect freedom. By listing these conflicting values together, 
Rawls opened the door to confusion about how he resolved these problems. At times 
he seemed to equivocate between different types o f  benefits for the “worst off 
person.” For example, he argued that inequalities in wealth benefit the 
“representative unskilled worker” because these inequalities result in overall 
improvement o f  the system. His defense is that the improvement in the situation o f 
the most disadvantaged person is better than it would be absent the inequality in 
freedom. It is the liberty o f the entrepreneurs that
.. .encourages them to do things which raise the 
longterm prospects o f the laboring class. Their better 
prospects act as incentives to that the economic 
process if more efficient, innovation proceeds at a 
faster pace, and so on. Eventually the resulting 
material benefits spread throughout the system and to 
the least advantaged. 1 shall not consider how far these 
things are true. The point is that something o f this 
kind must be argued if these inequalities are to be just 
by the difference principle.*
“The difference principle is compatible with the principle o f efficiency” because the
worst o ff person is better o ff in an efficient system than in an inefficient system.^ In
other words, Rawls sought the fairest procedures possible for arriving at the most
Just system possible. He did not attempt empirical analysis o f whether or not material
* Ibid., 78.
Ibid., 79.
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benefits actually do trickle down. However, he understood that equality o f
opportunity in terms o f  equal starting points in life could not be assured when
unequal outcomes are allowed. He wrote:
Now those starting out as members o f  the 
entrepreneurial class in property-owning democracy, 
say, have a better prospect than those who begin in the 
class o f unskilled laborers. It seems likely that this 
will be true even when the social injustices which now 
exist are removed (TJ, 78).
Here Rawls admitted that even if social injustices are removed, inequalities 
in economic class cannot be overcome through compensatory measures. Yet, he 
maintained that this inequality is justifiable when the difference principle is in effect. 
Evaluation o f  his original project hinged on the definition o f terms like “worst o ff 
person” and “better off.” In what sense is it true that the worst o ff person is better o ff 
in an efficient system than an inefficient system? Consider the case o f  a person who 
earns two dollars a day in an inefficient system and has little choice related to 
conditions o f  labor because in her society most people make only two dollars a day. 
Now consider that case in comparison with another society in which most people 
make only one dollar a day in an equally inefficient system where the cost o f  basic 
goods is the same as in the previous case. Is the person in the first case better off 
than the person in the second case? Without establishing a definition o f  the good we 
cannot answer the question. Adding an additional third comparison doesn’t help. If 
time passes and either society becomes more efficient so that income relative to 
expense rises significantly could we say that the members o f the society are better
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off? The same problem o f  defining the good exists. Rawls asserted that people are 
better o ff when their access to primary goods increases, but he did not adequately 
address problems o f trade offs between various items on that list o f  primary goods.
Are there cases in which liberty is justifiably sacrificed for material wealth? 
Liberty, power, and material wealth are all on Rawls’s list o f  “the social primary 
goods.” '® These are goods that are assumed to be valuable regardless o f  one’s 
individual comprehensive concept o f the good. Given Rawls’s definition o f primary 
goods, it is possible that an increase in the level o f  affluence o f  a society is offset by 
diminished power or liberty. Rawls’s insistence that liberty not be limited except for 
the protection o f liberty prevents justification o f losses o f freedom for the sake o f 
material prosperity. The priority o f the first principle over the second principle 
means that “a departure from the institutions o f equal liberty required by the first 
principle cannot be justified by or compensated for, by greater social and economic 
advantages.” "  However, when he defended the unequal worth o f liberty, he returned 
to overall increases in material wealth as the benefit to the worst off person.
These unresolved tensions between various goods on the list o f  primary 
goods relate to the problem o f the worth o f liberty. If we ask why liberty is valuable 
or what liberty is good for, then we come back to comprehensive notions o f  the 
good. To avoid these problems Rawls later claimed that his is not a comprehensive.
'® Ibid., 62.
"  Ibid., 61.
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but a political theory o f  justice. In Po/itica/Libera/ism, he responded to criticisms 
about his distinction between liberty and the worth o f liberty by bolstering his 
stipulation that provisions to ensure equal worth o f  political liberty be maintained.
He wrote.
This is done by including in the first principle o f 
justice the guarantee that the political liberties, and 
only these liberties, are secured by what I have called 
their ‘fair value.’ To explain: this guarantee means that 
the worth o f the political liberties to all citizens, 
whatever their social or economic position, must be 
approximately equal, or at least sufficiently equal, in 
the sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold 
public office and to influence the outcome o f political 
decisions.'^
Equal liberties secured by the first principle include all the liberties o f  citizenship.
Equal liberties do not apply to power over decisions in the workplace or corporate
board room. But leaving that issue aside for now, even securing equal liberties listed
as political would require a level o f redistribution o f material resources approaching
equality. Since Rawls left unanswered questions about how to accomplish this
redistribution, his notion o f freedom is merely formal. O f the following list o f
political liberties, many do not require equality o f material resources. He wrote:
The basic liberties o f  citizens are, roughly speaking, 
political liberty (the right to vote and be eligible for 
public office) together with freedom o f speech and 
assembly; liberty o f conscience and freedom of 
thought; freedom o f the person along with the right to 
hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary
12 PL, 327.
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arrest and seizure as defined by the concept o f the rule
o f law.'^
On the one hand, public financing o f  elections can ameliorate some o f  these 
problems as Rawls suggested. Providing equal opportunity for voting may be a 
manageable accom plishm en t.H ow ever, on the other hand, because such problems 
can never be totally eradicated, equal worth o f liberty to hold public office is merely 
formal when there are gross inequalities in material wealth. Similarly, freedom of 
speech will not be o f equal worth unless equal material resources are available to all 
persons. The freedom o f  a citizen who makes two dollars a day in comparison with 
the owner o f  the company who makes thousands a day is an equal freedom from the 
perspective o f  the purely negative concept o f liberty.
Rawls admitted that freedom is the type o f  good that requires other primary 
goods as prerequisites. Similarly “income and wealth” are listed as other primary 
goods and ownership o f  these types o f property resources require the establishment 
o f some rights. In fact, I think that assumptions about property rights are already 
presupposed by including income and wealth as primary goods. Rawls discussed 
private property regimes as one possible way o f organizing a just society, but by 
listing income and wealth as primary goods, he suggested that access to these goods
PL, 359.
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must be available in some form.'^ Income and wealth might be included in the 
broader category o f  property that I will refer to as property resources. In order to 
enjoy a primary good like liberty, one must have access to material goods that 
sustain life and allow participation in social systems. Rawls consistently argued that 
access to primary goods was a prerequisite for his theory. However, the exact level 
o f material resources needed would depend on the particular setting. For example, in 
some systems, not only shelter, food, and clothing would be required for a political 
freedom like voting, but access to transportation and a certain level o f education 
would also be necessary. Thus, Rawls acknowledged that a minimum welfare is 
required for political liberty, at least enough to secure effective political 
participation. Therefore, in Rawls’s theory liberty is dependent on other primary
goods. He wrote, “Liberty is governed by the necessary conditions for liberty itself.
«16
Rawls’s list o f  primary goods seems to include some goods that are 
inherently valuable. For example, property resources like access to clean water or 
food are such obvious primary goods that they are not listed as primary goods. They 
are natural goods rather than primary goods. But are income and wealth primary 
goods in the same way that political freedom is a primary good? To the extent that 
survival needs are met, income and wealth are tools to pursuing a life plan or a 
substantive notion o f  the good. Rawls seems unconcerned with scenarios in which
'^TJ, 259.
16 Ibid., 251.
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survival needs are not met. O f course, he has insisted that his theory o f  justice only 
applies when background conditions o f non-starvation are already met. However, 
this move left him vulnerable to the criticism that his theory is irrelevant to some o f 
the worst cases o f  injustice related to wealth distribution. Why the lack o f attention 
to the problem o f  unmet survival needs? His rational choosers behind the veil o f  
ignorance are supposed to assume that survival needs are met, and he him self 
brushes o ff this problem by assuring us that we can assume that survival needs will 
be met. But the historical and actual conflicts related to balancing enough property 
resources for survival with interest in other primary goods are daunting. Aren’t 
some o f  these goods that Rawls called primary goods really secondary goods? On the 
hierarchy o f  basic survival the most basic primary goods are more basic than what 
Rawls listed. What system would rational choosers select to ensure that survival 
needs o f  the community are met? Rawls wanted to leave this question open, hoping 
that a variety o f  specific economic systems or arrangements would be equally 
acceptable under the two principles o f justice.
Self respect is another primary good that becomes more highly emphasized in 
his later writings. “Health and vigor” as well as “ intelligence and imagination” are 
listed as primary goods that are natural g o o d s .H o w ev e r, this distinction between 
natural goods and social values is problematic. Although clearly there are cases o f 
natural inequalities in health or intelligence, there are many other cases in which 
health and even intelligence are directly related to socially constructed factors like
'^T J , 62.
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wealth distribution. Rawls intended to provide a corrective for inequalities based in
nature. He wrote,
All social values -  liberty and opportunity, income and 
wealth, and the bases o f self-respect -  are to be 
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution o f 
advantage any, or all, o f  these values is to everyone’s 
advantage.'*
Since some material goods are necessary conditions for liberty itself, one
must assume that Rawls would accept redistribution and regulation o f markets as
sometimes required for the sake o f  liberty. His reluctance to specify terms and
means for this redistribution and regulation derives from his liberal commitment to
prioritize liberty as the most important good. He wrote, “The precedence o f  liberty
means that liberty can be restricted only for the sake o f liberty itself.” '^ But, it may
be that liberty itself requires restriction o f  certain types o f  economic liberty in order
to protect political liberty. The concept o f positive liberty can help sort out the
distinction between material prerequisites to effective political participation and acts
o f will in cooperation with others that construct a social freedom that is more than
formal. Rather than proceed in that direction, Rawls tried to reconcile these problems
by separating liberty from what he called the “worth o f liberty.” In his discussion o f
equal liberty Rawls wrote;
The inability to take advantage o f one’s rights and 
opportunities as a result o f  poverty and ignorance, and
'*Ibid.
Ibid., 224.
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a lack o f means generally, is sometimes counted 
among the constraints definitive o f liberty. I shall not, 
however, say this, but rather I shall think o f  these 
things as affecting the worth o f liberty
Poverty and ignorance represent two different types o f problems with 
freedom. For now, I set aside the problem o f the relationship between freedom and 
ignorance. I will focus here on the relationship between freedom and what Rawls 
here refers to as “means.” In this case, poverty is equated with a lack o f  means. 
Notice that the terms “ inability” and “opportunity” are used to describe the results o f 
poverty. Capacity to advance one’s own ends and capabilities are separate from 
liberty but reflect the worth o f liberty in Rawls’s theory.
The Worth of Liberty
Why did Rawls make this significant move, locating the problems that
poverty poses for freedom in this term “the worth o f liberty”? He sought to avoid
conclusions about the necessity o f redistribution o f wealth, thus staying neutral with
respect to the laissez faire capitalism versus socialism debate. Furthermore, he
sought to address the type o f  freedom that he understood as political freedom as
opposed to economic or personal, familial issues o f freedom.
Thus liberty and the worth o f  liberty are distinguished 
as follows: liberty is represented by the complete 
system o f  the liberties o f  equal citizenship, while the 
worth o f liberty to persons and groups is proportional
Ibid., 204.
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to their capacity to advance their ends within the 
framework the system defines.^'
Justice as fairness requires that citizens equally share the capacity to act
politically. Political voice, representation, and participation are rights o f  citizenship
that would be held equally. Rawls argued that in contrast to equality o f political
power, equality in property resources would not be required by justice as fairness.
He argued that in some cases, inequality in material resources would benefit the least
well off. Since allowing inequalities is necessary to raise the level o f affluence or
most effective production, those at the bottom benefit from these arrangements,
according to this theory. Therefore, such inequalities would be justifiable because
they cause everyone to be better o ff than they would be otherwise. Although the
worth o f  liberty would be different in respect to ability to utilize material resources
as a mean to satisfactions o f  desires, what Rawls was willing to call liberty itself
would be equal. He wrote, “Taking the two principles together, the basic structure is
to be arranged to maximize the worth to the least advantaged o f  the complete scheme
of equal liberty shared by all.”^^
Because o f concerns for the worth o f liberty, Rawls insisted that “the value o f
the equal rights o f  participation for all members o f society” be protected by a
constitution.^^ We want assurance o f the value o f  the equal rights, not just rights that
Ibid.
22 Ibid., 205.
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are formally equal. In a just system a constitution “must underwrite a fair
opportunity to take part in and to influence the political process.” '^* On the other
hand, Rawls did connect the worth o f liberty with the concept o f opportunity. He
understood that equality o f opportunity requires compensation for starting places that
are unequal. He said,
... Those who are at the same level o f talent and 
ability, and have the same willingness to use them, 
should have the same prospects o f success regardless 
o f  their initial place in the social system, that is, 
irrespective o f the income class into which they are 
bom.^^
However, in this early work Rawls showed inadequate attention to the 
problems those inequalities in material resources pose for power in what he calls 
political liberty. Power to influence elections, political process, and all levels o f 
government related to liberty is grossly different depending on one’s level o f 
material wealth. Poverty represents a bottom level o f the economic spectrum, and it 
is true that measures can be taken to insure certain rights o f political participation for 
the poor. Nonetheless, the inequality o f political power between rich and poor is 
never eradicated. Rawls said, “In all sectors o f society there should be roughly equal 
prospects o f culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and
Ibid.
Ibid., 73.
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endowed.”^^  Prospects rather than outcome must be equal. The reason that fully 
equal outcomes are not defended by Rawls is justified by the difference principle. In 
other words, Rawls claimed that strict equality o f outcomes would disadvantage even 
the worst o ff members. Furthermore, equality o f  outcomes cannot be reconciled 
with reciprocity, since those who do not work would benefit at that same level as 
those who do. Therefore, Rawls argued that not outcomes, but opportunities should 
be equal. In this passage Rawls emphasized fair procedure for those people who 
have equal wi/Z/ngness to achieve, not those who exert similar levels o f effort. This 
subtle point has important consequences related to Rawls’s understanding o f 
reciprocity. The distinction can be illustrated by imagining that two workers both 
have an equal willingness to labor, but for whatever reason, one o f  them does not 
actually exert the effort in an act o f labor. Equal ability and opportunity to labor do 
not always coincide with equal willingness. However, discussions o f equality will 
only be analyzed here insofar as they intersect with the notion o f freedom. Rawls 
would like to leave open possibilities that many types o f economic systems could be 
just. He did not adequately resolve the conflict between highly efficient economic 
systems that augment the material resources o f  a people versus rival systems that 
promote values other than material well-being. Such choices between contending 
systems would be left up to the legislative level for resolution. However, the 
potential for material wealth to prevent fair procedure at the legislative level is not 
fully resolved. His discussion o f freedom focuses specifically on political freedom
Ibid.
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since having voice in the procedure is what is required for justice. Rawls was
stalwart in his defense o f  political liberty which he defined as, “The freedom to
participate equally in political a f f a i r s . H e  wrote:
Liberty is unequal as when one class o f  persons has a 
greater liberty than another or liberty is less extensive 
than it should be. Now all the liberties o f equal 
citizenship must be the same for each member o f 
society.^*
This is part o f fair procedure specified by persons in the original position. 
Because Rawls’s theory is a procedural concept o f  justice, he is most concerned that 
the process for making political decisions is fair, even though there may never be 
agreement about outcomes such as distribution o f resources being fair. He thought 
that
Compensating steps must, then, be taken to preserve 
the fair value for all o f  the equal political liberties. A 
variety o f devises can be used. For example, in a 
society allowing private ownership o f  the means o f 
production, property and wealth must be kept widely 
distributed and government monies provided on a 
regular basis to encourage free public discussion.^^
Sometimes inequalities in political power are the result o f  natural talents and 
disabilities resulting from birth. In order to examine this point more fully it is
Ibid., 201.
Ibid., 203-204.
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necessary to briefly discuss Rawls’s concern that natural inequalities be rectified 
whenever possible.
Rawls said that just as people do not deserve the inequalities in their abilities 
and resources derived from being bom in a certain body, class, and culture; similarly 
they do not deserve inequalities in what he called “natural liberty.” '^’ His notion o f 
desert is shared by many who affirm as a common sense agreement the idea that it 
seems unfair that some be bom with talents, abilities, and personal attributes that 
advantage them from the start. This intuitive idea implies that those bom with 
physical disabilities or unfortunate personal attributes should not be disadvantaged 
because o f  these accidents o f  nature. This matter will be considered more fully in 
chapter four relating ability and talent to work. Nonetheless there exists sharp 
disagreement about the implications o f  such natural differences for justice. Rawls 
rejected that idea that some persons might be justly privileged precisely because they 
are naturally endowed with excellent virtues or abilities. For this reason, Rawls has 
been faulted for defending in his later work the seemingly contradictory position that 
the benefits o f being born in one nation as opposed to another are defensible. This 
matter will be considered more fully in chapter three exploring the relationship 
between moral obligations and state borders. The distribution o f natural 
endowments by birth does not justify inequalities in resources according to his 
reasoning in J  Theory o f Jus//ce. He wrote.
Ibid., 66.
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It seems to be one o f the fixed points o f our considered 
judgments that no one deserves his place in the 
distribution o f  native endowments any more than one 
deserves one’s initial starting place in society.” '^
Because o f  Rawls’s notion o f  desert, he should not be satisfied with such a limited
notion o f freedom. In other words, equality o f  starting place is required for justice as
fairness. Equalizing starting place requires equalizing outcomes since each
generations choices determine starting places for the next. When selecting options
from behind the veil o f  ignorance, persons would choose a more robust notion o f
freedom that was underwritten with better property resources. Access to political
freedoms like political voice and vote would not be enough. Rawls’s concept o f
freedom is a formal conception, a negative conception. Rawls said, “Liberty and
opportunity, income and wealth, and above all self-respect are primary g o o d s . I f
he operated with a positive liberty conception he would clarify how there is no equal
liberty without equal access to property. As it is, the conflicts between those who
choose to maximize competing goods from the list are left unresolved.
/nPo/if/ca/Libera/fsm, Rawls offered little change in the way he viewed the
material conditions necessary o f  the value o f liberty. He maintained his view that the
“exclusive use o f  personal property” is one o f  the basic liberties.^^ Note the
specification o f  the terms “use o f property” and “personal property.” He continued
Ibid., 104.
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to seek a middle ground in contrast to both a libertarian view o f extensive property
rights and a communal claim o f  shared property rights. His interest in defending the
use o f property rests in the realistic conditions o f political cooperation and freedom.
In consideration o f  the right to hold and use personal property he wrote:
The role o f  this liberty is to allow a sufficient material 
basis for a sense o f  personal independence and self- 
respect, both o f which are essential for the 
development and exercise o f  the moral powers.^'*
However, Rawls did not include as basic liberty rights o f “acquisition and
bequest.”^^  In this way, he further distanced his position from libertarianism. On the
other hand, he also denied that there is a basic right “to equally control means o f
production and natural resources.”^^  Ownership o f the means o f  production is not
determined at the level o f first principles o f justice “but depend upon the traditions
and social institutions o f  a c o u n t r y . . . I n  this way he distanced him self from
socialism. How did he defend these limits to freedom? He said that these more
comprehensive claims about property rights are not “necessary for the development
and exercise o f  the moral powers.
Ibid.
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Rawls’s concern was in property as related to the fair value o f political liberty. 
Too much economic inequality results in lack o f  equality o f political liberty. 
Therefore, public financing o f political campaigns is a crucial issue. In this way, he 
did demonstrate recognition that material resources determine the value o f  liberties. 
Concern for the fairness o f the principles o f justice motivates his discussion o f  “the 
problem o f  maintaining the fair value o f  equal political l ib e r tie s .C o rre c tin g  the 
inadequacy o f  his treatment o f  this problem in his earlier writing, Rawls reflected 
awareness that political equality requires adjustments to compensate for economic 
inequality. He claimed that this can be corrected by institutional arrangements 
regulating elections and campaigns. He said, “What is fundamental is a political 
procedure which secures for all citizens a full and equally effective voice in a fair 
scheme o f  representation.” ®^ This necessity for institutions that ensure equal political 
liberties despite unequal economic situations requires justification at the level o f  the 
social contract. In other words, institutional safeguards o f equality in political 
participation require a principle o f justice defending this use o f collective power. 
Rawls argued that the second principle o f justice accomplished this. The difference 
principle is designed “to regulate the social and economic system so that social
Ibid., 357.
Ibid., 361.
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resources are properly used and the means to citizens’ ends are produced efficiently 
and fairly shared.”'*'
Rawls did not want to commit him self to either the laissez-faire notion that 
individuals would choose their own strictly individual survival and prosperity or the 
socialist notion that radically individual freedom is not as valuable as community 
well-being. To make either choice him self would be to burden his theory with a 
notion o f  the good that is more than a procedural notion o f  justice. His resistance to 
Joining this split is wise since there are cases in which people seem willing to die 
rather than submit to less than freedom, and other cases in which people seem 
willing to sacrifice some liberties to pursue others.
In The Law o/Peop/es, the values o f  liberty and equality are combined and 
ordered according to three principles that lead to stability for the right reasons. The 
third principle deals with the necessity o f material goods as a prerequisite for full and 
equal social cooperation. Rawls said, “ .. .the third assures for all citizens the 
requisite primary goods to enable them to make intelligent and effective use o f  their 
freedoms.”'*^  Here Rawls maintained his earlier claim that the worth o f freedom must 
be protected at the constitutional level, although the material conditions o f  political 
freedom were guaranteed at the level o f agreements in the original position. He 
wrote:
Ibid., 368.
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The third principle is the assurance o f sufficient all­
purpose means to enable all citizens to make intelligent 
and effective use o f  their freedom s.. .The guaranteed 
constitutional liberties taken alone are properly 
criticized as purely formal.'*^
Without the assurance o f primary goods including material necessities, “excessive
and unreasonable inequalities tend to develop.”'*'' Thus, a well-ordered society
underwrites material necessities for all citizens. In contrast to libertarian theory that
precludes that level o f  redistribution and safety net, Rawls’s theory requires
provision for “essential prerequisites for a basic structure” required by the
principles o f justice o f  all liberal conceptions because these lead to stability for the
right reasons. Rawls hoped to Justify more than merely stability based on a
precarious balance o f  power or mutual interests. Stability for right reasons would be
achieved through a procedural notion o f justice. He said the essential prerequisites
for this achievement o f contractual justice include: “fair equality o f  opportunity,
especially in education and training.”'*^
In The Law o/Peop/es^ dN^X?, continued the defense o f some redistribution o f
material resources because he viewed this as necessary for political fairness. He
wrote:
... All citizens must be assured the all-purpose means 
necessary for them to take intelligent and effective
Ibid.,49.
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advantage o f  their basic freedoms. (In the absence o f 
this condition, those with wealth and income tend to 
dominate those with less and increasingly to control 
political power in their own favor.''^
This insistence on the role o f  material goods as a necessary condition o f fair systems
o f cooperation does not amount to a sharp revision o f  his earlier writing, but rather a
stronger emphasis on the importance he had recognized from the beginning.
However, Rawls rejected the extension o f  the difference principle to the 
global sphere. Inequalities in resources will continue to exist across borders despite 
the law o f  peoples. Redistribution is not required beyond the bounds o f  the society, 
except as a limited duty o f assistance. Provision for only the most minimal 
requirements would be met by this duty o f  assistance. So, how does his theory 
address the conflict between freedom o f the entrepreneur to invest in the global 
economy and the consequences for the freedom o f  the worst o ff members o f 
humanity? The mechanism for determining the scope o f  economic development is 
left up to state constitutional government. In fact, whether the economic developer is 
a private investor or the state itself as an economic agent o f public trust, the same 
problems occur. We need some criterion to balance economic interest with personal 
freedom. Rawls assumed that the plight o f the worst off members o f  every nation are 
the responsibility o f  their own society. If the government o f the worst o ff persons 
does not protect their interests, is the entrepreneur from another society morally 
culpable to damage o f human rights or the environment? Rawls admitted a need for
46 Ibid.
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regional economic institutions to protect interests o f all. But, if the worst off 
members o f  another nation are incapable o f  defending their own interests, then 
injustice would result. Rawls’ argued that we have a duty o f assistance, that is, 
peoples with access to wealth must assist societies burdened with severe poverty, but 
only to the level that makes possible the development o f institutions o f self- 
governance. This duty o f  assistance should assure that even the worst o ff have the 
resources to ensure enough political power to achieve some protection o f their own 
interests. Yet, Rawls claimed that a global difference principle was inconsistent with 
the justice promoted through the Law o f Peoples, because o f his commitment to 
reciprocity. Without a global difference principle, cases o f purely formal freedom 
persist, rendering Rawls’s theory o f  justice either inadequate or irrelevant to the 
international scene. He could have made a different move, retaining a Kantian 
notion o f  positive freedom as the criterion by which competing interests and values 
would be adjudicated.
A strictly negative view o f freedom is inadequate for the problems related to 
the relationship between liberty and resources. Consider the illustration o f  a fountain. 
Whether the fountain occurs naturally or is artificially constructed, eertain material 
conditions must be in place. A natural bed o f  earth or rocks with varying levels o f 
height can set the stage. Physical items like water pipes, a pump, and a well-lined 
receptacle are required to construct a fountain. Then, o f course, the water is 
necessary. Some force to move the water; either gravity or energy for a pump is 
needed. All o f these material resources for the fountain can be present, without
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producing a fountain. We might look at an empty structure in the park and say, 
“That’s a fountain,” despite the fact that there is no water. To be more precise, a 
fountain is only real when the water is actually moving and flowing. The material 
resources required for the fountain parallel the way material resources are 
prerequisite for freedom. Freedom is more like a dynamic process, a function among 
various actors than it is like a possession. In that respect it is a different type o f 
primary good, because freedom is not easily provided in the way that clothing or 
food can be. Such illustrations point to a distinction between the material conditions 
o f freedom and the freedom itself. Resources are material conditions for freedom, 
not another type o f  freedom. Strictly speaking, negative freedom does not require 
material conditions, although positive freedom does. Maintaining substantive 
freedom in a positive sense is costly and calls for substantial regulation o f  social 
arrangements like economic systems. To illustrate this, I turn to a critique o f  Rawls 
offered by Martha Nussbaum.
Capabilities. Opportunities, and Freedom in Nussbaum’s critique
This difference between, on the one hand, having the formal elements for 
freedom in place and, on the other hand, having a real, functioning freedom indicates 
a weakness in Rawls’s theory. Among the myriad criticisms o f Rawls’s work, some 
offer suggested amendments to his work while affirming the direction o f  his liberal 
theory. Martha Nussbaum offers an important critique that advocates o f  Rawls’s 
liberalism would do well to incorporate. 1 examine her criticism o f Rawls because
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her work illustrates improvements being constructed on the Rawlsian foundation that 
share convictions from the positive liberty tradition. Positive freedom does not split 
ability from the concept o f freedom itself. Nussbaum’s emphasis on capability 
incorporates the freedom and the ability to make freedom meaningful. In this way, 
she offers a corrective to Rawls.
Nussbaum argued that human life has certain “central defining features.”'*^
She defended the idea o f  universal values through “internalist essentialism” saying,
One might, that is, believe that the deepest 
examination o f  human history and human cognition 
^om  within ^ \W reveals a more or less determinate 
account o f  the human being, one that divides its 
essential from its accidental properties.''*
This move is in opposition to that o f  Rawls who insisted that politics must eschew 
determinist theories o f  the human being and the human good.'*^ However, Nussbaum 
maintained that antiessentialism results in either relativism or subjectivism. She 
argued that global ethics requires more than relativism, “the view that the only 
available standard to value is some local group or individual,” or subjectivism, “that 
the standard is given by each individual’s subjective preference.” "^ Like other
Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense o f Aristotelian 
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liberals, Rawls rejected essentialism because he viewed it as based in metaphysical 
rea lism /' Although Nussbaum also rejects metaphysical essentialism, she defended 
internalist essentialism as a reasonable basis for ethics free o f metaphysical realism. 
She wrote:
The idea is that once we identify a group o f  especially 
important functions in human life, we are then in a 
position to ask what social and political institutions are 
doing about them. Are they giving people what they 
need in order to be capable o f functioning in all these 
human ways? And are they doing this in a minimal 
way, or are they making it possible for citizens to 
function well? ^
This Aristotelian conception defends the link between autonomy and capability
grounded in material and social conditions. “If one cares about autonomy, then one
must care about the rest o f  the form o f life that supports it and the material
conditions that enable one to live that form o f life.^^
I agree with Nussbaum’s claim that “we urgently need a version o f
essentialism in public life.” '^' Ethics o f  global wealth distribution require not only
promotion o f  negative freedom, but also some notion o f  personal freedom
underwritten by resources that yield genuine capabilities. Nussbaum wrote:
The general direction o f my argument should by now 
be clear: we cannot tell how a country is doing unless
51 Ibid., 206.
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54 Ibid., 229.
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we know how the people in it are able to function in 
the central human ways. And without an account o f  the 
good, however vague, that we take to be shared, we 
have no adequate basis for saying what is missing from 
the lives o f  the poor or marginalized or excluded, no 
adequate way o f justifying the claim that any deeply 
embedded tradition we encounter is unjust.^^
Her criticism o f Rawls’s liberalism is a criticism o f splitting o ff ability from freedom 
and well-being from options. The connection between material resources and 
functioning is the basis o f  this criticism.
A fascinating comparison could be made between Nussbaum’s criticism o f 
Rawls and her analysis o f  what she called “Cicero’s problematic legacy.” In a paper 
she presented at a conference on Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism at Stanford 
University in April o f  1999, she argued that Cicero shaped the way our theories o f 
international law and morality address questions o f  international economic 
relationships.^^ She must have been writing this paper at the same time Rawls was 
completing his final book, published the same year Nussbaum published this article. 
She challenged Cicero’s claim that “we owe the republic more material aid than we 
do to foreign nations and nationals”^^  and described his influence as “pernicious” *^
Ibid., 229.
^  Nussbaum, Martha. “Duties on Justice, Duties o f Material Aid: Cicero’s 
Problematic Legacy,” Journal o f  Philosophy, 8, no. 2 (2000), 176.
Ibid., 204.
Ibid., 180.
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when it comes to questions o f material aid across national boundaries. She provides 
the lines o f  connection from Cicero to Kant’s idea o f  universal law condemning 
violations o f “human fellowship,” and clearly sets up the connection to Rawls in this 
way.^^ She then quoted Cicero who called “this principle a part o f ‘nature, this is the 
law o f peoples’ in Book III o f De Cicero claimed that the law o f  peoples
results from obligations that arise from a sense o f  community.^' There is no 
reference to Rawls in this paper, yet her criticism o f Cicero paves the way for a 
criticism o f  Rawls.
In accessing the duties o f justice related to questions o f  material aid across 
borders, Nussbaum considered whether the distinction between “positive and 
negative” duties is morally significant.^^ The difference between acting and 
refraining is not a distinction that allows us to draw a line limiting moral culpability, 
according to both Cicero and Nussbaum. Yet, issues o f material aid are costly. Both 
the ability and the will to generate resources have a complicated relationship to 
issues o f  justice. She concluded that cosmopolitans lack adequate theory to justify 
unlimited duty o f  material aid across borders at this time. The concept o f  positive 
freedom might move the development o f such theory forward.
Ibid., 184.
60 Ibid.
Cicero. 6% Ob/igafions fDe Q^c//s) trans. P.O. Walsh. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000).
^^Nussbaum, WHO, 193.
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Nussbaum ’s work with Amartya Sen on the capabilities approach includes
considerations o f  problems in Rawls’s work that overlap with central concerns from
the tradition o f  positive liberty. Nussbaum wrote.
Again, it is right to demand that philosophers writing 
about poverty show that they have some understanding 
o f the complex interaction o f agency and constraint in 
the lines o f  those concerning whom they make 
recommendations.^^
Nussbaum found Rawls’s understanding o f  these dynamics wanting. “Agency and
constraint” are terms related to discussions o f the concept o f liberty. “Constraint”
implies the restrictions on liberty in the negative sense; whereas, “agency” begins to
get at the positive notion o f liberty. Nussbaum wrote:
To do justice to A ’s struggles, we must see them in 
their social context, aware o f the obstacles that the 
context offers to the struggle for liberty, opportunity, 
and material well-being. In his discussions o f liberty 
and opportunity, Rawls shows him self well aware that 
a theory o f  justice must be cognizant o f  the different 
situations o f  distinct lives, in order to distribute not 
only liberty, but also equal worth; not only formal 
equality o f  opportunity, but also truly fair equality o f 
opportunity. His emphasis on wealth and income as 
primary goods central to the task o f indexing, however, 
sells short his own respect for the individual.^
The respect for the individual that Nussbaum feared was in danger o f  getting lost in
Rawls’s theory must be grounded somewhere. Since Rawls wanted to remain
detached from comprehensive notions o f the good, he is at risk o f losing any basis
Nussbaum, WHO, 301.
Ibid., 69.
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for defending respect for Individuals as compelling. If he accepted a Kantian notion 
o f positive freedom as the one universal value, he could promote the thinnest 
possible notion o f  the good that is needed to resolve these problems Nussbaum 
identified. However, it is not adequate to say that everyone should be equal or that 
everyone should be free and then to ignore realities that prevent such claims from 
being realized even in the lives o f the worst off. If  Rawls did admit a universal 
reality that calls for respect for the individual, then he could not justify a cut-off 
point for aid to burdened societies without approaching something like a global 
difference principle.
These criticisms are based in a desire to strengthen Rawls’s theory, and
driven by a fear that his theory seems irrelevant to some o f  the worst instances o f
injustice. For example, Nussbaum criticized Rawls for exempting the family that
from the application o f his principles o f justice. She noted an inconsistency in his
treatment o f the family as an institution. Although he said the family is part o f  the
basic structure o f  society, he also said that the principles o f  justice don’t apply to the
internal workings o f  the family.^^ She argued that his theory could be extended to
familial relations. Nussbaum stated:
In short, the state’s interest in protection o f the dignity, 
integrity, and well-being o f each citizen never simply 
leads to external constraints o f the family structure,
^^Martha Nussbaum, “The Future o f Feminist Liberalism,”in Fane/ies o/Fem/nis/ 
Z/^ e/t/Z/sm (ed.) Amy R. Baehr. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers,
Inc., 2004), 115.
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whatever the appearance may be, it always leads to 
positive construction o f the family institute.^^
The idea that positive construction o f the family is necessary parallels the claim that
positive construction o f liberty is required for justice. Autonomy is a possibility
constructed by social and state institutions and arrangements. Furthermore, she saw
inconsistencies in Rawls’s stance toward the public/private distinction, saying that
Rawls rejected the distinction yet “remains half-hearted in that rejection.”^^  Despite
the agreement between Rawls and Nussbaum, she thought that they disagreed over
the extent o f  intervention appropriate to protect persons’ capabilities.
Nussbaum does not directly address the tradition o f positive liberty. It is 
possible that she would reject direct connection with the language o f  positive 
freedom. Nevertheless, her writing evidences concerns with economic realities that 
motivate advocates o f  positive liberty. Just as the institution o f  family must be 
governed not only through external constraints or limits on freedom, but also through 
the positive creation and development o f the family, even so the freedom must be 
both limited and empowered. In her discussion o f  human nature Nussbaum sounds 
almost like a proponent o f  positive liberty. She said, “Each human being is a maker 
o f a life plan.” *^ She stressed that what it means to be human requires us to respect
WHO., 272-278.
67 Nussbaum, 2004, 123.
WHO, 284.
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the capabilities o f  others as “active p l a n n e r s . N o w ,  I am not suggesting that 
Nussbaum would welcome any theoretical entanglement with the controversial 
concept o f positive freedom as it has developed historically. Furthermore, Rawls 
would agree with the importance o f  respecting persons as “active planners.” Where 
Rawls falls short in T/ieLaw o/Peop/es \^  that he attributes responsibility for the 
enabling conditions o f  meaningful freedom to the individual’s particular society 
rather than claiming this responsibility as a universal responsibility with no cut-off 
point based on borders. I agree with Nussbaum’s critique o f Rawls on this point. 
Freedom requires access to resources and justice requires personal freedom including 
capabilities.
Capabilities are directly related to options. Nussbaum’s analysis o f  the 
importance o f options includes an emphasis on the importance o f  economic options. 
She views problems o f prostitution and child labor as being linked to lack o f  options, 
choices, and other opportunities, especially economic options.™ This is the kind o f 
analysis that Rawls could incorporate to strengthen his theory. What would Rawls 
say about child labor? Would he say that it is a family matter beyond the scope o f  his 
theory o f  justice? What would he say about prostitution? Would he feel compelled 
to defend the idea that some prostitutes might freely choose that type o f work, so 
their freedom to do so should be protected? On the one hand, in doing so Rawls 
could be protecting significant rights o f the individual or family. Yet, on the other
Ibid., 285.
™ Ibid., 286.
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hand, he could be missing the realities o f lack o f opportunity for meeting survival 
needs in many societies. We know Rawls’s compelling interest injustice was in 
tension with his refusal to universalize any particular comprehensive concept o f  the 
good. By relegating questions o f  family hierarchy and power hierarchy in the 
economic realm o f business to some sphere beyond the application o f his theory o f 
Justice, Rawls opened him self up to these types o f  objections.^' In these examples the 
relationship between property resources and freedom becomes clearer.
Nussbaum offers a critique o f Rawls that advances both concern for 
promoting liberty in the negative sense and awareness that enabling conditions are 
necessary for positive freedom. However, more work is required in clarifying the 
terms Nussbaum uses. There is a lack o f precision in her use o f the terms capability, 
opportunity, capacity, possibility and freedom. Nussbaum occasionally used the term 
capacity as if  it were interchangeable with the term capability. The difference 
between positive and negative liberty is related to nuances in these te rm s .N e g a tiv e  
freedom does not take into account the requirement that people be actively engaged 
in the process o f pursuing life plans in order to be considered free. But the same 
problem is related to the term capability. We might say that this structure has the 
capability o f  producing a fountain, because the material conditions are all present.
For example Darrel M ollendorf agrees with Nussbaum and Sen’s critique o f 
Rawls that a capabilities approach is needed. Cosmopo/i/an Jus/ice. (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 2002),85.
Again, think o f  Charles Taylor’s suggestion that the difference between 
negative and positive freedom amounts to the difference between an opportunity and 
an exercise o f freedom. Taylor, 79.
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Even so, there might be no fountain present at all. We might say that a truck has the 
capability to bring ten tons o f  rice to the village. However, that is not a real 
capability unless other contingencies are met such that there are adequate, safe and 
peaceful roads, a willing driver who chooses to drive, and the resource o f the rice 
being available. This gets at the distinction Nussbaum drew between functioning 
and capability. Although she wanted to insist on capability but not functioning, 
certain levels o f  functioning by some persons are necessary for other persons to have 
mere capabilities.
This lack o f clarity parallels the distinction between positive and negative 
liberties. The driver is free to bring the rice in the negative sense if  there are no 
bandits or authorities who obstruct his passage. But in the positive sense, he is only 
free to bring the rice if  there are roads and rice. Although the term “capabilities” is a 
vast improvement over the language o f rights in the development literature as a 
measure o f  transnational quality o f life, it is no more precise than the term freedom 
in this case. Sometimes Nussbaum seems to use the term capabilities as if  it were 
interchangeable with liberties. For example, she said that capabilities must be 
balanced against the “claim o f  other capabilities” such as when the state grants 
“Liberty o f  association and self-definition but within constraints imposed by the 
central capabilities.”’  ^Nussbaum does not suggest that the capabilities language 
should completely replace the language o f rights. In her view the conception o f
Nussbaum, WHD, 275.
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rights is still valuable. She thought that the public discourse concerning rights could 
be enhanced through the addition o f the capabilities approach and should emphasize 
“choice and autonomy.” "^^ Linkages with the discourse on liberty should be 
enhanced in the same way.
Economic institutions are politically constructed and reflect choice as well.
In that sense, economic systems must be evaluated not just on the basis o f  efficiency,
but also on the basis o f their relationship to freedom. Nussbaum challenged Rawls to
admit that family systems are not outside the scope o f theories o f  justice. She argued
that Rawls would likely view her advocacy for women and female children as “too
much promotion o f  a definite conception o f the good.”^^  Nevertheless, her
understanding o f capabilities as essential to freedom led her to argue that the sphere
o f family and private life is not exempt from the standards o f justice. Criticizing
Rawls’s reluctance to intervene in family matters, Nussbaum said.
You didn’t just find the family lying around, you 
constituted it in one way, through the tradition o f 
property law; now we shall constitute it in another way 
one that protects women’s capabilities.^^
The same might be said o f the global economy. Current trade regulations 
weren’t naturally occurring. Political actors and events in history fashioned them. 
Although complete control is impossible, responsibility for steering global markets is
Ibid., 100-101.
Ibid., 282.
Ibid.
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a capability o f  political actors. Economic options, bargaining power, and political 
participation are all areas for the exercise o f  positive liberty. In the negative sense 
the poor woman in India may have freedom. But, does she have freedom in the 
positive sense? At first it may seem that Nussbaum’s term “capability” is a more 
accurate term than positive liberty. Unfortunately the term capability and others like 
it also have double meaning. Nussbaum advocates education “as a source o f  images 
o f worth and possibility and also as a source o f skills that make possibilities real.”^^  
Not many would argue about the importance o f  education. However in this particular 
statement, Nussbaum makes a disturbing move by implying that some possibilities 
are real as if  other possibilities are not. Are some possibilities impossible? Her 
point seems to be that capabilities are real possibilities while vacuous possibilities 
are like the structure o f  a fountain with no water present. Once again this parallels 
the distinction between positive and negative liberty. Without education a person 
may still be free in the negative sense. Nussbaum made a similar move in her list o f  
central human functional capabilities when she included under the “control over 
one’s environment,’ the “material” capability o f  “being able to hold property (both 
land and movable goods), not just formally but in terms o f  real opportunity.” *^
Again, this insistence that opportunity be real rather than merely formal amounts to 
the same distinction between positive and negative freedom.
Ibid., 288.
Ibid., 80.
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Her efforts to improve on Rawls’s work are illustrated in her list o f  
capabilities that she compared to Rawls’s list o f  primary goods. She wrote, “As with 
Rawls’s list o f  primary goods, so with the central capabilities: they are not meant to 
be an exhausting account o f what is worthwhile in life.”
1. Life
2. Bodily health
a. Nourishment
b. Shelter
c. Reproductive health
3. Bodily integrity
a. Move freely
b. Boundaries treated as sovereign
4. Senses, Imagination, Thought
a. Political and artistic speech
b. Freedom o f religion
c. Literacy
d. Freedom o f expression
5. Emotions
6. Practical reason
a. Liberty o f  conscience
7. Affiliation
a. Freedom o f assembly
b. Political speech
8. Other species
9. Play
10. Control over ones environment
a. Right o f political participation
b. Property
c. Freedom from unwarranted search and seizure’’’ 
Despite her avoidance o f  the terms liberty and freedom in the rest o f  her work
on capabilities, she used these terms to describe some important capabilities on her 
list. Freedom has conditions. She wrote, “For the Aristotelian claim (which Marx
Ibid., 95.
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endorses and develops) is surely a plausible one: that powers o f  practical reason are
powers that require, for their development, institutional and material necessary
conditions that are not always found.”*° She repeatedly stressed that material
resources required for these capabilities could not be optional. She wrote.
By insisting that the capabilities on the list are 
combined capabilities, I insist on the two fold 
importance o f material and social circumstances both 
in training internal capabilities and in letting them 
express themselves once trained; and I establish that 
the liberties and opportunities recognized by the list 
are not to be understood in a purely formal manner.*'
The concern that liberties and opportunities might be considered in a “purely formal
manner” is the same concern that negative liberty be protected when positive liberty
is not. This enhanced list o f  goods, although more thorough than Rawls’s list,
functions in a comparable way in Nussbaum’s work. She argued that political justice
requires delivery o f these capabilities. She wrote, “1 argue that the structure o f  social
and political institutions should be chosen, at least in part, with a view to promoting
at least a threshold level o f these human capabilities.”*^
Rawls might not disagree with this thicker list o f  goods since his theory
assumes that survival needs are assured. As his work progressed, Rawls increased
his emphasis on self-respect as a primary good. This awareness o f  the centrality o f
Martha C.Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in L/âera//smanc//he 
GoodEd. R.B. Douglas. (New York: Routledge, 1990),227.
*' Nussbaum, WHD.., 86.
*^  Ibid., 75.
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personal empowerment indicates appreciation for criticism like Nussbaum’s. This 
relates to Nussbaum’s claim: The problems o f  “ inner sense o f non-entitlement” could 
be reduced through “ images o f  worth and possibility” and “effective agency.”*^  
However, inequalities in wealth and economic power result in inequalities in 
political power. Therefore, inequalities in “effective agency” are at least in part a 
consequence o f  wealth distribution.
True to their common ground as liberal thinkers, Nussbaum agrees with 
Rawls about the importance o f  liberty to self-respect. For this reason, she attempted 
to maintain a distinction between what she called functioning and capability. She 
said, “I am not pushing individuals into the function: once the stage is fully set, the 
choice is up to them.”*”* Why did she insist that, “Where adult citizens are concerned 
capability, not functioning, is the appropriate political goal”?*  ^ It is the value o f 
freedom that motivates this move. Whether to function or not is a matter o f  personal 
freedom. The real functioning o f freedom, not just the capability for freedom, 
requires that she not push individuals into functioning. However, even the choice to 
not function in a certain way is actually an exercise o f  freedom.
Discussions o f  freedom as a primary good cannot avoid that conundrum o f 
the basis o f  rights in the right or the good. The language o f  capabilities rather than
Ibid., 288.
Ibid., 88.
Ibid., 87.
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rights still requires that some argument be offered for why one person should care 
about the capabilities, rights, or good o f another person. Are rights conventional? In 
other words, are rights merely socially constructed or are they metaphysical, natural 
and universal? Rawls’s effort to establish a persuasive argument that would at least 
be a helpful tool for political dialogue offers a helpful alternative to utilitarian 
options. Rawls said we have commonsense convictions that persons have ‘an 
inviolability founded on justice or, as some say, on natural right which even the 
welfare o f  everyone cannot override.”*^  This conviction is Justified in Rawls’s theory 
because it turns out to be a consequence o f principles chosen in the original position. 
In his contractarian theory, the basis o f  equality is universal. Who has rights, 
equality, and liberty? The capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for 
being entitled to equal Justice.
The relationship between the concepts o f capabilities and rights is the subject o f 
Nussbaum’s recent article, “Capabilities and Human Rights.”** Ongoing debates in 
political philosophy provide ample linkages between Nussbaum’s work on 
capabilities and discussions o f  rights. What about the connection between 
capabilities and freedom? Nussbaum said, “People differ about what the basis o f  a 
rights claim is: rationality, sentience, and mere life have all had their defenders.
*® Rawls, TJ, 28.
*’ Ibid., 505.
Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” I2 I.
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They differ, too, about whether rights are prepolitical or artifacts o f  law and 
institutions.. She thought that by avoiding the traditional language o f  rights and 
freedom and replacing that language with the language o f capabilities, her approach 
could avoid this conundrum. She suggested that something “close to the Rawlsian 
account o f  argument proceeding toward reflective equilibrium” would be the best 
method for proceeding toward international agreement about how to promote 
capabilities.^® Reforms in Rawls’s theory are required by this insight.®' Nussbaum’s 
suggested reform o f  Rawls’s theory on this point results from the concern that 
freedom be more than merely formal. It is this concern she shared with Sen that led 
to the capabilities language. Sen wrote, “A person’s actual freedom to pursue his or 
her ends depends o n . . .  what power he or she has to convert primary goods into the 
achievement o f  ends.”®^ Thus the concern over the relationship between freedom and 
resources drives Nussbaum’s critique o f Rawls.
John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum show considerable overlap in their analysis o f 
problems o f  justice and prescribed steps towards remedying injustice. Both uphold 
the liberal tradition o f tolerance for diverse conceptions o f  the good. Both share a
*® Nussbaum, WHD, 97.
®®Ibid., 101.
®' Hobhouse articulated this insight best in his claim that property equals power. 
L.T. Hobhouse, “The Historical Evolution o f  Property in Fact and in Idea.” /n 
Property: /fsDu//es anc/Jiigh/s. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1922).
®^ Sen, “Justice: Means versus Freedom,” P/ji7osop/jy ancfPu6//cAj^ /rs. 19, No. 
2, (1990), 120.
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concern for shaping procedural justice in ways that attend to the dignity and integrity 
o f the least well o ff in society. Although many points o f agreement have been 
identified in the writings o f Nussbaum and Rawls, there are three areas o f  consensus 
in their works that relate most strongly to the notion o f positive liberty. First, they 
both recognize that justice requires a minimum level o f  welfare in order for political 
liberty to be equalized. Secondly, Rawls and Nussbaum offer similar lists o f  basic 
human goods or capabilities to be protected. Third, both understand questions 
regarding desert to be riddled with issues o f resources as well as choices. By 
insisting that family matters are not outside the scope o f  the political, Nussbaum 
corrected some problems in Rawls’ work. At the same time, she illustrated a type o f 
critique that could be applied to Rawls’ attempt to preclude economic matters as 
being outside the scope o f  the political. In both instances, the concerns o f  positive 
liberty would strengthen Rawls’s theory.
The common ground between Rawls and Nussbaum is better understood 
through development o f the concept o f  positive liberty. Rawls would have done well 
to correct his theory by expanding his notion o f liberty in the directions that 
Nussbaum suggested, including family issues and explanation o f how property 
resources required for capabilities would be structured. Despite the common 
convictions apparent in their work, it is unclear whether or not Rawls and Nussbaum 
would reach the same settlement o f  the contending claims o f the entrepreneur and the 
laborer. Rawls did not want to be tied to one ordering o f these conflicting types o f 
freedom, but wanted his theory to accommodate either way of resolving their
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competing values. By defending the negative freedom o f  the entrepreneur to be 
unregulated, Rawls sides with the powerful in the international economy. Nussbaum 
would reach a different resolution, understanding that the capability o f  the laborer, 
and thus any meaningful sense o f  her freedom, requires restriction o f the freedom of 
the entrepreneur. The role o f  resources as prerequisites o f  freedom dictate that 
Rawls’s theory will lead to more redistribution o f material resources than he 
originally intended. This analysis o f  the relationship between the prerequisite 
property resources required to make the worth o f liberty real suggests that Rawls 
should have provided more explanation about the means o f  redistribution. Although 
Rawls set out to offer a theory that left open questions o f economic redistribution o f 
resources, his theory seems to support extensive regulation and redistribution. The 
irony is that it is precisely the promotion o f freedom that requires these restrictions 
o f economic freedom.
In her book, fVomen andNumanDeve/opmenf, in which she applied the 
capabilities approach to analysis o f  poverty in India, Nussbaum entitled one section, 
“Two Women Trying To Flourish.”^^  The concept o f flourishing is more robust that 
that o f  capabilities. Isn’t it possible to have all the freedom to flourish, but not the 
capability to flourish? It is as if  freedom is defined in only the negative sense. 
Freedom in the positive sense would include the notion o f  capability made possible 
through access to resources. If  freedom is only defined in the negative sense, it is 
merely formal. The means o f  providing both freedom and capability will be found in
Nussbaum, WHD, 15.
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human community. Meaningful freedom in contrast with purely formal freedom, is 
realized through the construction o f associational life. The next chapter connects the 
idea o f meaningful freedom with the issue o f community in Rawls’s theory. The 
potential problem that freedom might be merely formal remains the focus. To 
further illustrate this problem in Rawls’s work, I will consider Thomas Pogge’s 
critique o f Rawls as a corrective. Pogge shares many o f Nussbaum’s concerns and 
urges those concerned with political philosophy to attend to human flourishing.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FREEDOM AND COMMUNITY
The liberal concept o f negative freedom emphasizes the separateness or 
individuality o f  persons. While certain benefits accrue from that emphasis, there are 
detrimental consequences as well. The cooperative accomplishments o f  persons in 
communities require limits o f individual freedom. The harmonies o f a symphony are 
achieved through the discipline and subordination o f individual proclivities.' In 
association with others, persons can construct more extensive freedom than they can 
alone. If  ethics depend on contractual, voluntary arrangements o f  persons 
associating with others then the nature o f  those associations become central to the 
dynamics o f  freedom. First I will analyze the role that associational life in 
community played in Rawls’s theory as it developed throughout the course o f his 
writing over time. He argued that humans flourish in community noting that 
autonomy is defined in the context o f community and that cooperative systems give 
rise to both obligations and benefits. He defended the Kantian notion that social 
cooperation and relational life is motivated by more than strategic mutual advantage 
o f individuals by contrasting private society with the idea o f social union. 1 will 
argue that treating historical state borders as morally relevant is problematic given
' Rawls used this metaphor o f the orchestra in PL, 321.
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the nature o f community that can transcend such borders.^ Furthermore, I will argue 
that Rawls’s refusal to apply the difference principle at the global level creates the 
potential for freedom that is merely formal. These two critiques are grounded in the 
premise that meaningful freedom is more than mere freedom from direct restraint, 
but includes ability to construct meaning in concert with others. Finally, I will 
compare the criticism that Thomas Pogge made o f  Rawls’s work, and suggest that 
there is considerable overlap between his critique and the concerns o f  some thinkers 
in the positive freedom tradition.
Most o f  Rawls work focused on the domestic level, relying on the contract 
theory tradition to answer questions o f political justice. Since we sorely need 
adequate theory o f  ethics to help us in the international arena, we hope that Rawls’s 
work can be helpful on a global scale. Whether we consider our relationship to others 
in a local context or reflect on our connections with life beyond our own nation’s 
borders, we know that relationships affect our freedom. In this chapter, I examine 
the application o f Rawls’s contractual theory o f ethics to the international scene 
asking how obligations can be the result o f  contracts in a universal context from 
which there is no exit. The idea o f freedom is unintelligible apart from associational 
life in community. As persons, we are always, already selves in relationship with
 ^ Ronald Beiner makes a similar criticism o f  Rawls for failing to address “the 
problem o f  political community’’ in Lidera/ism, Nafiona//sm, C/Z/zens/j/p: Essays 
on Z/ieEroâ/em ofEo/f/ica/Community. (Vancouver, BC: University o f British 
Columbia Press, 2003), 195.
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other selves. In a real sense there is no exit from associational life. We cannot 
choose to opt out o f  the arrangement o f being with others in the world. In fact, this 
situation o f being in relationship with others cannot accurately be thought o f  as an 
arrangement. There is no arranging or contracting involved. It is no construction o f 
our own; rather it is simply given.
However, our response or our intentional w ^^of relating is a matter for our 
freedom. As our realization o f the interconnectedness o f all life increases, we 
understand that our existence has global repercussions. Contract theories o f  social 
justice made sense more easily when societies were more isolated from each other, 
and a person could conceive o f  opting out o f  a particular community.^ From a global 
perspective there are limitations and realities that are not negotiable. When it comes 
to agreements between international actors, thorough isolation is no option given the 
shared environmental elements o f air and water. Therefore, I examine how Rawls’s 
international theory helps answer questions about what obligations or right-relations 
does justice demand across the demarcations that separate different communities? 
We not only want to be free from interference from beyond our borders. We also 
want to relate with the world outside our national boundaries, constructing 
associations and connections. Positive liberty includes the freedom to conceptualize 
our lives in relationship with others, even those who live on the other side o f our 
national borders. We want freedom to develop relationships or deals with others.
 ^ Rawls, LP, 8-9. Rawls suggests that immigration would disappear when political 
unrest is corrected.
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For example, the affluent investor from a wealthy nation can be free to develop 
relationships o f  mutual respect and honor with the woman in the third world who 
earns only two dollars a day.
The quality o f  our relationship with others is essential to a concept o f positive 
freedom. In other words, the quality o f my individual life is always affected by the 
quality o f  my relationships with others and their freedom. Rawls said he sought to 
uphold the “liberty and integrity o f  the p e r s o n .R a w ls  did not fully explain what he 
meant by the term ïn/egn'tyoï the person. If we pause to wonder about his inclusion 
o f this term, linked as it is here with liberty, we are drawn into classically profound 
questions about the nature o f  human life. The wholeness and well-being o f  a person 
cannot be understood apart from the person’s relationship to other persons. Although 
integrity o f  a person is not something Rawls describes in detail, it seems to be 
connected to the construction o f a meaningful life. While on the one hand, persons 
do not exist apart from community, on the other hand, boundaries between the 
individual and the community must also be maintained in order for a person to exist. 
The boundaries between communities or societies and also the boundaries between 
the individual and her society or community are essential for freedom. This raises 
questions that get at the heart o f  positive liberty.
^Rawls, PL, 291.
179
In the tradition o f  Hegel and Rousseau^, advocates o f positive liberty insist 
that individual freedom is realized through the state or community. A community or 
society is required for liberty that is meaningful or has integrity. The positive notion 
o f liberty cannot be developed apart from the concept o f community or social 
relationships. In the positive sense, liberty is far more than mere independence. 
Liberty is also construction o f meaningful self-definition in community. The 
relationship between an individual and the community is shaped by the community, 
its shared values, and its structuring o f  power. The balance between individuals and 
communities is a perennial challenge. So, the implications o f human community for 
freedom must be studied in order to more fully understand how Rawls understood 
the liberty o f  persons. Reactions against Hegelian idealism emphasized the autonomy 
o f the individual.’ As a liberal, Rawls was firmly rooted in the tradition, but wanted a 
notion o f  political right that did not depend on ‘Western individualism”.* 
Nevertheless, Rawls sought to balance the good o f the individual and that o f the 
community. Striking a balance between the individual and the community remains a 
challenge for seekers o f justice.
 ^ See Hegel, Phi7osopky o/Lmt', sec. 29 and 270.
 ^See Rousseau, Soc/a/Con/rac/, Book 1, chap V lll, 2'"^  par.
’ Karl R. Popper, TAe Open Soc/ety and/fs £nem/es: The //igTi Tide o f Prophecy.- 
T/egei, Marx, and/he d/ferma/h. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1962), 44.
* Rawls, CP, 552.
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Humans Flourish in Communities
Although my primary concern is the question o f our obligations across
national boundaries, first it is necessary to turn to Rawls’s early work to uncover the
foundations o f his notion o f community. In A Theory o f JusAce, Rawls sought to
balance the appreciation for collective life or the community with the freedom o f  the
individual and a realistic acknowledgement o f  individual motivations. Drawing on
Aristotelian notions o f human completion through community life, Rawls argued that
social values are promoted in his scheme. He wrote:
... Justice as fairness has a central place for the value 
o f com m unity... The essential idea is that we want to 
account for the social values, for the intrinsic good o f 
institutional, community, and associative activities, by 
a conception o f  justice that in its theoretical basis is 
individualistic.^
How did Rawls understand this “intrinsic good o f institutional, community, and 
associative activities”? For Rawls, whatever the intrinsic good o f community may 
be, the good o f individuals must be prior to it. Individuals cannot be used as a means 
to some supposed good o f  the community. Rather, the good o f  community must 
always benefit the individual. Nevertheless, at the same time, the good o f the 
individual requires the community. In one sense, Rawls’s entire theory is summed up 
in his statement " ... the collective activity o f justice is the preeminent form o f human 
flourishing.” '^ Humans most fully actualize themselves in collective activity. It could
TJ, 264.
Ibid., 529.
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be said that humans also transcend the limits o f their individuality through the
collective activity that could be called community. This motivates persons to
contract in just institutions. As Rawls said, everyone benefits from “cooperating to
affirm Just institutions.”"  So, the self-realization o f the individual through social
cooperation is inseparably linked with the public realization o f justice. Rawls wrote:
In a well-ordered society each person understands the 
first principles that govern the whole scheme as it is to 
be carried out over many generations; and all have a 
settled intention to adhere to these principles in their 
plan o f  life. Thus the plan o f each person is given a 
more ample and rich structure than it would otherwise 
have; it is adjusted to the plans o f others by mutually 
acceptable principles.'^
By nature humans gravitate toward collective activity. They have goals that 
cannot be achieved in isolation. Influence, education, identity formation, and 
persuasion are all factors that both limit and extend freedom. If our concept o f 
freedom is only the negative conception, then we will only guard against direct 
coercion or restraint. We would not be adequately alert to the complex power 
dynamics involved in identity construction through means o f cultural formation like 
education. Rawls was not insensitive to this potential problem, but hoped that equal 
worth o f  political liberty would protect opportunities for balancing such influences. 
The difference principle should protect the opportunity for self-actualization and 
cooperative construction o f  meaning within a constitutional democracy with
"  Ibid.
Ibid., 528.
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adequate background conditions. However, on the international level, without the
difference principle, the ability to shape the structure o f decision-making is subject to
inequalities as a result o f  wealth distribution. The concept o f positive freedom
emphasizes the value that is possible because o f associational life, and could provide
a basis for defending the well-being o f  every individual who adds variety to the
harmony o f  voices constructing the arrangements that regulate all. Since it is human
nature to “appreciate and enjoy” cooperating in social relationships, individual aims
are fostered through collective activity. Rawls said.
It follows that the collective activity o f  justice is the 
preeminent form o f  human flourishing. For given 
favorable conditions, it is by maintaining these public 
arrangements that persons best express their nature and 
achieve the widest regulative excellences o f which 
each I is capable. At the same time just institutions 
allow for and encourage the diverse internal life o f 
associations in which individuals realize their more 
particular aims. Thus, the public realization o f justice 
is a value o f community.'
Hence, individual pursuits are balanced with the limits and obligations implied in
community. This collective activity is achieved through the social union based on
agreements made voluntarily by individuals. The concept o f social union, collective,
corporate, or communal life based in agreements motivated by human nature and
interests is central to Rawls’s theory. \n A Theo/y o f Jusfice, Rawls seemed to use
the terms community and social union interchangeably. He wrote, “Persons need one
another since it is only in active cooperation with others that one’s powers reach
Ibid., 529.
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fruition. Only in a social union is the individual complete.” '^ ' Social union is a more 
technical and precise term than the term community with all its historical baggage. 
Through the years as his theory developed, Rawls further specified his definition o f 
the term community and no longer used it in reference to the social union or society. 
The terms society and community in Rawls’s writing have specific definitions that 
are clarified below. Nevertheless, his concept o f society was never merely a means to 
individual ends. In other words, social union is not only a strategic move to 
maximize advantage for the individual. Relational life is a form o f human 
flourishing.
At the same time, associational life gives rise to conflicts and can result in 
challenges to individual freedom. Rawls adhered to K anf s way o f  resolving the 
tension between the increase in freedom made possible through a social contract and 
the relinquishing o f freedom necessary to achieve that contract. Here it is necessary 
to consider Rawls’s use o f the term autonomy. Early on Rawls wrote that people are 
acting autonomously when: " .. .  they are acting from principles that they would 
acknowledge under conditions that best express their nature as free and equal 
rational beings.” '^ In other words, autonomous persons are not controlled or 
manipulated by others who have educated them or hold power over them. Yet, notice 
that there is a significant qualifier included in this definition o f autonomy.
Ibid., 525.
Ibid., 515.
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Autonomy is not merely unbridled freedom. Autonomy means acting in accordance 
with principles. Furthermore, not just any principles can be the basis o f  autonomy. 
Autonomy requires acting in accordance with principles that àes/express a person’s 
nature. Rawls not only included those qualifiers, but he went further to specify 
human nature as that o f  /ree ani/eçua/ra/iona/\i€\n%s. That would mean that if  a 
person made an irrational choice or a choice contrary to rational principles they 
would not be acting autonomously. This sets the stage for objecting to a person’s 
freely chosen moves on the grounds that they are irrational. In order to follow Rawls 
in his understanding about autonomy, we must ask what conditions best express 
humans’ nature as free and equal rational beings. Furthermore, if  such conditions 
could be specified then justice requires efforts toward maintaining such conditions.
Rawls argued that the original position could serve as a tool for specifying
these conditions o f  autonomy. Rawls said.
The veil o f  ignorance prevents us from shaping our 
moral view to accord with our own particular 
attachments and interests. We do not look at the social 
order from our situation but take up a point o f view 
that everyone can adopt on an equal footing.'^
In the original position no one is starving, and no one is dominant over another. Thus
self-interest is detached from moral judgment. Since this theory o f  justice as fairness
only applies to cases where background conditions are met, autonomy o f individuals
is protected in the domestic application o f the theory. The reality o f  the “equal
footing” is inseparable from the potential usefulness o f the original position. Outside
Ibid., 516.
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of the original position only the reasonableness o f  persons can motivate one person 
to respect another person’s autonomy. Rawls believed that “the notions o f  autonomy 
and objectivity are compatible; “there is no antinomy between freedom and 
reason.” ’  ^ The exception to this compatibility would be the position o f a person who 
defended the freedom to dominate others. Such a position may be impractical given 
the risky consequence that others with even more power might come along. Outside 
o f the safety o f  the original position with its qualifier o f  equality, freedom and reason 
seem less compatible.
Later Rawls distinguished between “political and moral autonomy.” '* In 
contrast to Kant’s comprehensive moral view “ . ..in which the ideal o f  autonomy has 
a regulative role for all o f  life ...” Rawls advocates a “political constructivism o f 
Justice.” '^ Rawls’s theory differs from Kant’s because o f  these differing conceptions 
o f autonomy. Attempting to separate Kant’s practical, procedural conclusions from 
transcendental idealism, Rawls distinguished political autonomy from “doctrinal 
autonomy” and “constitutive autonomy.” "^ Again, the reason Rawls rejected 
transcendental idealism was due to its reliance on comprehensive claims about the 
good. This distinction becomes increasingly important in the international
Ibid., 516.
Rawls, PL, 98.
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application where Rawls continued to maintain that “moral autonomy is not a
political value.”^' Respecting the autonomy o f  others may be merely a strategic
concession based on calculations o f balance o f  power between individuals or nations.
However, the conditions under which political autonomy flourishes are
circumstances requiring maintenance and regulations. Rawls has been criticized by
John Gray for failing to adequately grasp implications o f  autonomy.
Autonomy is not free-standing. It is a complex 
achievement, encompassing (among a good many 
other necessary ingredients) the absence o f  coercion, 
the possession and exercise o f skills in choice-making 
and an environment which contains an array o f options 
that are worth choosing.^^
The concept o f  autonomy is difficult to distinguish from the concept o f 
freedom in Rawls’s writing. The idea that autonomy has an aspect o f “self-creation” 
links the concept o f autonomy with that o f positive liberty.^^ Nonetheless, the 
problem o f balancing the individual and the society persists. The richness and 
complexity o f collective life justifies some restriction o f  individual liberty in order to 
preserve such collective social life. Thus, social benefits imply social obligations. At 
the same time, social benefits expand individual possibilities. Herein lays the 
connection between Rawls’s concept o f collective life and his concept o f freedom. It 
is because persons voluntarily participate in the social union that they have
Rawls, LP, 146.
Gray, John. 2000, 100.
23 Joseph Raz, TheMora///y o/Freec/om. (New York: Clarendon Press, 1986), 370.
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obligations as a result o f  receiving benefits o f  the social union. The principle o f 
fairness justified by its adoption in the original position is the basis for obligations 
limiting freedom. Describing the consequences o f the principle o f fairness Rawls 
wrote:
I shall try to use this principle to account for all 
requirements that are obligations as distinct from 
natural duties. This principle holds that a person is 
required to do his part as defined by the rules o f an 
institution when two conditions are met: first, the 
institution is just (or fair), that is, it satisfies the two 
principles o f justice; and second, one has voluntarily 
accepted the benefits o f the arrangement or taken 
advantage o f  the opportunities it offers to further one’s 
interest. ^
When a person benefits from the cooperative social system, justice requires 
that she must “do her part” to uphold the institution. For now, we will set aside 
questions determining what “her part” is in the institution. This matter will be taken
up in the next chapter when questions o f  labor are examined. However, there is a
more crucial problem if the only recognized good is the individual’s own ends.
What if there was a crafty individual who could glean benefits from the social union 
without doing her fair share to uphold the institution? The grounds for criticizing 
this type o f  free rider require that some good beyond the individual good o f each 
person be recognized. In other words, free riders using the social union as merely a 
means to their own private ends could not be criticized unless some higher, separate 
good than individual ends was acknowledged. Rawls is clear that such a collective
Rawls, LP, 111-112.
188
good is real. He calls it fairness, and this is the “right” that is prior to the “good.” 
Individual freedom is justifiably restricted when necessary for the social union. He 
wrote,
The main idea is that when a number o f  persons 
engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative 
venture according to rules, and thus restrict their 
liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, 
those who have submitted to these restrictions have a 
right to a similar acquiescence on the part o f  those who 
have benefited from their submission. Now by 
definition the requirements specified by the principle 
o f  fairness are the obligations. All obligations arise in 
this way.^^
In this way, Rawls distinguished his theory from what he called the notion o f
private society that would be the basis o f libertarian theory. Private society lacks the
community spirit Rawls advocates. His example o f  private society is competitive
markets. The sheer self-interest o f markets provides a contrast to Rawls’s view o f
society. He wrote.
The social nature o f  mankind is best seen by contrast 
with the conception o f private society.. Private society 
is not held together by a public conviction that its basic 
arrangements are Just and good in themselves, but by 
the calculations o f  everyone, or o f  sufficiently many to 
maintain the scheme, that any practicable changes 
would reduce the stock o f  means whereby they pursue 
their personal ends.^^
This is a crucial distinction in Rawls’s thought. Ca/cu/aiïons?Âmç.di at 
benefiting self are not adequate for motivating associational life rich enough to foster
Ibid., 112.
Ibid., 522.
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human flourishing. Life in society must be more than what private society can offer.
On the one hand there can be a social union that is “just and good” in which
members participate because they are persuaded by their shared value o f  procedural
justice. On the other hand, private society is identified with self-interest limited only
for sheer, calculated gain. Rawls wanted to offer a procedural notion o f  justice based
on more than mere practical necessities. The common life has an inherent value in
this scheme. He said.
The social nature o f mankind is best seen by contrast 
with the conception o f private society. Thus human 
beings have in fact shared final ends and they value 
their common institutions and activities as good in 
themselves. We need one another as partners in ways 
o f life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the 
successes and enjoyments o f others are necessary for 
and complimentary o f our own good.^’
What are these s/iarecZ/ina/enc/s that unite people? When there is agreement 
about final ends people can cooperate well. However, the problem o f disagreement 
over final ends arises frequently. The times when there is not agreement about 
shared final ends are the times that Rawls must address. The final ends in the 
workplace or marketplace would be matters o f disagreement since some would argue 
for efficiency or sheer profit while others would defend qualitative standards o f 
relationships and processes. Since Rawls considered business and market 
arrangements exempt from the application o f the principles o f justice and fairness,
his theory may not help us with such cases o f  conflict over final ends. Rawls hoped
Ibid., 523.
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that no agreement about comprehensive notions o f finals ends would be necessary to 
unite people. Justice as fairness is a procedural notion o f  justice specifying the 
process o f  decision-making about how to cooperate in the absence o f  agreement over 
final ends. Yet, Rawls thought that in contrast to private society, the social nature o f 
persons leads to a social good, that is, the value o f  community or collective life.
Persons are only real selves in relationship with others. Mutual regard for
others can be viewed as a sentiment in conflict with individual freedom if freedom is
construed only in a negative sense. In other words, I can view the freedom o f  others
as a restriction o f my freedom, if  I think o f my freedom only in a negative sense. If I
understand that I have no freedom apart from my connections with others, then my
motivation to value the freedom o f others changes. Rawls said.
But the question remains whether the contract doctrine 
is a satisfactory framework for understanding the 
values o f  community and for choosing among social 
arrangements to realize them. It is natural to 
conjecture that the congruence o f the right and the 
good depends in large part upon whether a well- 
ordered society achieves the good o f  community.^*
“The good o f  community” is the good o f  the social union. Again the problem arises
over disagreements regarding what the good o f  the community actually looks like.
Communitarians like Sandel argue that a thicker notion o f the good must be
Ibid., 520.
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included.^^ In contrast, libertarians like Nozick argue that collective life must not 
limit individual ideas o f the good/" The attempt to side step these problems by 
insisting that his is a /;6'/%Zh@/conception o f justice does not completely ameliorate 
this tension. After critiques by both communitarians and libertarians, among others, 
Rawls used more precision in later works when referring to this conception o f 
collective life.
Clarification o f terms: Community, Association, Society
In The Law o/Feop/es, Rawls sought to apply his procedural notion o f  justice 
as fairness to relationships between different collectives o f people on an international 
level. He attempted a distinction between states as international actors and what he 
called peoples. Having examined the conception o f  community or collective life in 
relationship to liberty in Rawls’s work, next 1 seek to analyze further the relationship 
between positive freedom and the concept o f freedom in the Law o f  Peoples. Given 
Rawls’s understanding o f collective life and its implications for freedom, can a 
purely negative conception o f freedom be adequate? In order to answer this question, 
we must first ask what the demarcations between peoples are, what is the glue that 
unites a people, and what are the moral consequences o f such aggregates o f people
Sandel, Michael. Democracy’sD/scon/en/. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Harvard University Press, 1996. See also Lihera/fsm ancL/heL/mhs o/Jusf/ce. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press), 1982.
Robert 'HoLxck, Jaarchy S/a/e, andD/opia. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
Publishers), 1974.
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both internally in relation with other members o f the same people and between two 
peoples? These questions seek to illustrate the relationship in Rawls’s theory 
between freedom and community. In this way the connection with the classical and 
on-going discussions about community can be applied to Rawls’s theory in an 
examination o f positive liberty.
As Rawls writing progressed, the importance o f  clarifying the distinctions 
between various types o f associational life increased. In Fo/it/ca/LiAera/ism, Rawls 
emphasized a distinction between the terms community and society. He wrote, 
“Society is a fair system o f  cooperation.”^' He continued to maintain his attempt at a 
middle ground between a communitarian emphasis on community and a libertarian 
rejection o f  community. The insistence that there is a collective good in the social 
union carried over in this second book from his original theory o f justice. In addition 
to the good that an individual seeks as an individual, there is also the good that 
persons realize “as a corporate body.”^^  Because o f the social nature o f humanity, 
as explained in his earlier work, humans flourish in connection with other humans. 
This acknowledgement o f  the ancient tension between the one and the many is the 
problem o f  community. But, in this work, Rawls defined the term community in a 
specific and precise way. He said that a community is a kind o f association. He 
wrote, “By definition, let’s think o f a community as a special kind o f association, one
Rawls,PL, 34.
Rawls, TJ, 201.
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united by a comprehensive doctrine, for example, a church.”^^  Since many persons
are divided over questions o f  comprehensive doctrines some other basis for the
social union is necessary for peaceful and harmonious coexistence. Rawls hoped that
shared political values, like justice as fairness, would unite those who held those
values, despite differences in overall comprehensive ideas about virtue or the good.
If persons from many differing communities, each holding conflicting
comprehensive doctrines all shared some common ground about a fair process for
making decisions, this would be a political value that could unify. This is why Rawls
admitted that his theory is not a comprehensive theory o f  justice and maintained
instead that it is a /w /y/ha/theory . Those who share common ground in shared
political values are able to unite on grounds that are neutral when it comes to
judgments about comprehensive doctrines. Thus the social union is understood as a
collective based on a shared political aim. The relationship o f freedom in social
union is addressed through the concept o f overlapping consensus. Rawls wrote;
...political liberalism conceives o f social unity in a 
different way: namely, as deriving from an overlapping 
consensus on a political conception o f justice suitable 
for a constitutional regime.^''
The idea o f  overlapping consensus is essential to understanding Rawls’s 
conception o f  social unity. A society is held together by recognition o f  justice as 
fairness derived from the principles o f fairness. The unity achieved by overlapping
Rawls, PL, 40.
Rawls, PL, 201.
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consensus rests on an intersection or overlapping o f different moral conceptions. 
However, in contrast to cohesion rooted in a shared comprehensive view o f  the good, 
these societies are united by elements within their own comprehensive view that 
intersect with others. This is not just tolerance motivated by a desire for mutual 
tolerance. Rawls wanted to contrast his view o f society with private society based on 
mere calculations o f personal expediency as the basis o f social unity. Rawls said that 
overlapping consensus is not “a mere modus vivendi” but rather reflects political 
unity founded on overlapping moral conceptions.”^^  As his theory developed in this 
area, Rawls clarified the terms community, society, and also association. However, 
more clarification is needed regarding the relationship between these aggregates o f 
people and states as they exist historically.
Rawls addressed the issue o f state’s relationships with one another most fully in 
his late work. However, he had begun delineation o f these complex relationships 
between a state, a community, and a society early on. In Theory ofJus/ice^ dN^X  ^
acknowledged that states have national interest as recognized in international law.^^ 
The possibility o f  social union based in shared principles o f  Justice as fairness 
provides for various societies sharing political values across national borders. 
However, in that early writing, Rawls was still using the terms community, society.
Ibid., 146.
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and nation with less precision than he did in later work. For example, in Theory o /
Jusfice he wrote,
We are led to the notion o f  the community of 
humankind the members o f which enjoy one another’s 
excellences and individuality elicited by free 
institutions, and they recognize the good o f each as an 
element in the complete activity the whole scheme o f 
which is consented to and gives pleasure to all.^^
The more precise Rawls who contrasted community as a union defined by a shared
comprehensive doctrine, would not have used the term community as it is used there.
His attention in his earliest work was focused on constitutional democracies at first,
and especially on internal issues rather than international issues. However,
throughout his work, he stressed the Kantian roots o f his theory.
We have only to note the various ways in which the 
fundamental institutions o f society, the just 
constitution and the main parts o f the legal order, can 
be found good in themselves once the idea o f social 
union is applied to the basic structure as a whole.
Thus, first o f  all, the Kantian interpretation enables us 
to say that everyone’s acting to uphold just institutions 
is for the good o f each.^*
As his work developed over time, he used the term community with more care, but 
he still maintained the Kantian claim that unity could be based on more than mere
Ibid., 523.
Ibid., 527-528.
196
strategic balance o f  power motivated by pure self-interest/^ In Fo/Zf/ca/L/dera//sm, 
he distinguished between societies and communities more precisely. He said, “A 
well-ordered democratic society is neither a community nor, more generally, an 
a s so c ia tio n A s s o c ia tio n s  differ from a well-ordered democratic society in two 
ways. Rawls said:
1. Democratic society is “complete and closed” “entry 
into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death” 
and it is “self-sufficient” “has a place for all the main 
purposes o f human life.
2. Democratic society “has no final ends and aims in 
the way persons or associations do.'*'
However, Rawls did not thoroughly examine the distinction between a
society and a state in Po/fZ/ca/Liiera//sm. At this stage, he spoke as if a democratic
society might be a state. However, the absence o f shared ends other than political
ends becomes a point for later questions. He said.
This means that citizens do not think there are 
antecedent social ends that justify them in viewing 
some people as having more or less worth to society 
than others and assigning them different rights and 
privileges accordingly. Many past societies have 
thought otherwise: they pursued as final ends religion 
and empire, dominion and glory; and the rights and 
status o f  individuals and classes have depended on 
their role in gaining those ends.'*^
^^Rawls,PL, 147.
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There Rawls sounds as if  he was speaking o f  states and societies 
interchangeably. He is aware o f  the realist critique that states seek empire. In 
contrast, he claimed that societies share no “antecedent social ends.” He did not 
adequately consider prosperity itself as a goal. It could be argued that since 
economic prosperity promotes the good o f individuals it is a shared end o f  the 
society. This question o f  prosperity as a notion o f  the common good will be taken up 
more thoroughly in the conclusion o f  this chapter. For now, we note that prosperity 
is hard to categorize as a political versus a nonpolitical aim. Rawls said, “But it is 
also mistaken to think o f  a democratic society as an association and to suppose its 
public reason includes nonpolitical aims and values.”''  ^ Since economic prosperity 
might be considered a political aim that affects the rights and status o f individuals, 
this remains unclear. Before reflecting further on that question, Rawls’s distinctions 
between associations, communities, and societies must be reviewed more fully. This 
problem continues to generate criticism o f Rawls. As Luis Cabrera wrote, “ If the 
interests o f all are not adequately represented in construction o f  political culture, 
political institutions or economic policy, then Rawls has not justified his 
understanding o f  toleration.” '^* The issue o f collective choice and responsibility 
complicates attempts to clearly define both states and peoples.
'*^  Rawls, PL, 43.
'*'* Luis Cabrera, “Toleration and Tyranny in Rawls’s ‘Law o f  Peoples’,” Po/ity 
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First, it is necessary to clarify what constitutes membership in a community 
or society and secondly, the limits or borders o f that community must be clear. If 
Rawls does not want to simply utilize the nation state as the aggregate o f  people in 
his theory, then the relationship between a people and a state must be clear. Rawls 
does not say that one people is separated from another by state boundaries. But, he 
does maintain the relevance o f  state boundaries for defining moral rights and duties. 
He said, “ In the absence o f  a world-state, there mus/he boundaries o f some kind, 
which when viewed in isolation will seem arbitrary, and depend to some degree on 
historical circumstance.”'*^  The territory o f a nation is the property o f that nation, 
and borders are necessary “to prevent the deterioration” o f property.'*^ However, 
there is lack o f  clarity about the relationship between the nation and the people who 
are the agent o f  the property. If peoples have no national interest, as Rawls claimed, 
then what interest do they share a joint agents and owners o f property? Rawls did 
not resolve this problem and or answer this question. He did uphold property 
ownership rights accorded by state borders. But, he left unanswered the question o f 
how a people should relate to a state if and when the state acts unjustly in defense o f 
the territory. The boundaries among and between peoples is also unclear if one 
people is not distinct from another as bounded and defined by geographic territory. It 
is unclear whether or not a person exit the group or terminate membership in a
Rawls, LP, 39.
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“people” as one might emigrate from a state.'*’ Even if you can exit, it is unclear 
whether or not you could form a new people with or without international 
recognition as a legitimate grouping. Rawls left too many questions over the 
relationship between nations with territorial borders and peoples as groupings 
separate from nations.
National borders change daily. More often they change because o f  irrational 
forces such as violence and war than because o f principled agreement or rational 
process. The historical contingencies that led to the national borders o f  the current 
moment in time are riddled with examples o f injustice and unreason. To suggest that 
moral obligations are defined by national boundaries is a strange idea in our world 
where participants o f  nations did not contract to be citizens. In her essay, “National 
Boundaries and Moral Boundaries: A Cosmopolitan View,” Judith Lichtenberg 
argued that “the proper scope o f a nation’s concern extends beyond itself.”** She 
called for a cosmopolitan conception o f Justice that would be implemented without a 
world-state but rather achieved through “cooperation.”*^  The controversy over the 
moral relevance o f  state borders continues.^'* For example, Andrew Kuper criticized
*’ Ibid., 170.
** Judith Lichtenberg, “National Boundaries and Moral Boundaries: A 
Cosmopolitan View.” in (ed). Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue. Boundaries. 
(Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield. 1981), 79.
*“* Ibid., 98.
Shue, Henry. Basic B/g/jis. Suôs/sience, Aj^ uence, andi/.SForeign Bo/icy. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980. also Boundaries
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Rawls for obscuring asymmetries o f power— and their ill effects” by
treating current forms o f  nation and state as perm anent/' Rawls dodges this problem
by developing his theory based on cooperation between societies o f  people rather
than states. He did not want to deal with the problem o f state’s tendency toward
empire-building as a matter o f  national interest, but he did want to defend state
borders as definitive o f the entity he called a people. Pogge’s criticism o f Rawls
confronts this unresolved problem. Pogge wrote,
Only within a national territory and the population it 
defines does he view the focus on the least advantaged 
as appropriate. He thereby circumvents a crucial moral 
question, which his theory ought to answer, namely 
whether the institutionalization o f  national borders 
really has this magical moral force o f shielding us from 
(or reducing the force of) the moral claims o f 
“foreigners.”^^
A discussion o f  the rights and duties o f  foreigners requires clarification about who is 
a member o f  the contracting entity. Rawls did not adequately explain how peoples 
compare to nations.
According to Rawls, the value o f collective life is expressed at different 
levels in associations, communities, and societies. The problem o f  freedom is at the 
heart o f  these various descriptions o f ways o f being with others. Democratic society
Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue. (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and 
Littlefield), 1981.
Andrew Kuper, “Andrew. Democracy Beyond Borders. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 197.
Pogge, RR, 10.
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includes institutions that are designed for “establishing a social world within which
alone we can develop with care, nurture, education, and no little good fortune, into
free and equal c i t iz e n s .W h i le  acknowledging this need for collective life, Rawls
maintained that society need not be as unified as what he called a community -  that
is a collective sharing a comprehensive notion o f  the good as opposed to a political
notion o f  the good. It is the value o f  freedom that prohibits building social union on
comprehensive notions o f  the good. Liberty requires some other basis for collective
life. Rawls wrote:
To think o f democracy as a community (so defined) 
overlooks the limited scope o f its public reason 
founded on a political conception o f justice. It mistakes 
the kind o f  unity a constitutional regime is capable o f 
without violating the most basic democratic 
principles.^''
Thus, a well-ordered society captures the necessary value o f social union or
collective life while at the same time preserving individual freedom to choose and
pursue various comprehensive notions o f  the good. Rawls said.
If we think o f  political society as a community united 
in affirming one and the same comprehensive doctrine, 
then the oppressive use o f  state power is necessary for 
political community.^^
”  Rawls, PL, 43. 
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I find Rawls profoundly satisfying and beautifully convincing on this point. 
Communitarians go too far in limiting freedom on the basis o f  comprehensive 
notions o f  the good. However, the question o f  economic considerations remains. 
Rawls consistently maintained that “equal basic liberties” are a prerequisite for 
“social cooperation on the basis o f mutual respect.”^^  Economic prosperity is valued 
both as an end in itself and as a means to other goods. Is it a political aim or not? It 
seems that some level o f  prosperity is required for the collective life as well as 
individual life. Therefore, affluence is a political aim. It must be regulated in the 
social union. On the other hand, some individuals claim that material wealth is their 
comprehensive good. Therefore, they claim that their right to pursue wealth should 
be unrestricted. What grounds for limiting freedom to pursue prosperity can Rawls 
offer and defend? Especially if  prosperity is viewed as a political end o f  a society, it 
may be viewed as an untouchable birthright. How persuasive is Rawls in response to 
such claims? Rawls’s desire to defend justice as fairness as more than merely a 
practical arrangement or logical operating procedure depends on the ability o f one 
person’s good to be inseparably linked to another person’s good.
The motivational power o f  Fo/iiica/Libera/ism xQ\\t% on reasonableness o f 
persons in relationship to others who cannot be viewed as merely means to an end. 
Willingness to cooperate is related to mutual respect. Rawls said, “ If the equal basic 
liberties o f some are restricted or denied, social cooperation on the basis o f  mutual
Ibid., 337.
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respect is impossible.”^^  Mutual respect is a prerequisite for the social union. The 
willingness to respect others and cooperate in collective life must be shown to be o f 
benefit to the individual. Freedom and pursuit o f  the good is best achieved through 
this cooperation, according to Rawls. The pressure to abide by the agreements o f  the 
social union is a persuasive, political pressure. Rawls said, “Political power is 
always coercive power” but in a democratic society this power is the “power o f  the 
public, that is, the power o f  free and equal citizens as a collective body.” *^ In some 
cases the power o f  the individual is subordinate to this corporate power, as 
individuals must recognize the collective good. But, there are rogue individuals who 
claim their comprehensive good o f  material affluence is at odds with the limits and 
obligations o f  democratic society as Rawls conceives them. This parallels the 
problem Rawls leaves unanswered in The Law o/Feop/es to the propensity o f
societies to pursue material wealth at the expense o f  those outside their social union.
In The Law o/Feop/es, Rawls continued the use o f the terms association, 
community, and society as developed in Fo/hica/Lihera/ism. An association is a 
group with a shared goal. A community is a specific type o f association united by a 
comprehensive notion o f the good. A society is distinct from an association or a 
community and is united only by political aims supported by overlapping consensus. 
In this later work, Rawls used the term society as he did in earlier writing, but here 
the termpeop/es 'is also used. Furthermore, since this work described relationships
Ibid.
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among different societies, the relationship between societies and states is also 
crucial. However, in Rawls’s writing there is a lack o f clarity about the relationship 
between societies, states, and collectives united by shared territory. Here the abstract 
theory o f  social union resulting in the notion o f  societies as Rawls describes those 
bumps up against the historical realities o f states as actors. In an idealized world, 
societies are united because o f  the reasonable and social nature o f  humans making 
cooperation practical. In the historical world, things are messier than that. Although 
Rawls clearly stated that societies are not the same as states, he did not fully explain 
how societies should relate to states and state power.
Society’s Relationship to States as Actors
To deal with complexities in the relationships between societies requires
extension o f  his original theory o f  justice. His final book contains the culmination o f
his theory. Therefore, The Law o/Peop/esy^\\\ be the focus o f the application o f
positive liberty in the remainder o f  this chapter. Rawls attempted to delineate
between states as political actors and “society o f peoples.” He wrote:
I shall use the term “Society o f  Peoples” to mean all 
those peoples who follow the ideals and principles o f 
the Law o f  Peoples in their mutual relations. These 
people have their own internal governments....^^
For the purpose o f  clarity, it would have been helpful to use the term ‘society” only
in reference to a collective o f peoples. Peoples cooperate with each other in this
Rawls, LP, 3.
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cooperative society that is regulated by the law o f peoples. However, Rawls uses the
terms w e//-o rc /erec /p eo p /es dLX\A w e //-o rt^ ere d so c /e //e s m{&xz\\dXi%t,dkAy throughout
the monograph. The important distinction then, is between jykvku-and peoples or
societies. Rawls claims that “the difference between states and peoples is
enormous.”*Vccording to this distinction, states have interests that put them at odds
with others in ways that lead to war and insecurity.^' Rawls wrote.
How far states differ from peoples rests on how 
rationality, the concern with power, and a state’s basic 
interests are filled in. If  /•<ir//b>%7Æ>'excludes the 
rea so n a b /e  is, if  a state is moved by the aims it 
has and ignores the criterion o f reciprocity in dealing 
with other societies); if  a state’s concern with power is 
predominant; and if  its interests include such things as 
converting other societies to the state’s religion, 
enlarging its empire and winning territory, gaining 
dynastic or imperial or national glory, and increasing 
its relative economic strength -  then the difference 
between states and people is enormous.^^
In contrast to states, liberal peoples “limit their basic interests as required by 
the reasonable.”^^  By defining his terms in this way, Rawls has already assured that 
liberal peoples will achieve reasonable pluralism because by definition they value 
cooperation and coexistence. Well-ordered peoples limit their own freedom by 
fostering values o f  peace. Rawls might have achieved the same distinction by
Ibid., 28.
Ibid., 29.
Ibid., 28.
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drawing a line between imperialistic states and liberal states (defined as non-
imperialistic). But he did not. He wrote, “Liberal peoples can live with other peoples
o f like character in upholding justice and preserving peace.’’^ '^  Why this distinction
rather than one between peaceful states and imperialistic states? He states but cannot
fully prove that just peoples are rational whereas states, by nature, are not just
because they are not rational. Rawls wrote:
What distinguishes peoples from states -  and this is 
crucial -  is that just peoples are fully prepared to grant 
the very same proper respect and recognition to other 
peoples as equals.^^
He could have easily said “just s/a/eszxo. fully prepared to grant proper respect to 
other states as equals.” But that would imply that states can be moral actors. He 
begins offering an explanation o f how states differ from peoples. But then, he defines 
peoples as capable o f moral motivation without really showing how peoples are 
different in any other respect from states. Thus, he side-steps the issue o f  how 
peoples are constituted, how they are separated from other peoples and how they 
interact with states. He wants to avoid saying that peoples are united by a 
comprehensive idea o f the good, or a general will based on agreement about the 
good. Rather than saying that states are defined by material and historical 
conditions, and peoples are constituted by a culture, civilization, or common 
interests, he leaves the relationship o f  these terms fuzzy. This is problematic since it
Ibid.
Ibid, 35.
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leaves unanswered the question o f  how a person’s freedom is realized in cooperation 
with others at an international level.
Examination o f what constitutes belonging in a society, the boundaries or 
borders o f a society, and the moral implications o f  society are needed. The reality 
that the boundaries o f nation states have been established by political actors and 
contingencies o f  history rather than rational process is a problem for Rawls’s work. 
Rawls discussed this issue in some detail, stating that the laws o f  peoples pertained 
to societies or peoples rather than states. What does he mean by the term societies? 
Collectives o f  people can be identified that are not states. However, the uniting 
cause and the boundaries o f  such collectives need definition. For example, there are 
collectives o f  people like the Palestinians or Tibetans in exile who have no state 
territory that they occupy and control. They are not recognized as states, at least not 
formally. They are united by common ancestry and culture but not necessarily a 
shared comprehensive vision o f the good. Would he say European peoples with their 
respective internal governments provide a better example o f what he has in mind? He 
seems to be using the term in a way approaching Huntington’s idea o f  civilizations. 
We can conceptualize divisions o f persons based on geographic location, gender, 
economic class, religion, race, or various other characteristics. What Rawls meant 
by the term peoples as opposed to states is unclear, except insofar as he wanted to 
illustrate that there are associations, communities, and connections that do not 
depend on state boundaries. Ethical issues among various collectives o f  people 
obviously predate the development o f the modem nation state. Thus, questions o f
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international ethics are not limited to the model o f how one nation relates to others, 
since the actors in the international arena are not only nations. Individuals, 
corporations, races, interest groups, religions, and various other groupings transcend 
national borders. The phenomenon o f  globalization, including increasing economic 
interaction across national borders has prompted talk o f  an international community. 
No longer can a sharp distinction hold between obligations owed to members within 
a society and differing obligations owed to those outside its membership unless the 
reasons from belonging and being excluded are justified.
Rawls presented a theory o f justice that he thought fair because the principles 
that justify policies are selected in the original position in a way that “nullifies the 
contingencies and biases o f historical fate.”^^  However, the constituency o f  a 
collective o f  people, a community, society, or nation is not clearly defined in 
relationship to historical contingencies in Rawls’s work. In his attempt to avoid 
international application o f his theory, Rawls had maintained in his earlier work that 
his theory applied only within a certain collective o f people. Most typically, he 
operated as if  that collective o f  people was both united and restricted by a contract 
that was probably a constitution. The principles o f justice that apply to persons in 
constitutional democracy were to be extended as far as possible to the international 
level. \r\ Theo/yo/Jus/ice^drnX^^^ xoX '^.
The basic principle o f  the law o f nations is a principle
o f equality. Independent peoples organized as states
“ Rawls, TJ, 378.
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have certain fundamental equal rights. This principles 
is analogous to the equal rights o f citizens in a 
constitutional regime. One consequence o f this 
equality o f  nations in the principle o f  self- 
determination, the right o f  a people to settle its own 
affairs without the intervention o f  foreign powers.
Because o f the commitment to remain as neutral as possible about the content 
o f the contract itself, Rawls did not specify enough examples o f this demarcation 
between types o f  collectives that would qualify and those that would not. His theory 
was developed with the idea o f modern democratic states in mind, although he did 
not want to limit the application o f the theory only to such states. In his later work, 
Rawls most typically described contractual ethics as a process resulting in the law o f  
peoples regulating interaction between people joined in a society. This leaves 
unanswered some crucial questions about the relationship between a society and its 
territory. Society is not limited by geographical borders. But where are the edges o f 
the society? Furthermore, what constitutes obligations across borders?
Consider two different cases o f state borders. On the one hand, the border 
between the United States and Mexico is an easy example o f the reality o f  state 
borders and their implications for freedom. Sharp differences in economic 
prosperity, opportunity, and meaningful freedom are enforced at this border. On the 
other hand, many parts o f  the border between the United States and Canada seem 
blurred since commonalities in lifestyle and level o f affluence unite people on each 
side. That is to say, in the case o f  the U.S./Canadian border, a common people can
Ibid.
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be easily imaged transcending that state border. In contrast, real community bridging 
the border between the United States and Mexico is hard to imagine. If the border 
between the U.S. and Mexico happens to coincide with what Rawls would call a 
separation between one people and another, then what obligations and possibilities 
for relationship are implied? What about the desire for freedom to bridge the United 
States border with Mexico by constructing true community based on common 
humanity? Are we free to do that? Do we have a duty o f  assistance in that case? The 
will o f  workers or humanitarians to transcend that border is in conflict with the 
power structure o f  the institutional states. Historical and practical arguments have 
been used to justify the border and its consequences for distributive justice. Rawls 
accepted state borders as necessary for the effective protection o f  property, but does 
not fully justify the different moral duties between the society o f people on one side 
of the border and the society on the other side. Although Rawls tried to answer such 
questions in T/ieLaw o/Feop/es, his argument fails to clarify these matters related to 
state versus societal boundaries and identities.
In his most recent work Rawls responded to the criticisms related to these 
matters o f  the scope and meaning o f  community. However, his response focused 
only on the obligation to assist impoverished societies. He did not adequately 
address the reliance o f  his theory on the significance o f state borders. Rawls’s 
consideration o f  the relationship between societies includes a response to Pogge and 
others in the discussion o f  the duty o f  assistance to what Rawls called burdened 
societies. In TheLau' o/Feop/es, Rawls addressed Pogge specifically noting that
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their possible agreement depended on Pogge’s willingness to acknowledge a cut o ff 
point for assistance.^*
Rawls’s law o f peoples requires a limited duty o f  assistance to burdened 
societies. Burdened societies are those “whose historical, social, and economic 
circumstances make their achieving a well-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, 
difficult if  not impossible.”^^  No consideration o f  historical injustices that led to the 
difficulties o f  these burdened societies appears in The Law o/Feop/es. Imperialism, 
conquest, and colonialism are not acknowledged as having any pertinent 
consequences for the relationships between well-ordered societies and burdened 
societies. Rawls did acknowledge that national borders are “historically arbitrary,” 
meaning that they came about through a process that was not a fair, rational. Just 
process.’® Nevertheless, Rawls sets aside past injustices in favor o f  asking how to 
proceed in the future. He said, “It does not follow from the fact that boundaries are 
historically arbitrary that their role in the Law o f  Peoples cannot be justified.””  Then 
he argued that the justification for maintaining the current boundaries has to do with 
the efficacy o f  borders for maintaining property interests that states have in their 
territory. This highly practical approach assumes that the cooperative good will o f  all
Rawls, LP, 39.
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parties can be secured despite past resentments in order to secure a stable future.
The empirical question about whether or not this approach o f starting over in the 
interest o f practical stability for the future is tenable cannot be addressed here. 
However, it is worth noting that the question remains.
Similarly, Rawls suggests other analysis that relies on empirical claims that are 
unfounded. For example, he made a strong case for blaming the historical causes o f 
poverty on badly ordered regimes.^^ Whether or not certain policies actually do or 
do not render predictable results still does not answer normative questions about 
desert. If wise policies lead to situations wherein basic needs are met then we still 
must answer questions about our obligations in cases where wise policies are not 
followed. For the sake o f argument, suppose that certain historical policies chosen 
by a society in the past result in extreme poverty. Later generations o f  individuals 
within that impoverished society who had no power over the policy-making prior to 
their birth cannot deserve situation. A cut-off point in assistance would always allow 
such injustices. It is inconsistent to leave the past behind when it comes to the 
arbitrary and unjust division o f national borders, but to insist that the consequences 
o f past policy are deserved. The limits o f  the duty o f assistance must be based in a 
more complete understanding o f the nature o f  duty itself. Rawls did not want to 
argue that it was prudent for wealthy nations to assist burdened societies. He argued 
that there is a assistance. He said that the “unfavorable conditions” o f
Ibid., 38.
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burdened societies generate a limited duty o f  assistance/^ Not only the limits o f  this 
duty, but the basis for this duty remain unclear.
Rawls seemed to simply assume that this duty exists. Other than the practical 
benefits o f aid, there is no real justification for the requirement as a duty. He wrote:
In regard to these burdened societies we must ask how 
far liberal or decent peoples owe a duty o f  assistance to 
these societies so that the latter may establish their own 
reasonably just or decent institutions.^"*
He accepted that he must deal with the question o f the extent and conditions o f  the 
duty, but never fully explains why there is such a duty at all. He has taken as a 
starting point for his discussion a list o f  principles o f justice for international law that 
is commonly accepted.’  ^ One might think that Rawls would just have an 
international version o f the original position wherein persons behind a veil o f  
ignorance would select this duty. However, in T/ieZaw q/'/’eo/p/esRawXs argued 
that a “second original position” was required to model justice as fairness among 
peoples.^^ The representatives to this second original position know that “reasonably
"  Ibid., 105.
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favorable conditions obtain that make constitutional democracy possible.”^^  In other 
words, there are no representatives o f outlaw or burdened peoples allowed to have 
voice in this model. The assumption is that reasonable and rational choices o f 
representatives from relatively well-off nations would select the best principles to 
govern all situations. Choosers in the second original position evaluate and select 
among variations o f “the eight principles o f the Law o f Peoples.” *^
The duty o f  assistance is included in this list. Rawls argues that 
representatives in the second original position would affirm the limited duty o f 
assistance. But, Rawls never fully explained how the second original position 
wherein these principles should be scrutinized and rationally chosen would justify 
the duty o f  assistance as more than modus vivendi. Consider this claim that the law 
o f peoples includes a duty to assist burdened societies. What is the basis in Rawls’s 
theory o f  this duty? In the domestic case, the difference principle Justifies a duty 
within a liberal society to assist burdened individuals. However, in the international 
case, Rawls said that the difference principle does not apply, and does not fully 
Justify the duty o f assistance at that level.
Rawls was clear that “the object o f the duty o f assistance” is not equalizing 
levels o f  welfare. The duty is simply to deliver burdened states to the minimal level 
that makes it possible for them to Join the well-ordered states by achieving Just 
institutions. Rawls deals with the case o f burdened societies in connection with his
”  Ibid., 30.
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treatment o f the relationship toward outlaw states. Both are cases o f  non-ideal 
theory. But, in his discussion o f  outlaw states he does not use the language o f duty. 
He does not say that well-ordered states have a duty to pressure outlaw regimes to 
reform. His interest in discussing the limits o f  the society o f peoples is to exclude 
outlaw states from that society and to defend the right o f  well-ordered states to use 
force in self-defense. In the case o f an aggressive outlaw regime, a well-ordered 
state may resort to nonideal responses like war. Perhaps, Rawls intends to claim that 
in the case o f burdened societies, a well-ordered state may resort to nonideal 
responses like assistance. But, if this is the intent, why does he say they must resort 
to assistance rather than simply saying that they may assist? That is, why does he say 
they have a duty to assist?
One possible answer to this question might be that peaceful coexistence is 
furthered when burdened societies receive assistance. Following the liberal vision in 
Kant’s essay, “Perpetual Peace”, Rawls thinks that “peace reigns” among 
constitutional democratic societies.^^ Eliminating causes o f  war motivates the efforts 
o f the liberal or decent people in order to bring outlaw states into the fold o f those 
who live according to the Law o f  Peoples. Perhaps a similar line o f  reasoning 
justifies his claim that there is a duty o f assistance. In other words, since starving 
and desperate peoples from other states may pose an outside threat to liberal or 
decent peoples, the plight o f  those burdened societies must be alleviated to secure 
peace. For example, the stability and security o f  a liberal people could be
79 Rawls,LP, 19.
216
jeopardized if a neighboring people are agitated because o f  severe poverty. In such a 
case, prudent self-interest motivates assistance. However, if that is the reasoning for 
what Rawls calls the duty o f assistance, why does he call it a duty? Why not say that 
well-ordered societies have an interest or a goal in assisting burdened societies? 
Rawls hoped to offer a reason different from the mere utility o f  cooperation. 
Remember his early distinction between private society, exemplified by the market 
versus social union, united by a political notion o f  Justice. Competitors in the market 
will curtail their own freedom insofar as it furthers their overall and long-term 
benefits. However, Rawls was seeking a deontological alternative to such moral 
reasoning. His method o f  reflective equilibrium must be the source o f  Justification 
for this duty. Perhaps there is a moral sentiment based on sympathy or common 
humanity. This moral impulse might become fully developed as a duty o f  assistance 
through the process o f  reflective equilibrium. If so, this should be clarified. If  the 
duty o f assistance is based on a felt impulse rather than a thoroughly considered 
Judgment what Justifies the insistence on a cut-off point for assistance?
The cut-off point in assistance distinguishes the conclusions o f The Law 0/  
Teop/esixom the cosmopolitan concept o f Justice. In contrasting his claims regarding 
distributive Justice among peoples with the cosmopolitan view, Rawls said that the 
later “ is concerned with the well-being o f individuals, and hence with whether the 
well-being o f  the globally worst-off person can be improved.”*^  Rawls clearly states 
that the Law o f  Peoples is indifferent to the possibility o f improving the well-being
“  Rawls,LP, 120.
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of the globally worst-off individuals.*' Rawls detailed this distinction between his 
theory and the cosmopolitan theories by examining Charles Beitz’s resource 
redistribution principle and Thomas Pogge’s Egalitarian principle.*^ Rawls viewed 
the duty o f  assistance as a transitional measure to help burdened societies achieve a 
threshold o f  possibility for political autonomy. Briefly stated, Beitz and Pogge both 
argued for greater redistribution across borders than Rawls suggests.*^ Because 
Beitz’s proposal is so similar to Pogge’s, I have chosen to address only Pogge’s 
critique o f Rawls in detail. Rawls’s rejection o f their arguments depends on his 
notion o f  reciprocity. For example, if an attempt to act on the assistance to burdened 
societies as suggested by the law o f peoples was implemented in 2006, there might 
be a cut-off point to that assistance in the year 2026 assuming that the threshold 
required for political autonomy was achieved. However, by the year 2046, severe 
poverty might recur as a consequence o f unwise policies. Reciprocity would demand 
that affluent nations in 2046 had already done their part, and ought not be taxed to 
assist this burdened nation further. In opposition to these justifications for 
international wealth redistribution, Rawls maintains that the law o f peoples does not 
necessitate redistribution o f wealth except when a duty o f assistance is required to 
elevate a people to a minimal level wherein a well-ordered society is possible.
*' Ibid.
Ibid., 118, n.53.
Beitz, 38, n. 44.
218
Attention to the well-being o f individuals is the focus o f  cosmopolitan 
international theory. Why is this opposition to the cosmopolitan argument so 
important to Rawls? He wants to preserve neutrality about competing 
understandings o f the good. Justice as fairness does not promote welfare o f  
individuals as an appropriate end o f political institutions. However, when Rawls 
makes that move, leaving aside questions o f historical injustice that may have led to 
burdens, he needs to make a stronger case for claiming that there is a duty o f 
assistance rather than just a practical motive for assistance.
State borders demarcating territory are important in Theory o/Justiceh^ cdiW^Q 
they limit the extent o f duties and obligations. The contract is with members o f the 
constitutional democracy (or decent state). In T/ie Law o/Peop/es Rawls did not 
answer questions about whether people as individual members o f a people or society 
have moral rights or obligations in relationship to other members o f  their same 
people or society who do not happen to be members o f  their same state. The 
relationships between a definition o f community, the question o f borders, and the 
question o f  assistance are identified as key elements in any theory o f  distributive 
justice, according to Michael Walzer in his essay, “The Distribution o f 
Membership.” Walzer wrote, “The idea o f distributive justice presupposes a 
bounded world, a community within which distribution takes place.”*'* Rawls did not 
adequately address the finite limits o f  water and air or the perspective o f a global 
unity o f  shared responsibility and need existing over generations for such resources.
Walzer, 1.
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Rawls would agree with Walzer that the idea o f distribution presupposes some 
bounded collective o f  persons. However, Rawls argued that the national borders as 
the exit today provide those bounds.
This leaves unanswered questions o f  shared resources that transcend national 
territory like air and water.
The assumption o f the current distribution o f land resources as defined by 
historical borders would entail that the agent responsible for those resources is the 
nation state corresponding to those boundaries not an amorphous society. It is 
inconsistent to reject states as actors when selecting building blocks for the Law o f 
Peoples and then to tie the cut-off point in aid to reciprocity based in state 
responsibility. If aid designed at ensuring political autonomy has a cut-off point as 
Rawls requires, then the state as the policy-maker responsible for these property 
interests must be the agents cooperating in the Law o f Peoples. When discussing 
principles o f distributive Justice in The Zoh' ofPeop/es, Rawls emphasized the 
requirement o f  reciprocity. His example in this case amounts to a claim that a people 
should reap what they sow. Efforts should be rewarded. His theory o f  Justice holds 
that talents are morally irrelevant but the will is not. A minimum assurance o f 
opportunity should be afforded. However, if  one people exhibits thrift and industry 
and another does not, the hard-working, disciplined people deserves its profits over 
time. Two questions are relevant at this point. First o f  all, why is the will different 
from talent? In other words, if  collective wisdom, energy, and will-power o f  a 
people is as arbitrary as their other talents, why is the will morally relevant? Rawls
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might argue that reciprocity requires that the collective wisdom and energy o f  a 
people is a result o f  that people’s past choices, so it is not arbitrary at all. Rawls 
noted that there are historical examples indicating that “resource-poor countries may 
do very well (e.g., Japan), while resource-rich countries may have serious difficulties 
(e.g. Argentina).”*^  Rawls identified the “political culture” and “political virtues” as 
the crucial element determining the outcome.*^ Once again Rawls seem oblivious to 
the grim realities o f generations o f  mal-nutrition, lack o f education, and other 
resources that can sap the will o f  a people.
Despite historical cases that might be exceptional for various reasons, Rawls 
has not offered strong evidence to settle the empirical question about effects o f 
severe poverty on the quality o f  representational processes for setting policy that will 
affect future generations. Instead, Rawls follows in the tradition o f  reliance on labor 
as defining factor constituting property rights and allocation o f  resources. The 
claim that people deserve the fruit o f  the labor will be addressed further in the next 
chapter. However, lack o f  labor is not the only reason for poverty. Rawls clearly
Rawls, LP, 108.
*^Rawls, LP, 108.
In this way Rawls agrees with Dworkin, Ronald. “Equality, Luck, and 
Hierarchy, ”F/ii/osophy andFub/ic 31, No. 2 (Spring:2003) 190-198. See
also: “Political Obligation and Community,” Socia/andFo/F/ca/F/if/osophy. ed. 
John Arthur and William H. Shaw. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991), pp. 
33-44. and Sovereign Fir/ue. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), 
2000 .
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stated that poverty is caused by bad institutions.** He gives examples o f how 
resource poor nations can be well-ordered, while nations with abundant material 
resources can remained burdened. In this way, he claims to demonstrate that 
inequalities in material resources are not the cause o f disparity between the 
prosperity o f  nations. His examples are anecdotal and hardly constitute conclusive 
empirical evidence regarding the relationship between natural resources and the 
wealth o f  nations. Although it would be equally unfounded to claim that imperialism 
was a contributing cause o f  poverty, the point is that Rawls has not ruled out that 
possibility. Rawls acknowledged that empires rise to power because o f  “gluttony” or 
“the ever-expanding craving for power.”*^  However, he does not adequately address 
any need to ameliorate historical consequences lingering from past injustice o f 
empires.
Some have claimed that the historical development o f  international trade 
resulted in patterns o f  dependency that are deeply entrenched.^'’ These and other 
possible causes o f wide-spread poverty must be examined empirically. Such 
research is beyond the scope o f this study. Yet, Rawls would do well to admit that 
the causes o f poverty and wealth are also beyond the scope o f his study. If  realists 
are correct that greed and lust for power will motivate human interaction regardless
Rawls,LP, 108.
*^  Ibid, 29n.
^  Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Enzo Faletto. Depenc/ency anc/Deve/opmen/ 
in La/m America. (Los Angeles: University o f California Press), 1979.
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of culture and moral training, then redistribution o f wealth within and among 
societies will always be required in order for peoples to have enough mutual respect 
to be free in a meaningful sense. Continuous redistribution without a cut-off point is 
unacceptable to Rawls because o f his commitment to reciprocity. Claims to property 
can be based on need or desert. When tension between the two claims arises in 
conditions o f  scarcity, communities must either choose to prioritize claims based on 
need or on desert. In his international theory, Rawls prioritized desert based on 
reciprocity over need. Severe poverty can be understood to be deserved according to 
Rawls’s theory because if  the policy-makers for a people make unwise choices such 
poverty may be part o f  the consequences. According to Rawls, peoples whose 
policy-makers made wise choices resulting in relative affluence should not be 
penalized or taxed by an unlimited duty o f  assistance since this violates reciprocity. 
Therefore, understanding the causes o f poverty accurately are important in the 
application o f Rawls’s theory.
A final argument related to international assistance relates to the limits o f 
freedom in community because o f  limited material resources. In other words, both 
within and among different communities o f  people, there might be a willingness to 
limit negative freedom in order to promote positive liberty, but not if much sacrifice 
is required. A duty o f  assistance extending to continual redistribution might be 
rejected on the basis that wealthy peoples would be unfairly asked to sacrifice too 
much because the needs o f the impoverished are so great. If too heavily taxed, the 
productive will o f  a people might decline from resentment. Henry Shue analyzed this
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argument in his work, Basic Jiig/its: Subsis/ence, Aj^ uence, and [/.S. Foreign Policy.
He stated that one possible argument against international assistance is that “there
are so many deprived persons that the cost o f  aiding them all until they can be self-
sufficient is an unfair, if  not impossible burden to impose upon the affluent.”^' His
answer, based on empirical study, is that such an argument fails. He wrote;
It would not be possible, and it is not necessary in 
order to fulfill subsistence rights, to transfer so much 
wealth and income from the currently affluent to the 
currently deprived that today’s affluent will be reduced 
to a level only marginally better than subsistence.^^
Once again, such empirical matters cannot be resolved here. However, if Shue is
correct, there are implications for Rawls’s theory. Shue claimed that the survival
rights o f  the impoverished should not be sacrificed because o f the less weighty free
trade rights o f  the affluent. He recommended limiting the freedom o f  individuals and
corporations in international trade for this reason. W ouldn’t Rawls be committed to
similar regulation o f  international trade? If he took seriously a more robust notion o f
freedom, including the positive notion o f  freedom, he would. In community, some
freedom is limited so other freedom is made real. It is not the aggregate amount o f
freedom that is important, but the quality and integrity o f the freedom within
community. Rawls agrees that subsistence rights are legitimate and so includes the
duty o f  assistance to burdened societies in his law o f peoples. But he leaves
Shue, 105.
Ibid., I I I .
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unanswered questions about the extent o f  the hardship that can be imposed on an 
affluent people in order to meet subsistence needs o f burdened peoples.
International Community in Pogge’s critique
I turn now to the themes offered in Thomas Pogge’s critique o f  Rawls to 
demonstrate where the considerations o f  these problems are being developed in the 
contemporary debate. The potential for the application o f the positive concept o f 
liberty to Rawls’s work coincides with Pogge’s concerns. In other words, the critique 
o f Rawls’s view o f  freedom in relationship to collective life that I have offered above 
is based on the idea o f positive freedom. This critique overlaps in important ways 
with criticisms o f  Rawls offered by Thomas Pogge. Pogge briefly considered and 
rejected emphasizing a distinction between positive and negative l i b e r t y , b u t  at the 
same time indicated sympathy with classical concerns upheld by positive liberty. The 
substance o f  my agreement with Pogge is as follows: Pogge begins from the reality 
o f “widespread human misery” and derives from three main problems.^'* First o f  all, 
Pogge said that Rawls does not convincingly defend the importance o f state borders 
as legitimizing differences in ethical obligations and rights. Secondly, Pogge argued 
that Rawls’s notion o f freedom is inadequate because it is not “worthwhile
Thomas Pogge, “The Interpretation o f Rawls’ First Principle o f  Justice,” in The 
Two Tnhc/p/es and Their Jus/i/ïca/ion. (ed.) Henry S. Richardson and Paul J. 
Weithman, (New York: Garland Publishers, Inc. 1999), 62.
Pogge, RR, 273.
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f r e e d o m . A n d  finally, Pogge demonstrated that Rawls did not adequately answer 
the questions related to the limitations o f natural resources and material causes o f 
poverty. Because Pogge’s work so closely mirrors my own criticism o f  Rawls, I will 
explore his analysis in detail and demonstrate how the concept o f  positive liberty 
provides important historical and ethical connections worth further development in 
Pogge’s critique o f Rawls.
Pogge stated, “The distinction between positive (social, economic, and
cultural) and negative (civil and political) liberties is a purely conceptual one.”^^  He
did not think that the distinction would be helpful in sorting out the prioritizing o f
liberties in the original position. In other words, he rejected the idea that they would
select negative liberties over positive liberties or vice versa. In fact, Pogge
challenged the distinction that Rawls made between political liberties in contrast to
other liberties. He noted that “The political liberties, though intrinsically ‘positive’,
often -  by sleight o f hand -  end up in the ‘good’ pile o f the Western theorist’s
classification.”^^  He argued that Rawls prioritizing o f political liberties over
subsistence rights could be a problem, although Rawls relegated such a conflict to
cases o f non-ideal theory. Pogge wrote.
The Rawlsian concern for the least advantaged 
undercuts then the classical liberalist emphasis on civil 
and political liberties, because the parties can be
Ibid., 127.
Pogge, 1999,61.
Ibid., 61, n. 6.
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presumed to be equally reluctant to risk death from 
starvation or lack o f hygiene as they are to risk being 
killed through assassination or torture.^*
In a footnote^^ Pogge clarified that the classical liberalist emphasis on civil 
and political liberties he had in mind was that o f Isaiah Berlin who prioritized 
negative over positive liberties. Pogge did not suggest that the opposite o f this 
classical liberal emphasis on negative liberties was the answer. He did not see the 
solution as promoting the positive concept o f freedom as developed by opponents o f 
liberalism. However, he did argue against promoting only a negative concept o f 
liberty because that could result in liberties being merely formal. In reference to the 
distinction between positive and negative freedom Pogge noted the work o f 
MacCallum who convinced him that this distinction is not “as clear-cut as had been 
supposed.” "^ Despite these disclaimers, Pogge’s work repeatedly returns to the 
problem that social and economic constructions lead to freedom that is merely 
formal rather than meaningful. For this reason, 1 find themes sympathetic to my 
emphasis on positive freedom in Pogge’s criticism o f Rawls. I do not claim that 
Pogge would embrace promotion o f positive freedom as a corrective to problems in 
Rawls theory. However, 1 think he would acknowledge resemblances between his 
critique and mine.
Ibid., 62.
Ibid., 62,n. 7.
Ibid.
227
Pogge made a move similar to promoting positive liberty when he 
distinguished between the “positive and negative” versions o f the golden rule. He 
urged consideration o f  the positive version because it is “much closer to the ‘spirit o f 
solidarity’ invoked in article four o f the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights. He 
said, “Endorsement o f the positive version would have made it difficult to deny that 
persons have a responsibility to help others in distress. . The definition o f 
community is in question again as Pogge reflected on our responsibility to others.
He argued that the global economy is unjust because “as advantaged participants we 
share collective responsibility for injustice” o f  poverty and unfair distribution o f 
wealth.
Pogge analyzed Rawls’s distinction between liberty and the worth o f  liberty 
and found Rawls wanting on this point. In considering the liberties that Rawls 
intended to insure Pogge wrote, “All these must exist not merely on paper but 
effectively, in practice.” The positive notion o f  freedom could be helpful to 
Pogge’s criticism o f Rawls because o f its emphasis on the material conditions o f 
freedom as opposed to the formal conditions o f  freedom. In his writing Pogge 
referred to the distinction between merely formal freedom versus effective freedom. 
He wrote, “Thus the first principle requires not merely formal but effective legal
Thomas Pogge ,“An Egalitarian Law o f  Peoples,” in (ed.) Henry S. Richardson 
and Paul L. Weithman. ThePh/7osop/ry 0/ Jicm/s, (New York: Garland Publishing, 
Inc., 1999), 156-157.
Pogge, RR, 277.
Ibid., 147.
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freedom .. His insistence on worthwhile freedom reflects the same concern. He 
said.
They and their families may be unfree to purchase a 
nutritious and healthful diet, sufficient clothing and 
heating fuel for the winter, needed medical care and 
medications, a decent education, and so forth. Where 
does Rawls’s account take note o f  this sort of 
unfreedom?'®^
Pogge noted Rawls’s admission that “the basic liberties may prove to be 
merely formal” '®^  Rawls saw the potential problem, but did not provide an adequate 
solution. Although the difference principle is designed to address the problem at the 
domestic level, when it comes to the international level, Rawls allowed for cases o f 
burdened societies that must suffer the consequences o f their bad political culture 
even if  it results in unequal worth o f  liberty. All too often, liberties prove merely 
formal, and freedom is only freedom in form but not substance. Pogge repeatedly 
stated that, “All these must exist not merely on paper but effectively, in practice” '”’ . 
The distinction between positive and negative liberty provides a basis for correcting 
this problem. In other words, freedom is not just the absence o f restraint, but the 
presence o f a positive, dynamic, functioning process. 1 agree with Pogge that 
persons in the original position would choose what Pogge called worthwhile freedom
Ibid., 128.
Ibid., 133.
Rawls, PL,lviii, and also Pogge, RR, 133.
107 Pogge, RR, 147.
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rather than what Rawls called freedom. This is another way o f  saying, persons in the 
original position would insist on positive freedom, not just negative freedom. Pogge 
wrote.
Delegates o f  liberal societies as Rawls conceives them 
would therefore not merely prefer, but would choose, 
my more egalitarian law o f peoples over his 
inegalitarian alternative.
Unfortunately, Rawls did not live long enough to respond to this specific critique o f
his last book. His best response might have been that Pogge’s claim rests on liberal
assumptions that assume universal or comprehensive notions o f  the good that Rawls
aimed to avoid. Yet, Pogge is convincing that freedom is a vacuous term unless the
positive construction o f freedom is protected within social systems. It is the
inadequacy in Rawls’s concept o f freedom that leads to this problem. Pogge
criticized Rawls for valuing formal freedom over actual embodied freedom. By
insisting that on the priority o f the first principle, " .. .  Rawls lets his lexical priority
o f the basic liberties (the first principle o f Justice) undermine his priority o f  concern
for the least advantaged.” '®^
The source o f  disagreement between Rawls and Pogge results from the
different real-world problems each sought to address. Rawls was motivated by
preserving freedom against intolerance and the potential for totalitarianism inherent
in comprehensive conceptions o f the good. In contrast, Pogge comes from a
Pogge, 1999, 182.
Pogge, RR, 10.
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heightened awareness o f realities o f severe poverty. It is respect for the diversity o f 
societies that motivated Rawls’s insistence that pluralism must provide for different 
comprehensive views to f l o u r i s h . A g g r e s s i v e  viewpoints that seek to eradicate 
opposing views cannot be protected, since those would destroy the freedom to 
provide a context for pluralism. However, although aggressive societies are 
destructive o f freedom, it may be that the worst threat to freedom resides in 
concentrations o f economic power whether in a state or in a people. Therefore, the 
most extensive freedom may be promoted by positive construction o f community 
rather than Rawls’s more casual association among peoples. The relationship 
between the definition o f a community and the implications for moral reasoning 
cannot be avoided. Pogge said, “I do not believe that Rawls has an adequate 
response to the historical arbitrariness o f  national borders -  to the fact that most 
borders have come about through violence and coercion.” ' ' '
Could Rawls agree that moral duties towards others outside members o f the 
contractual community exist without toppling his entire theory? Pogge thinks he 
could. For this reason, Pogge insisted that Rawls’s theory be applied to the global 
economy, with the result that Rawls should advocate for market regulation through 
democratic process even at an international level. Pogge wrote.
110 See PL, 144 on Rawls using the term “flourish.’
Pogge, 1999, 156.
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What is true o f  a domestic economic order is clearly 
true o f  the international economic order as well; 
Alternative ways o f  organizing global economic 
cooperation have diverse distributional tendencies and 
differ, in particular, in how supportive or obstructive 
they are o f  economic development in the poorest 
countries and areas.
The background conditions must be present in order for justice as fairness to apply. 
Therefore, some limited duty o f  assistance is necessary to insure that peoples have a 
fair opportunity to select wise policies for themselves. Yet, with no application o f 
the difference principle at the international level inequalities will continually occur, 
so the cut-off point in aid is problematic. There will continually be lack o f  fair 
access to the decision-making process at the international level without a global 
difference principle.
A barrier to the international application o f the difference principle could be 
lack o f unity among persons bound together in a global economic system. The 
motivation to cooperate within national borders depends on complex psychological 
and practical awareness. Why would persons submit to a global difference 
principle? Differences in levels o f  affluence might actually affect how people answer 
that question. From the perspective o f  wealthy nations collective life in relationship 
with poorer nations may mean sacrifice o f  power, freedom, and prosperity. From the 
perspective o f  impoverished nations, genuine cooperation with wealthy nations could
'" P o g g e , RR,16.
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mean solutions to lack o f  real freedom. In writing about global justice, Pogge
criticized Rawls for underestimating the differences in starting places between rich
and poor. Thus, Pogge demonstrated a type o f  privileged bias within Rawls’s
thinking. By considering justice as fairness as a procedural matter within a society’s
boundaries, Rawls inadvertently incorporated characteristics o f the privileged society
he experienced by upholding the idea that state borders are morally relevant without
adequate justification. This makes Rawls’s theory seem oblivious to the vast
disparity between rich and poor that exists on a global level. Furthermore, in addition
to these material realities o f poverty that Rawls failed to appreciate; the finite nature
o f material resources is also overlooked in Rawls’s theory. The world’s natural
resource base is limited. How does ownership o f those material resources relate to
the concept o f a community, society, or nation? Geographic control o f the land rich
in a particular resource might give a nation a right to ownership o f that property, but
this is not a foregone conclusion. Pogge wrote.
The affluent countries and the elites o f the developing 
world divide these resources on mutually agreeable 
terms without leaving ‘enough and as good’ for the 
remaining majority o f  humankind."^
This reference to Locke’s “enough and as good” proviso points up the 
assumed rights o f ownership and property. Rawls did not fully explain the extent 
and limitation o f property rights. Pogge challenged Rawls for assuming with Locke 
that capitalism provides such a benefit to the society that its increases justify its
Ibid., 15.
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negative consequences. Even if  the least well o ff benefit from the elevation o f the 
level o f affluence because o f  capitalism, the consequences to the environment in the 
depletion o f  natural resources available to future generations is a problem. According 
to Rawls peoples have a right and a responsibility to maintain their territory, but the 
lack o f adequate property o f another people is assumed to be justifiable since it is the 
result o f  mismanagement, lack o f industry, or bad institutions. This point relates 
back to the discussion o f the relationship between material resources and freedom 
with its implications for borders and systems o f ownership.
Pogge urged those interested in social and political ethics to study the “ lack 
o f stamina and initiative” that result from extreme poverty. Pogge wrote about 
“having grown up in grinding poverty, childhood malnutrition and disease, and 
primitive school” as realities that must be taken into account in reflections on 
freedom, desert, and virtue.""* The motivation for assistance can be based on this 
need rather than on some ideal o f reciprocity or prudential desire for international 
stability. Pogge suggested that Rawls’s theory be revised to respond to two 
demands:
— Global social and economic inequalities must 
be limited so that children, wherever they may be bom, 
have a reasonable prospect o f becoming respected 
members o f the world-community with a stake and say 
in its future.
— International juridical and political 
institutions (both global and regional) must be 
strengthened and democratized to the point where they
114 Ibid., 18.
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will effectively protect the rights, and represent the 
will, o f  all people within their scope.'
That extension o f  the Law o f  Peoples would be consistent with the concern for 
positive freedom protecting the m//of all people. The consequences o f  freedom 
may always lead to inequalities that require continual adjustments necessary for 
equality o f  opportunity. Rawls seems to assume that once a burdened people 
receives enough assistance to develop into a well-ordered society, the problem is 
solved. His confidence that mutual respect and peaceful coexistence will follow is a 
result o f  his own understanding o f the causes o f  poverty. I have argued that his views 
on this matter are controversial and a matter for empirical research that is beyond the 
scope o f this argument. However, if Rawls is wrong about the causes o f  poverty the 
stability he hoped to achieve could be in Jeopardy.
The relationship between an individual and a society points to a tension that 
has been a source o f  deliberation and reflection throughout history. This same 
tension exists between various collectives o f people whether they are associations, 
societies, or peoples. Increased technology for communication and travel have made 
it necessary to consider more deeply the obligations we owe each other across 
boundaries. It no longer works to construe ethics that only apply within local or 
regional collectives o f  people. The cosmopolitan theory o f international relations 
suggests that some type o f  international community is possible based in the desire to 
realize the good o f  each individual. Rawls distanced his theory from that view, by
Pogge, 1999, 147.
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utilizing the term society o f  peoples rather than international community. Thomas 
Pogge’s criticism o f Rawls is constructive and corrective. He thought that Rawls 
theory had value and should be more extensively applied to international relations 
than Rawls him self thought possible. Had Rawls lived longer to respond to this 
argument, I suspect he would have moved in the direction Pogge suggested, being 
drug further to the left as his theory has been from the beginning in response to such 
criticism."^
The application o f the positive concept o f freedom to Rawls’s theory results 
in conclusions like those offered by Pogge. National borders do not justify 
inequalities in freedom or welfare. They do not exempt parties in relationship from 
rights and duties owed each other. Prosperous states or societies do have a duty to 
assist impoverished peoples, and this obligation is broader than Rawls admitted. 
Rawls underestimated the extent o f regulation and redistribution required to foster 
and maintain positive liberty. The law o f peoples suggests that members o f  a society 
o f peoples would contractually agree on fair rules or procedures to govern 
interactions on an international level. This law o f  peoples would be accepted by free 
and equal citizens who are not “dominated or manipulated or under pressure caused 
by an inferior political or social position.”"^ That type o f freedom requires a mutual 
respect among peoples that will be difficult to achieve. Rawls avoided claiming
Rawls, LP,118,n.53.
"^Rawls, PL, 48-54 and LP, 14.
236
universal values in the interest o f remaining neutral on comprehensive claims about 
the good. However, the need for subsistence level resources is a good candidate for 
a starting point for a universally shared value. The extent to which freedom o f 
affluent persons would be sacrificed in order to promote that universal value would 
be a matter o f  debate. Ironically, human flourishing may require limits to the pursuit 
o f material prosperity. If  it could be shown that excessive wealth is becoming a 
detriment to a society, or to the relationships among various societies, the obligations 
for distribution would be further complicated.
Rawls’s desire for a realistic utopia preserving peace for the right reasons 
through a liberal procedural notion o f justice like the law o f peoples is laudable. It 
can be improved by suggestions made by Thomas Pogge. But, can this vision be 
realized? Allen Buchanan raised this critique o f Rawls stating that the inequalities 
that characterize the global structure are real problems for the idealized theory o f 
Rawls."* The current concentrations o f  power in transnational corporations and the 
severe disparities among rich and poor peoples make the realization o f the law o f 
peoples seem remote if  not impossible. If only prosperous peoples participate, in this 
society o f  peoples governed by the law o f  peoples might not be so hard to establish. 
The existence o f burdened societies and the problems o f redistribution associated 
with realities o f  severe poverty represents a great challenge to the realization o f this 
utopian vision. Extensive redistribution o f power and economic resources would be 
required to extend the community to encompass poor peoples. The legacy o f
"* Buchanan, 706.
237
imperialism, and the historical consequences o f slavery and colonialism as well as 
various attempts at development have effects that are difficult to measure or prove. 
It seems unlikely that a society o f  peoples could form without facing issues o f 
redress. Nevertheless, this may be the best path to promoting both freedom and 
integrity, if  the project is extended to indefinitely redistribute wealth through 
regulation o f  trade. Talk o f global community arises because individual persons are 
interacting with others across state borders, class divisions, and cultural boundaries. 
Trade interactions on this international level have consequences for freedom and 
community. If the interaction o f people across state borders is guided by more than 
mere modus vivendi arrangements that balance power, then Rawls needs a more 
universal conception o f  freedom.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FREEDOM AND LABOR
The world has never had a good definition o f  the word liberty, 
and the American people, just now, are much in want o f one. We all 
declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the 
same thing. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to 
do as he pleases with him self and the product o f  his labor; while with 
others the same word may mean for some men to do as they please 
with other men, and the product o f other men’s labor. Here are two, 
not only different, but incomputable things, called by the same name -  
liberty. And it follows that each o f  the things is, by the respective 
parties, called by two different and incomputable names -  liberty and 
tyranny. The shepherd drives the w olf from the sheep’s throat, for 
which the sheep thanks the shepherd as liberator, while the wolf 
denounces him for the same act as the destroyer o f  liberty...
—Abraham
Lincoln.'
Political freedom, then, has two different and incompatible meanings 
according to whether we think o f the holder o f the subject o f political 
pow er... Not only are these two conceptions o f  freedom mutually 
exclusive in logic, but they are also incapable o f co-existing in fact 
within any particular sphere o f action.
-H an s J. Morgenthau^
How are decisions made at work? How are decisions made regarding the 
product o f  labor? Do people in “relatively free and affluent countries” have 
responsibilities “to try to improve working conditions and wages o f  workers in far-
Abraham Lincoln, April 18, 1864 address at Sanitary Fair in Baltimore.
 ^Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Dilemmas o f Freedom,” American Political Science 
Review. (Sept, 1959. Vol LI, 3), 714.
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off parts o f  the world”?  ^These questions can be matters o f life and death. They are 
questions that are deeply political; although too often they are set aside as if they 
were merely economic or business matters. Rawls’s theory cannot resolve the thorny 
issues o f  seeking political justice that balances freedom and equality without more 
fully addressing issues o f  labor. Both freedom at work and freedom from work are 
inseparable from political liberty.'' When labor is thought o f as simply a means o f 
sustaining physical life, it may initially seem to fall outside the realm o f the political. 
Thus, Just as Hannah Arendt understood the market to be separable from political 
life, some thinkers have been content to leave governance within the workplace to 
business and economics.^ Rawls theory needs to be revised in order to address these 
questions o f  justice in relation to labor issues.
The extent to which markets, corporations, and trade agreements should be 
subject to political control is unclear in Rawls’s writing. His determination to 
remain neutral regarding economic structures conflicted with his awareness o f  the 
background conditions necessary for justice as fairness. He maintained that “either a 
private-property economy or a socialist regime can satisfy this conception o f
 ^Marion Iris Young, “Responsibility and Global Labor Justice,” Journal o f 
Political Philosophy, 12 N.4 (2004), 365. This question is the focus o f  her essay.
'' See Robert Dahl, Frejace /o Econom/c Democracy and Michael Walzer, Sphere 
o/Jusf/ce, 117-19, on democracy within the workplace.
 ^Hannah Arendt, /fuman Conc/i/ion{fZ\(\f:.'à%o\ University o f  Chicago Press,
1989),
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justice.”  ^ Yet, it remains unclear whether the market is part o f  the basic structure 
that is the primary subject o f justice. Rawls intended to provide assurances that trade 
could be justly regulated within the society o f  peoples. However, he did not 
adequately address problems o f justice in production o f goods for trade at the 
international level. The production o f wealth is always accompanied by distributions 
o f leisure, power, and alternatives in the workplace. In a footnote in Po/i/ica/ 
Libera//sm, Rawls mentioned the possibility o f adding leisure to the list o f  primary 
goods.^ However, that provision within a liberal society in conditions o f 
nonstarvation would not hold across borders in the international case. An adequate 
theory o f  distributive justice in the international arena must address ways to protect 
the well-being o f  workers and protect against economic slavery.
I will use the term economic slavery to mean the condition in which workers 
remain in such destitute poverty that they are not free to negotiate decent terms o f 
employment. This condition is only slightly better than actual slavery.* One might be 
tempted to argue that conditions are never really that bleak for workers because they 
could always find new, alternative ways to produce wealth. However, it seems clear
Rawls, TJ, 309.
 ^Rawls, PL, 181, n. 9.
Although this term is often associated with Marx, the problem is addressed by 
others. For instance, Bertrand Russell wrote, “At present the man who has no capital 
usually has to sell him self to some large organization, such as a manufacturing 
company, for example. He has no voice in its management, and no liberty in politics 
except what his trade union can secure for him. If he happens to desire a form o f 
liberty which is not thought important by his trade union, he is powerless; he must 
•s.XmsQ.r Fo/i/ica//c/ea/s, 17.
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that Rawls appreciated the potential for this problem, since he insisted that 
background conditions o f nonstarvation be met in order for his theory o f  justice to 
apply. We can imagine workers who have few, if  any, choices o f  employment.
They are systematically denied power to collective bargaining, organizing as 
workers, or power related to conditions within the workplace. Although this is not 
an empirical study intended to detail such situations, it seems safe enough to advance 
the claim that there are many people in such conditions. An example is the case o f a 
woman making two dollars a day in a cigar factory, where the cost o f  good required 
for survival is greater than two dollars a day.^ Unemployment is high in her region. 
There are not other jobs she could choose. Furthermore she has no control over 
conditions or wages because there are so many starving, unemployed workers ready 
to replace her that she has no bargaining power. Granted this problem is a matter o f 
degree, wherein more or less power is held by workers in various actual situations. 
Furthermore, I grant that this condition is preferable to actual slavery. Nevertheless, 
the reality o f  economic slavery remains a grave problem.
A solution resulting in perfect justice in political economy is not the target o f 
this study. Rather, I will simply consider whether Rawls’s theory provides redress 
for the worst aspects o f  economic slavery. The particular dynamic o f  the global
’ Certainly the cost o f living varies regionally. Measurements o f basic 
subsistence needs are used in development literature to compare the cost o f wages 
with the cost o f  living. Without evaluating any specific index, I assume that it is 
possible to estimate cost o f living in a way that evaluates whether wages meet those 
costs. I assume that cases exist where the daily wage is so far below the cost o f 
survival that no meaningful political freedom exists.
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economy with its ability to utilize the cheapest labor available makes accountability 
for the problems o f  economic slavery especially difficult. In the domestic case, 
Rawls clearly appreciates the ways in which self-respect and human dignity are 
related to the freedom to seek meaningful work. However, in the international 
application o f  his theory he seems to lose sight o f  this reality. I will argue that the 
concept o f  positive freedom helps clarify questions o f justice in matters related to 
labor. The liberal concept o f  negative freedom implies that the opposite o f freedom 
is direct coercion backed up by force. Therefore, matters o f power-relations within 
the business world are not acknowledged to be relevant to political freedom. 
Economic pressure, like the threat o f  losing a Job would not be viewed as an 
infringement o f political freedom based on the assumption that alternative jobs are 
available. The global application o f Rawls’s theory illustrates complications with 
these distinctions.
In many cases meaningful work may be chosen as a means o f self-expression 
or fulfillment. Kant’s concept o f positive freedom as self-expression and self- 
fulfillment has important implications for work opportunities. Positive freedom 
implies the cons/ruc/ionoïself, the JaArica/ionoimeaning, the bui/dingQÎa life. 
Developing a meaningful life is work. Opportunities to integrate this personal work 
with work in the world depend on political systems. Work that integrates creative 
self-development and social contribution while at the same time meeting economic 
requirements would be universally valued as a basic human good. Nevertheless,
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there will always be work that is d r u d g e r y . F o r  example, despite potential 
technological advances, cleaning toilets and disposing o f trash are not likely to be 
phased out. In the present global economy, much affluence is enjoyed at the expense 
o f laborers doing work that is discouraging, repetitive, and unimaginative. Positive 
freedom must be reflected both in making work more democratic when possible, and 
in maximizing leisure and minimizing work through advances in technology and 
efficiency. For these reasons Rawls must apply his theory o f  Justice to the realm o f 
work to ensure that the most efficient ways o f  minimizing dehumanizing work can 
be found. The fairness o f  the distribution o f leisure and also o f  distasteful work must 
be examined."
At least in part, labor is activity to sustain life. We might imagine an 
environment o f  abundant resources, where food and shelter are plentiful, and labor is 
no problem. However, when resources are scarce or difficult to procure, work is 
necessary to sustain life. Labor driven by necessity is always in tension with 
freedom, since labor involves sacrifice o f time, leisure, and energy. However, that 
does not exhaust the truth concerning the nature o f  work or labor. Work can also be 
among the highest o f  human joys and fulfillments. Even when it requires tremendous
Margaret Radin, Con/es/edCommoc/iiies{ Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press), 1996. She reflected that Even in most tedious and unappealing jobs “many 
people can express their humanity in their relationships with co-workers... “ Yet she 
agrees with Marx that “these jobs involve inhumane commodification o f people.
' ' Ibid., The relationship between access to leisure and political freedom is 
analyzed by Radin.
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effort, self-discipline, and sacrifice, labor can be a kind o f  self-expression that is a 
form o f freedom. In this chapter, I conclude with a review o f G.A. Cohen’s critique 
o f Rawls based in the claim that the personal is political.’  ^ This critique is then 
linked to my concept o f positive freedom. After reviewing the relationship between 
labor and justice in his early writings, I will focus on these problems at the 
international level looking for help from Rawls’s Law o/Peop/es.
Rawls’s View of Labor Issues
Although Rawls said little about work, labor, or creative achievement, the 
common human activity o f  labor is assumed as part o f his concept o f  cooperative life 
in society. Each o f his primary works includes at least some mention o f labor. In À 
Theory ofJus//ce\\'& developed the idea that humans by nature enjoy complexity and 
challenge. He applied this idea based on what he called the Aristotelian Principle to 
his theory in various ways. He wrote, “other things equal, human being enjoy the 
exercise o f their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this 
enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its 
complexity.” ’  ^ Rawls thought that his principle explained why humans prosper in 
communities where they challenge each other. He claimed that it is part o f  human
G.A. Cohen, “Where the Action Is: On the Site o f  Distributive Justice,’ 
P hi/osophyancLP uh/i'cVol 26, no. 1 (Winter 1997), 3.
Rawls, TJ, 426.
245
nature to enjoy “feats o f  ingenuity and invention.” ''* Through acts o f  laboring, 
individuals develop their capacity for ingenuity and invention. Work is not always an 
oppressive necessity. Accomplishments such as discoveries, inventions, mastery o f 
skills, and artistic development require the type o f self-discipline that is both a 
limitation o f  freedom and an expression o f  our ability to be freed from limitations. 
Our development as mature persons requires self-fulfillment and self-actualization as 
a process o f  defining and pursuing our own notion o f the good.'^ In a sense, the 
very effort o f  fashioning a life and the pursuit o f  a life plan is a kind o f  work.
Rawls said, “A rational plan— constrained as always by the principles o f 
right— allows a person to flourish, so far as circumstances permit, and to exercise his 
realized abilities as much as he can.” '^ So the freedom to labor in a way that furthers 
one’s own life plan develops individuality and requires exercising one’s abilities.
The construction o f  a life and a self in relation to a plan grounded in a notion o f  the 
good is central to Rawls’s understanding o f freedom. Rawls spoke o f  the human love 
for “meaningful work” and the “fashioning” o f  “beautiful objects.” He noted that, 
“The social interdependency o f  these values is shown in the fact that not only are 
they good for those who enjoy them but they are likely to enhance the good o f
"* Ibid., 427.
Radin illustrated how sometimes “work is understood not as separate from life 
and se lf  but rather as a part o f the worker, and indeed constitutive o f her.”
Rawls, TJ, 429.
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others.” ' ’ The social cooperation that fosters creative and meaningful work, and the 
enjoyment o f  the fruits o f labor are conditions for the realization o f our freedom. 
Thus, freedom is related to work, whether it be in the public sphere o f  markets and 
economics or o f  creative invention or art. Unfortunately, despite the possibility o f 
Joy related to meaningful work, the drudgery o f labor as necessity is also a reality.
Therefore, labor is not always an expression o f the self; sometimes labor is
merely the production o f necessary primary goods. Clearly, the production o f  goods
necessary for life and liberty is connected to Rawls’s notion o f  freedom. Someone
must produce the material goods necessary for life. These basic necessary goods are
not always easily produced. Rawls did not examine the problems o f labor in much
detail. His confidence that the necessary goods can be produced without
inappropriate coercion seems rather idealistic. He wrote:
... a well-ordered society does not do away with the 
division o f labor in the most general sense. To be sure, 
the worst aspects o f this division can be surmounted: 
no one need be servilely dependent on others and made 
to choose between monotonous and routine 
occupations which are deadening to human thought 
and sensibility. Each can be offered a variety o f tasks 
so that the different elements o f  his nature find a 
suitable expression.'*
His confidence that work need not amount to economic slavery is not 
supported by much explanation o f how this liberation o f  work from drudgery is 
possible. Although “monotonous and routine labor” can be enhanced by various
Ibid., 425.
'* Ibid., 529.
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forms o f  incentives, it still has to be done. If labor that is “deadening to human
thought and sensibility” is required then equitable distribution o f  that burden would
also be required. How will this problem for freedom in the realm o f  labor be
overcome? In some cases, Rawls seemed to imply that a public spirited willingness
to work for the prosperity o f  the society would be a motivator. He said.
The collective activity o f  society, the many 
associations and the public life o f  the largest 
community that regulates them, sustains our efforts 
and elicits our contribution. Yet the good attained 
from the common culture far exceeds our work in the 
sense that we cease to be mere fragments: that part o f 
ourselves that we directly realize is joined to a wider 
and just arrangement the aims o f which we affirm.
The division o f  labor is overcome not by each 
becoming complete in himself, but by willing and 
meaningful work within a just social union o f social 
unions in which all can freely participate as they so 
incline.'^
At least in theory, it is possible that a social union might be meaningful enough to 
compensate individuals for the hardships o f  disheartening work. However, if  the 
dissatisfaction o f  the individuals at work is great enough, this calls into question the 
reasonableness o f the social union. Rawls suggested that the reasonableness o f 
people normally will be the sufficient assurance that all will cooperate fairly in 
economic transactions.
The concept o f reciprocity functions as the lynchpin o f  his arguments 
regarding labor. The reason that labor is the mechanism for fair distribution o f 
resources is that this meets the demand for reciprocity. Rawls held that the difference
Ibid.
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principle “expresses a conception o f reciprocity.” ®^ Rather than promote some type
o f egalitarian distribution o f  either resources, welfare, or opportunities, Rawls
thought that the difference principle synthesized incentives for production o f  wealth
with a measure o f  equality. By specifying fair terms o f cooperation for reciprocal
advantages, the difference principle justifies unequal distributions because o f
different contributions. In other words, as Rawls said.
The main idea is that when a number o f  persons 
engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative 
venture according to rules, and thus restrict their 
liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, 
those who have submitted to these restrictions have a 
right to a similar acquiescence on the part o f  those who 
have benefited from their submission. We are not to 
gain from the cooperative labors o f others without 
doing our fair share.^'
This same point about reciprocity as a requirement for Justice is restated in Political 
Liberalism where Rawls wrote, “Fair terms o f cooperation specify an idea o f 
reciprocity: all who are engaged in cooperation and who do their part as the rules and 
procedures require, are to benefit in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable 
benchmark o f  comparison.”^^  This is formulated with the free-rider problem in mind. 
“Where the public is large and includes many individuals, there is a temptation for
Rawls, TJ, 102.
Ibid., 112.
Rawls, PL, 16.
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each person to try to avoid doing his share.”^^  In order to protect against free-riders it 
is necessary to institute policies that make it difficult to protect the welfare o f  the 
infirm or disabled.
Rawls thought that these problems regarding regulation o f trade, business,
and labor could be resolved at the legislative level. He thought that the sense o f
obligations and fairness could be underwritten by laws dealing with the
noncompliance o f individuals who unreasonably take advantage o f the social union.
The same sense o f fairness also supports the equality o f  opportunity in the
workplace. Rawls said.
It (the government) also enforces and underwrites 
equality o f  opportunity in economic activities and in 
the free choice o f occupation. This is achieved by 
policing the conduct o f  firms and private associations 
and by preventing the establishment o f monopolistic 
restrictions and barriers to the more desirable 
positions. Finally, the government guarantees a social 
minimum either by family allowances and special 
payment for sickness and employment, or more 
systematically by such devices as a graded income 
supplement (a so-called negative income tax).^”*
In these ways meaningful freedom is protected in labor-relations in the domestic 
application o f  the theory. Rawls tried to balance both incentives to production and 
protection for the least well o ff persons. Justice as fairness is based on the claim that
Rawls, TJ, 267. 
Rawls, TJ, 275.
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“We are not to gain from the cooperative labors o f others without doing our fair 
share.
/nPo//f/ca/L/bera//sm, Rawls said that a liberal political conception o f 
justice includes “measures assuring to all citizens adequate all-purpose means to 
make effective use o f  their liberties and opportunities.”^^  Therefore, he maintained 
his view that basic rights and liberties include the choice o f  occupation. In respect to 
questions o f labor, this second book improves on his earlier presentation o f  work as 
part o f the economic sphere. He expanded his description o f the basic list o f  primary 
goods to include: “free choice o f occupation against a background o f  diverse 
opportunities” and also “powers and prerogatives o f  offices and positions o f 
responsibility in the political and economic institutions o f  the basic structures.”^^  
Furthermore, he addressed problems o f  workplace discrimination and issues o f 
disability more fully here. He said, " .. .  some principle o f  opportunity is essential 
requiring at least freedom o f  movement and free choice o f  occupation.” *^ At the 
same time, it cannot be assumed that “ fair equality o f  opportunity” is assured. Rawls 
argued that this was not an essential and could be regulated in various ways that 
should be left up to specific societies at the level o f  constitutional agreements on fair
Ibid., 112.
Rawls, PL, 6.
Ibid., 181.
Ibid., 228.
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equality o f opportunity.^^ He argued that fair equality o f opportunity was not a
“constitutional essential.” Therefore, policies and regulations governing equality o f
opportunity would be “decided by the political values o f public reason.” ®^ He argued
that fairness would operate in the economic and business sphere through
constitutional and legislative stipulations. He said.
Thus, announcements o f jobs and positions can be 
forbidden to contain statements which exclude 
applicants o f certain designated ethnic and racial 
groups, or o f either sex, when these limitations are 
contrary to fair equality o f  opportunity.^'
Left to the level o f  the legislative function in constitutional democracies, the
prevention o f  discrimination in the workplace has not always fared well. In order for
Rawls insist that these matters are not negotiable he would have to secure them prior
to the legislative stage. Why didn’t he specify that such policies that allow unequal
opportunity on the basis o f  irrelevant factors be categorically forbidden? Rawls’s
desire for the conception o f justice to remain neutral in relationship to concepts o f
the good led him to avoid that move. To promote equality as a good prior to the
principles o f  justice selected in the original position would violate his project.
However, this leaves his theory vulnerable to the objection that accidents o f  birth
29 Ibid., see also TJ, 72F.
Rawls, PL, 229.
Ibid., 363.
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that are morally irrelevant can result in unfair determinants or advantages depending 
on how well the legislative level functions.
In this second book he addressed the problem o f welfare and responsibility.
His adherence to the value o f  reciprocity becomes increasingly evident in this regard.
He said that persons “can take responsibility for their ends: that is, they can adjust
their ends so that those ends can be pursued by the means they can reasonably expect
to acquire in return for what they can reasonably expect to contribute.”^^  However,
the problems o f  disability and infirmity are not adequately addressed. He said that
justice as fairness requires that “variations in physical capacities and skills, including
the effects o f  illness and accident on natural abilities” should not “give rise to
injustice.”^^  In eases involving “variations as result o f  illness or accident” the
society would decide on measures for compensation with the goal o f correcting the
disabilities. Addressing such cases he said that these:
... can be dealt with, 1 believe, at the legislative stage 
when the prevalence and kinds o f these misfortunes are 
known and the costs o f  treating them can be 
ascertained and balanced along with total government 
expenditure. The aim is to restore people by health 
care so that once again they are fully cooperating 
members o f  society.^'*
Rawls wants to avoid exacerbating the free-rider problem. He doesn’t want to rend
the connection between incentives to produce that foster production o f  wealth from a
Ibid., 64.
”  Ibid., 184.
Ibid.
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fair system o f  distribution. However, a problem results because his solution seems to 
imply that only productive people -  those who produce something o f  value to the 
society, are fully cooperating members. What about the permanently disabled? If 
certain members can never be expected to contribute to the production o f  wealth o f 
the society, do they have no claim to the benefits o f  societal wealth? Although such 
cases are relatively infrequent at the domestic level, the analogous counterpart in the 
international application o f the theory would be the case o f  burdened societies.
Again, Rawls trusted that such cases would be solved at the legislative level. He 
seems naïve about the potential for capital to corrupt the legislative process.
In The Law o/Peop/es, Rawls considered certain requirements needed to 
achieve stability for the right reasons in a constitutional regime. These requirements 
include:
Society as employer o f  last resort through general or 
local government, or other social and economic 
policies. (The lack o f  a sense o f long-term security and 
o f  the opportunity for meaningful work and occupation 
is destructive not only o f  citizens’ self-respect, but o f 
their sense that they are members o f society and not 
simply caught in it.^^
This passage illustrates the centrality o f work to Rawls’s notion o f reciprocity 
where people get what they deserve for their effort, but are not penalized for 
accidents o f  birth, as a mark o f justice. Reciprocity requires that people be rewarded 
for effort or sacrifice. In order to defend inequality o f outcomes in wealth
Rawls,PL, 50.
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distribution, Rawls needs to provide assurance that there is equal opportunity to do 
some type o f  productive work. The policies o f  public employment as a means to 
achieve full employment are not viewed by Rawls as incompatible with political 
liberalism. Why did he qualify this statement by saying that society as employer 
would be a policy o f “ last resort”? In other words, why not affirm systems that 
promote public ownership o f the means o f production and actually encourage public 
employment? The free-rider problem, “a temptation for each person to avoid doing 
his share” led Rawls to conclude that economic efficiency is better promoted through 
private rather than public means.^^ That would be consistent with his defense o f 
property based on the argument o f  the most efficient care and maintenance o f 
property. Rawls continued to view the well-being o f persons as the responsibility o f 
their particular society or state rather than advancing a view o f universal rights or 
obligations. Nevertheless, the defense o f freedom is given as the reason for this 
safety net o f society as employer o f  last resort. Since stability for the right reasons 
requires opportunities for meaningful work, social means o f production are 
sometimes necessary. This provision o f society as employer o f last resort illustrates 
Rawls continued movement to the left on economic policies. He increasingly 
accepted that markets must be regulated.
TAe Zaw qf/^ eop/es 'mcXuàes regional institutions to regulate trade.
“Standards o f fairness for trade” are among the cooperative institutions required for
Rawls,TJ, 267.
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justice at the international level?^ However, in the second original position, those 
who discern the law o f peoples will be representative o f “all reasonable (liberal) and 
decent societies.” *^ Burdened societies are not represented in this discernment 
process. Furthermore, Rawls assumed that societies by definition do not have 
aggressive aims.^^ The possibility that aggressive trade policies o f societies or 
associations within those societies could injure members o f  other societies is not 
sufficiently examined in his theory.
Rawls viewed economic transactions as subordinate to political 
arrangements. The principles o f justice as fairness that guide democratic societies are 
not applied directly to arrangements in the workplace. However, respect for citizens 
are “free and equal persons” is required even in the realm o f work. Rawls wrote, 
“The aims and conduct o f  citizens in society are therefore subordinate to the priority 
o f these liberties, and thus in effect subordinate to the conception o f  citizens as free 
and equal persons.”"*® Among other things, this means that you cannot sell your 
freedom or buy someone else’s. Yet, Rawls did not adequately address the issues o f 
production o f basic goods required as a background condition for justice as fairness. 
In one sense, he did acknowledge the problem by providing the stipulation that his
Rawls,LP, 38.
Ibid.
Ibid., 64.
40 Rawls, PL, 366.
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theory applies only in cases where basic survival needs are met. He knows that 
starving people might not order his principles o f justice the same way he intends.
Labor Problems in Rawls’s Theory
There are at least three problematic areas in Rawls’s theory as it relates to 
labor in his international application o f his theory o f justice. First o f  all, his 
insistence on using reciprocity as a mark o f justice as fairness results in a problem 
regarding burdened societies and societies who have inherited consequences o f 
foolish policies from past generations. Secondly, Rawls’s insistence that the 
difference principle cannot be applied on the global scale results in the controversy 
over the cut-off point for aid. This results in an inconsistency over issues o f  desert, 
luck, and freedom o f  will. Finally, Rawls’s theory is inadequate when problems 
arise regarding conflicts between the freedom o f investors and the freedom of 
workers’ well-being. We need more information about how fair political process 
will be protected within corporations and markets. Although Rawls thought that 
regional institutions to regulate trade could uphold principles o f justice, we need a 
standard o f well-being for working conditions that arbitrates conflicts between 
investors and workers. The responsibility for justice in matters o f labor cannot be 
left only with the local state or society because o f the relationships that transcend 
borders in international trade. We need standards for when and if people would be 
justified in intervention to redress issues o f unjust labor practices.
The line between the political and the personal is unclear in matters o f  labor. 
Rawls tried to separate political freedom from personal freedom by maintaining that
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principles o f  justice would not apply to internal matters within associations. For 
example, he claimed that, “We wouldn’t want political principles o f  justice -  
including principles o f distributive justice -  to apply directly to the internal life o f 
the family.”^' This same dynamic extends to the realm o f  business or workplace. He 
wrote:
Much the same question arises in regard to all 
associations, whether they be churches or universities, 
professional or scientific associations, business firms 
or labor unions. The family is not peculiar in this 
respect.'*^
He has drawn a line between the public or political realm and the private 
realm o f  associational life. One characteristic o f  associational life as he describes it 
is that associational life is voluntary. He assumes that you can exit an association if  
it doesn’t fit with your life plan.'*^ This makes sense given the background 
conditions he required in the domestic case where freedom to choose an occupation 
given other options. However, in cases where options for work that preserves human 
dignity and the social basis o f self-respect are limited or absent there is a problem.
In such cases, it is not adequate to trust the protection o f  workers to the legislative 
level. The preservation o f  freedom for meaningful work must be included in the first
Rawls, IPR, 159.
Ibid., 158.
Ibid.
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principle o f  justice. It is part o f the content o f the freedom that must be maximized if 
it is to be more than merely formal freedom.
On the global scale, Rawls said that a duty to provide aid is required.'*'* 
However, he does not explain how production o f  the necessary goods required for 
this dutiful redistribution will be achieved. This makes the controversy over the 
cutoff point o f  such aid extremely crucial. When material resources are needed for 
labor, they are necessary to freedom. Not all labor requires material resources. A 
person can write a poem or discovery a theory without interacting with the natural, 
material resources o f  the world. In contrast, much labor does require procurement o f 
resources. Thus, discussions o f  labor are linked to analysis o f property rights. What 
is the difference between stealing versus Justifiable taking o f resources for labor? If 
a fisherman can get out to the middle o f the ocean, the fish he takes are thought to be 
his because there is common agreement that they belong to no one. In conditions o f 
abundance, unclaimed resources are assumed to belong to no one. On the other 
hand, what if  the fisherman hooks a fish that is discovered to be the last o f its kind? 
For the moment, set aside the implausibility o f  knowing or proving this. Doesn’t the 
entire society o f  peoples have an interest in and a claim on what happens to this fish? 
It may be difficult to imagine getting excited about a rare fish. But, what if  the fish 
happens to contain some chemical essential for the production o f some much-needed 
medicine? In conditions o f scarcity, resources attached to no particular person may 
be said to belong to everyone rather than no one. Resources like land, air, and water
'*^  Rawls,LP, 38.
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were once assumed to be so plentiful that reaching the end o f the resource was not 
considered. Decisions about how to allocate access to and use o f  limited resources 
needed for labor are decisions distributive justice must answer. What answers are 
provided by Rawls’s theory? In the example o f  the fisherman in international waters 
catching the last o f a type o f endangered species o f fish, the law o f  peoples would be 
indifferent.
Taking something that belongs to no one is different from stealing. Rawls 
continues the liberal, Lockean tradition o f ignoring the historical realities o f  greed 
and imperialism as factors in the current land distribution among nations. If the 
property distribution today is the historical result o f  stealing through conquest and 
war, or stealing o f  labor through slavery, then the current distribution o f  property 
resources among peoples cannot be defended as a Just starting point. Liberal theory 
would not Justify such actions, but sometimes does claim to Justify the ownership o f 
such stolen property through inheritance. The freedom to bequest property results in 
depletion o f land, minerals, and other material resources required for labor. 
Consequently, some states redistribute property to realize the freedom o f laborers. 
The choice is between using need rather than desert as the criterion for distribution. 
The need for opportunities to labor can be in conflict with the dictates o f reciprocity. 
We can imagine examples that illustrates a conflict between obligations to investors 
and obligations to workers. Tolstoy poignantly portrayed this conflict between titled
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land owners and starving, displaced farm ers/^ He recognized the tendency o f 
government to become the enforcer o f  the property rights o f the powerful at the 
expense o f  the needs o f  the impoverished.
Similarly, the following example o f  land reform demonstrates the 
relationship between positive liberty and labor. The point o f the illustration is that 
the dictates o f reciprocity for the land owner and the workers are in conflict in such 
cases. In 1975 a land invasion near Benito Juarez, Chihuahua included a then 17- 
year-old named Tiberio Chavez. The land reforms under President Lazaro Cardenas 
had not extended to some states and regions o f Mexico. Later, in the 1990’s the 
constitution was reformed, but at that time, under Mexican law, people who had no 
land had a right to lay claim on unused property that belonged to the state. There 
was an estate that had been declared property o f the state in that area. A group of 
people who owned no land began meeting, then formed a caravan and occupied the 
center o f  this property, living there for six months. Then they initiated legal 
procedures to procure formal titles to the land. Tiberio Chavez and his family gained 
ownership o f some land through that action. Reflecting on that action years later, he 
said:
That event showed me that a group o f people with a 
single goal could achieve what they wanted. This was 
something that stayed with me -  the idea that with 
unity, things are much easier, things that an individual 
could never do alone. That’s when I understood that
45 Leo Tolstoy, The Kingdom o/Godis fVith/n You {ymzoXw, Nebraska:
University o f  Nebraska Press, 1984), 289.
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social justice often had to be enforced by people’s 
action. Otherwise, our rights would Just stay on paper.
Many politicians and others like it to remain that way -  
on paper, looking good. It is up to us to put it into 
practice."*^
Labor and freedom are often related to the use o f natural resources such as land. 
In this case, the land owner had secured title to the property through some legal 
process. The squatters were violating respect for the land owner’s rightful claim. 
However, the squatters’ freedom to exercise labor in behalf o f  their survival was in 
conflict with the land owner’s claim. In this case a legislative process later 
recognized and legitimated the redistribution o f this land in favor o f  the squatters. 
However, the original land owner probably felt cheated. In this case, a group o f 
people promoted positive liberty by restricting the negative freedom o f the land 
owner. Rawls would be able to accept this land reform as a just resolution o f 
conflicting obligations. However, the case illustrates the problems at the 
international level in relationship to property involving national borders. The same 
action that this family took securing property to farm, would be considered a case o f 
“outlaw” behavior if  a national border was crossed in the acquisition. Furthermore, 
this case illustrates the fuzzy boundaries between the personal and the political 
because membership in this family determined participation in this illegal economic 
venture.
David Bacon, The C/j/Mren o f JVJFTÀ: LaAor fVars on /he (/.S./Mex/co Border 
(Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 2004), 253.
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Questions o f  property in material resources like land or talents that 
individuals possess are entangled with questions o f  labor. L.T. Hobhouse, writing in 
the early 1920’s, made a distinction that could help reconcile Rawls’s concern for 
reciprocity and problems o f  justice related to property. Hobhouse shared the concern 
that persons ought to be able to reap where they sow. He was a proponent o f 
individual liberty. However, he understood that, “Unfortunately what is liberty for 
one man is often the negation o f liberty for another.”"*^ Property held for reasons 
other than actual use becomes a means to control the labor o f others. He examined 
historical systems that could accommodate temporary private possession and 
permanent common ownership. Hobhouse argued that the abstract right o f property 
is founded on the right o f  the worker to what the work produces. However, he noted 
the problem that, “as industry develops the most conspicuous function o f property is 
to secure a part o f  one m an’s labour-product for the benefit o f  another.''^ This 
illustrates two functions o f  property; namely, 1.) to give freedom and sercurity and 
2.) to control persons through things. When property allows persons to reap without 
sowing, it is unjustifiable. Property for power is inimical to the liberty o f self­
definition because it accumulates in the hands o f a few and erodes the freedom of 
others.
L. T. Hobhouse, “The Historical Evolution o f  Property in Fact and in Idea.” In 
Froperfy.-/is Duties a n d York: Macmillan Company, 1922), 9.
Ibid., 10.
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Do individuals deserve exclusive benefits o f the talents they possess? Rawls 
thought that they did not, since talents are the result o f  accidents o f  birth. Yet he did 
seem to think that they deserved material benefits that accrue from realizing a wise 
life plan."*  ^ According to Rawls, if a person is smart enough to get others to work for 
her, while enjoying the leisure o f watching investments grow, she deserves the profit. 
Sustaining one’s own physical life does not always depend on one’s own labor. In 
addition to engaging in labor, another road to fulfillment o f basic needs has always 
been available. For those that have the might and the will to enslave others, or live 
off their forced labor, freedom from work and freedom from hunger were both 
possible. One’s own freedom can be expanded by diminishing the freedom o f 
others. This further complicates the relationship between freedom and labor.
Rawls’s political theory o f  Justice must answer problems o f desert, luck, talent and 
welfare regarding the relationship between freedom and work. In order to more fully 
explore these controversial questions o f  freedom and labor, consider the following 
example.
Imagine that ten people receive information that in a week they will be 
instantaneously transported to an isolated island, leaving all memory o f  their 
previous lives behind. But before they go, these ten people must meet and make 
some decisions about their future life together on a deserted island.^*’ They are told
Rawls, LP, 118.
Ronald Dworkin’s example o f the auction o f resources on the desert island is 
meant to demonstrate the need for economic markets to divide resources in ways that
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that there will be exactly ten jobs that must be accomplished daily in order for human 
life to continue there. For the sake o f  argument, imagine that they learn that there 
must be one artist, one doctor, three food gatherers, three housekeepers, and two 
janitors. The work o f the artist will require great psychic effort, as the artist will bear 
the responsibility o f  providing meaning and joy  for all ten. The doctor will also bear 
great responsibility for the health and life-sustaining o f all ten. The work o f  the artist 
and the doctor will require unusual talent and intellect. On the other hand, the food 
gatherers, the house keepers, and the janitors will require not particular skill and will 
have little stress. The jobs must be allocated by distributing ten different labor cards, 
each granting claim to one o f the ten jobs. All ten have an interest in making sure 
that all ten jobs are done well, since all are required for continued life. If  these jobs 
are all filled no other needs or desires will arise. Prior to their suddenly being 
transported, none o f  the ten have information about what type o f  interests they will 
have or which work they would most enjoy. Now the ten must meet and make the 
following decisions. How will the ten job cards be distributed?
This scenario parallels some aspects o f  decision makers in the original 
position. The participants are determining operating procedures based on their self- 
interest without knowledge o f  their interests or position. Continuing with this 
example, assume that they might be able to come to agreement about the questions
maintain equality o f  resources. Although he introduced the possibility that 
occupation be included in the bundle o f resources, his illustration does not deal 
directly with the international application o f such labor problems. My illustration 
here is intended to emphasize labor issues at the international level in contrast to the 
domestic level. See Dworkin, Sovereign Firfue, 66.
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because they are each reasonable persons. Will jobs be assigned on the basis o f talent 
and intellect, and if  so, what process will be used to determine this? Will each person 
blindly draw a card determining their Job? Or will they wait until they know their 
preferences and then try for some centralized process for fairly dividing the cards? 
Suppose that when the ten gather to engage in this process o f deciding, two o f them 
are confident that they are stronger and more crafty than the others and would come 
out better by grabbing the cards they want than by cooperating in a fair process? 
What will be the provisions to assure that resentments, bitterness, and envy do not 
destroy the lives o f all involved?
But, for now, imagine that the ten do reach some agreement, and distribute 
the job  cards ready to embark on this adventure. Yet, before the initial decision­
making session is over, they learn there are yet more decisions to make. They are 
informed they will work together happily for some time on the island. But after a 
time, a surplus o f  goods will begin to pile up. Then, as the surplus builds, suddenly 
ten more people will show up on the island. Still in their original discernment 
meeting, they are then informed that at that time, a second distribution o f labor cards 
will occur. However, even though there will be more people to support, still only ten 
workers will be needed. No additional workers will be required to sustain the life o f 
all twenty. Now there are twenty labor cards to be distributed. In addition to the 
original ten cards, there are three cards that say “disability” and five that say 
“capitalist” and two that say “free rider.” Now the original ten must decide what 
rules they want to make for the second distribution. Will the newcomers be brought
266
in at that time in an attempt to reach agreement about rules for the second 
distribution? Since everyone has an equal chance o f ending up with a disability card 
or a free rider card, what system o f  incentives should be developed to motivate 
workers and prevent animosity between workers and those who are not workers? 
Can a system be conceived that all would consider fair, prior to knowing which card 
they would have? For the sake o f  the argument, suppose that the original group o f 
ten could reach agreement about a system that seems fair to them for the second 
distribution. But, then imagine they are told that after life on this island continues in 
relative peace for a time, a shortage o f  necessary goods occurs such that there are 
inadequate goods to sustain all twenty. As long as it is assumed that adequate 
resources are available to sustain each life, the agreements about distribution are 
much easier. We can see how Rawls would apply the original position and then the 
application o f principles o f justice at the legislative stage to answer such questions at 
the domestic level. However, it remains unclear how Justice would pertain to 
individuals who are not among the society o f  peoples cooperating in the Law o f 
Peoples.
Rawls continually reminds his readers that at the domestic level his theory 
assumes that the basic requirements for life are assumed to be available to all. When 
his theory is applied to the international level in TheLan> o/Peop/es, the problems 
involved with this assumption become clearer.^' How will enough goods be 
produced to ensure subsistence level for all? Once the potential for life-threatening
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scarcity is faced, a fair system is much more difficult to construct. Now Rawls insists 
that conditions o f justice to not obtain in cases like this because starvation is outside 
o f the background conditions for justice. This may mean that Rawls’s theory is 
irrelevant in some o f the most serious dilemmas facing international dialogue. 1 
return to the island example in order to illustrate. In trying to construct an agreement 
for facing this shortage, prior to actually being in the situation, the group might 
decide to devise a system for sacrificing certain people so that life for others could 
go on. Or the group might decide that all could divide whatever goods there are and 
allow nature and chance to kill o ff the surplus consumers o f goods. On that small, 
local level the problem o f  scarcity and the distribution o f goods is horrible to face.
However, next suppose that this single island scenario is expanded and applied 
to twenty islands, each having different labor cards. In this way, we move with 
Rawls from the development o f his original theory, to the international application o f 
that same theory. One island is an island with a culture and identity o f  being artists, 
three islands are food producers and so forth. Imagine that each island is satisfied 
with the process o f  agreement that established this distribution. Some islands have 
disability cards and others free rider cards, but all participate in a distribution they 
agreed to as fair. Bound by this agreement, all twenty islands participate in a society 
o f islands, cooperatively sharing goods and services. But times change. Now assume 
that scarcity occurred such that not enough goods to sustain all islands were being 
produced. Islands that could provide for their people have no incentive to stay in the 
redistribution system. They could manage the fulfillment o f all ten necessary labors
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on their own island. But, what if  they know that fewer lives on other islands will 
survive without their island’s participation in the society? If there are not surplus 
goods to be distributed, but there is death due to scarcity to be distributed, what 
system for fair distribution can be developed?
We can think o f  these islands as a sort o f federation or as completely separate 
and autonomous in relationship to each other. At least we can try to imagine them as 
totally separate and autonomous. Yet, even if each island decided to be self- 
sufficient, the shared ocean and air resources prevent complete separation. When we 
think about nations today as being analogous to these islands, it seems that even if a 
nation tried to be completely separate, preventing all trade and communications 
between their own individuals and those beyond their borders, even still the shared 
water and air resources preclude complete isolation. The question o f what 
obligations does a person in an affluent nation have toward a person working in 
conditions near slavery cannot be answered by suggesting that total separation is 
possible. So, assuming that there is relationship between these various islands, the 
question is whether or not there is intentional, open process for decision-making 
about the conditions o f  those relations. On the one hand, there could be a contract 
developed between representatives o f these islands motivated by the promise o f 
mutual benefit for all. Such a contract would not be likely to include burdened 
islands whose inclusion in the society o f  islands would be a detriment to the others 
rather than a benefit. On the other hand, we can also imagine an attitude o f kinship 
based on recognition o f  mutual humanity that would motivate cooperation and
269
assistance to burdened islands as well. The point is that geographical distance and 
geographical separations like oceans facilitate a different attitude about obligations 
and human connections. Whether or not these different psychological attitudes 
justify different moral stance is the question. The grim awareness that not everyone 
can live, changes the tone o f the contract governing the society. However, when 
discerning a fair process for dealing with conditions o f life-threatening scarcity, it 
will he easier to accept terms o f annihilation o f certain islands than it would he to kill 
o ff individuals in the original scenario o f  twenty people in which all interact face-to- 
face. The choice between self-preservation and preservation o f  the whole 
community looks like a different choice within a group that shares daily face-to-face 
interaction, than it looks in relation to distant and unseen people on a different 
t e r r i to r y .O n  an international level, the need for aid is overwhelming, since at that 
level imagining an end to the need seems impossible.
Can a process o f deliberation and democratic agreement be designed to 
continually reinvent the contract for the society o f  islands through changing times? 
Would free rider islands and disability islands have any voice in this process? Would 
it be an equal voice? In the Law o f Peoples, burdened societies and outlaw societies 
do not have representatives in the second original position. Either on the one hand, 
justice requires that member islands have an equal voice in the deliberation process
The question o f  material aid to foreigners brings to mind Nussbaum’s analysis 
o f Cicero, whom she quoted as saying, “the resources o f  individuals are limited, and 
the needy are an unlimited horde...” Martha Nussbaum, “Duties o f Justice, Duties 
o f Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic Legacy,” Journal o f Fo/U/ca/Phi/osophy. 8: 
No. 2 (2000), 206.
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simply because they are fully human or, on the other hand, justice requires that only 
productive, contributing members have voice in the democratic process because 
reciprocity demands this. Several conclusions drawn from this scenario illustrate 
challenges to T/ie Law o/Peop/es. First o f  all, if  Rawls thinks that the vicissitudes o f 
luck ought to be ruled out at the domestic level, then there is no reason to claim that 
they are relevant at the international level. Yet, by refusing to apply the difference 
principle at the international level, Rawls in effect, decided that the well-being o f 
individuals often does amount to being bom on a lucky island. There is no moral 
sense in which a person deserves to experience the consequences o f  being bom on 
one island as opposed to another. Secondly, reciprocity as a standard o f justice 
results in a lack o f compassionate inclusion o f  unfortunate and unproductive 
members o f  humanity. Rawls did not want to make the move that cosmopolitans 
made affirming a universal human value because he thought that promoted liberal 
values. Thus, Rawls was careful to limit the duty o f  assistance and not base it in 
anything like a universal recognition o f human worth and dignity. Finally, although 
the psychological dynamics o f weak affinity among communities on a global scale 
makes it easier to cut o ff aid beyond a certain point, there is no justifiable reason to 
do so. The consequences o f  choices and distributions in one generation always 
determine the limits o f  freedom for the next generation. Continual and thorough­
going redistribution is a constant requirement in order to assure equality o f 
opportunity. Freedom to make new contracts must be balanced with the obligation to 
uphold inherited contracts from the past in order to instill both stability and justice.
271
The Law o f Peop/es\% designed to guide the foreign policy o f  a liberal nation. 
Although Rawls’s primary concern was to consider the limits o f the use o f  power 
and the extent to which non-liberal states should be tolerated, his theory must also 
address the material basis o f  f r e e d o m . I f  material aid is not just a practical 
concession for the sake o f  a stable peace, then there must be not only enough aid to 
allow the possibility o f  decent institutions, but also enough to provide freedom at the 
level o f  the individual worker. Rawls suggested that although luck should not be 
accepted as a justification for inequalities, reciprocity demands reward o f  unequal 
labor. Labor is the embodiment o f choice, will, and responsibility. People have 
done nothing to earn their natural talents, so those belong to the community. The 
difficult challenge o f  separating the personal and the political is evident at this point. 
The creative work and effort that an individual pours out belongs both to her 
personally and to the community. We need some way to negotiate the tension 
between workers who deserve the benefit o f  their labor and the survival needs o f 
those who are free-riders for the right reasons. That is to say, although some free­
riders may deserve to starve because they are unwilling to work while the rest o f us 
submit to such discipline, there are other free-riders who are truly unable to work due 
to lack o f  opportunity or ability. If there was clear agreement about the notion o f 
desert, then it could be shown that redistribution schemes are unjust when they 
infringe on the enjoyment o f the deserved fruits o f a person’s labor. But, the problem 
o f  desert cannot be solved without a concept o f  justice. To claim that something is
Rawls, LF, 6.
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deserved amounts to the same thing as claiming that it is justly distributed. As 
changes in the Job market develop, the possibility that there could be a permanent 
shortage o f  jobs could also affect these notions o f desert. In April o f  1990 at a lecture 
at Harvard, Rawls commented that he might go along with a basic income scheme 
under conditions o f permanent job shortage.^'' My goal has been to illustrate the 
potential to improve Rawls’s theory through the application o f the positive 
conception o f  liberty. In order to continue this argument, next I will turn to 
reflections by G. A. Cohen who offered criticisms and suggestions for Rawls.
G.A. Cohen’s Critique
G.A. Cohen offers a critique o f Rawls based on the relationship between 
freedom and labor. This criticism is related to Cohen’s attack on Berlin’s distinction 
between positive and negative liberty.^^ His insights derive from a notion o f  freedom 
he calls self-ownership, autonomy, and sovereignty over self. The part o f his critique 
o f Rawls that I most want to develop is based in the claim that “the personal is 
political.” *^ In his article entitled, “Where the Action Is: On the Site o f  Distributive
Philippe Van Parijs, Jiea/Freec/omFor Press, 1995), 297-298,
n. 75.
Matthew H. Kramer mentions an unpublished typescript written by Cohen 
entitled, “Freedom and Money,” in TheQuah'ty o/Freec/omÇ^çrs York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003),76, n. 75.
G.A. Cohen, “Where the Action Is: On the Site o f Distributive Justice,” 
Phi7osophy anFFuh/ic4/^ irs, vol 26, no. 1 (Winter 1997), 3.
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Justice,” Cohen claimed that the action o f  distributive justice happens at the site o f 
individual choices as much as basic structures o f society. He drew on the familiar 
slogan, “the personal is political,” often associated with feminist critique, noting that 
this phrase actually derived from liberation theology.^^ Cohen related his critique o f 
Rawls to the claim made by liberation theologians that the political and economic 
should not be separated from or set in opposition to the personal and spiritual.^* 
Asking whether economic choices occur within basic structure o f  society or prior to 
those structures in ways that actually determine the structures, Cohen said that Rawls 
applied the principles o f justice at the wrong point. Cohen then developed the 
objection that not only choices in the original position that lead to determination o f 
the basic structure, but also choices o f individuals acting within the basic structure 
may be just or unjust. This leads to ambiguities about the application o f the 
principles o f  justice in matters o f freedom that are not actually coercive but 
constructive. Cohen said, “The ambiguity turns on whether the Rawlsian basic 
structure includes only coercive aspects o f the social order or, also, conventions and 
usages that are deeply entrenched but not legally or literally coercive.”^^  The line 
between the personal and the political is not as easy to draw as Rawls suggested. 
Rawls did address the distinction between the personal and the political. He said.
”  Ibid.
Denys Turner, “Religion: Illusions and Liberation,” in Terrel Carver, ed.. The 
Cambr/e^ ge Com/?an/on/o A/arxÇHew York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Cohen, 1997, 11.
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“The political is distinct from the associational, which is voluntary in ways that the 
political is not; it is also distinct from the personal and the familial, which are 
affectional, again in ways the political is not.”*° What it means to say that the 
personal is “affectional” is quite unclear.
Cohen analyzed the concept o f  self-ownership that is ironically shared by 
both Marxists and libertarians like Nozick. Cohen found that Rawls’s claim that 
self-ownership must be limited was correct. Rawls rejected the claim that a person is 
totally free in relationship to the fruits o f labor. Due to the role o f luck in 
determining person’s circumstances, talents, and abilities, Rawls argued that income 
could be Justly redistributed.^' Cohen agreed with Rawls that self-ownership does 
not amount to unrestricted power over fruits o f  labor. However, Cohen argued that 
Rawls did not go far enough in understanding that freedom is limited by the duty to 
assist others. Cohen’s criticism o f Rawls has two themes. First o f  all, Rawls’s 
theory does not deal adequately with cases o f the infirm. This is a problem when 
distribution is determined by desert rather than need. Secondly, the idea o f  contract 
motivated by mutual advantage is inconsistent with the idea that natural talents are 
assets to be enjoyed by the whole community. Although the less talented do benefit 
from the contract, the more talented are disadvantaged through the contract.^^
Rawls, PL, 137.
Rawls, TJ, 101.
Cohen, “On the Currency o f  Egalitarian Justice,” £(h/cs, 99 (July 1989), 906- 
944, 226.
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Finally, Cohen criticized Rawls for maintaining the freedom o f  capitalists to operate
without more regulation and restraint. Cohen wrote:
I restate a criticism that I have made elsewhere o f John 
Rawls’s application o f his difference principle, to wit, 
that he does not apply it in censure o f  the self-seeking 
choices o f high-flying marketers, which induce an 
inequality that, so I claim, is harmful to the badly off.^^
Although there are limits on inequality in the domestic application o f  Rawls’s 
theory because o f  the difference principle, in the international case there are 
inadequate provisions to protect against such inequality. Cohen shared with Marx 
the conviction that reward for contribution generates inequality and future injustice. 
The case o f  the infirm illustrates this potential injustice. Rawls admitted that the 
case o f  a disabled person was a problem for his original theory o f  justice .^
Nussbaum offered a similar criticism claiming that Rawls set aside cases o f 
dependency due to disability and never adequately dealt with the implications o f  
those cases.^^ Those persons who do not work because they choose not to work are 
not deserving. Systems o f  distribution don’t want to encourage the problem o f  free­
riders. Justice as fairness entails reciprocity based on desert. But those who do not 
work because they are unable to work raise an interesting problem for desert. Since 
disability is a result o f  luck, some safety net in the social system should prevent them
“ Cohen, 1997,5.
“  Rawls, TJ, 248, see cases o f nonideal theory and problems o f paternalism.
“  Nussbaum , 2004, 107. See also Rawls, CP, 332.
276
from starving. They do not deserve to starve because they have done nothing to 
become infirm.
Unfortunately, not all cases are so clear-cut. What about the case o f  a person
who chose not to wear a motorcycle helmet and became disabled as a result o f
willful recklessness? What about the case o f baby who is mentally impaired because
of mothers drug use during pregnancy? In these cases choice and will are involved
rather than strictly matters o f sheer luck. Cohen said,
There are people whose inefficiency at turning 
resources into welfare is clearly their own fault, and 
others whose inefficiency is clearly bad luck. But 
between these extreme types, there is a vast range o f 
cases where it is unclear whether or not fault applies.^^
Cohen’s argument that the luck o f access to resources and talents should not 
result in inequalities agrees with Rawls’s position. The extent o f the redistribution 
required to avoid this injustice becomes the point o f conflict between Cohen and 
Rawls. But, setting those unclear cases o f  bad luck aside for now, we might agree 
that a disabled person does not deserve to starve because o f  inability to work.^^ 
Would we also agree that a lazy person does deserve to starve because o f
66 Cohen, 1999,911.
Steven R. Smith Smith, “The Social Construction o f Talent: A Defense o f 
Justice as Reciprocity,” Journa/o/Po/iiica/FMosophy. 9, No. 1, (March: 2001), 19- 
37. Smith argued that political philosophers ought to question their understanding o f 
disability. He demonstrated that all too often, a medical or “naturalistic” definition o f 
disability and talent is assumed. He suggested that a social model o f understanding 
talent would clarify the role that social construction plays in evaluating talent and 
disability. In other words, those called disabled have presented a problem for justice 
as reciprocity, since they can’t reciprocate through work. However, opportunities to 
reciprocate might be possible for them if society was constructed differently.
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unwillingness to work? A further examination o f the relationship between work and 
desert illustrates the connection between desert and reciprocity. Note the way in 
which work is the criterion that justifies inequalities. In order for reciprocity to be 
satisfied, effort must be rewarded with benefits that exceed those received by a 
person who did not exert the effort. Thus, reciprocity is irreconcilable with equality 
if  one assumes that labor or effort deserves reward. The provision that inequalities 
must benefit the least well-off is based on the premise that in order for some work to 
be accomplished, there must be high motivational incentives. We need more 
information from Rawls about how real choices and freedom o f occupation will be 
achieved. Rawls cannot assume that work will be meaningful as long as it is well- 
paid. People may freely choose to contract for distasteful tasks if they are 
compensated well. However, that does not make the work they do meaningful. More 
often, demeaning or tedious work is not freely chosen, but rather is accepted only as 
an alternative to starvation or poverty.
Cohen connected the idea o f work with that o f  self-ownership. What Cohen 
calls self-ownership amounts to the same thing as negative freedom. He said that 
this must be limited in order for everyone to enjoy “a reasonable degree o f 
autonomy.” *^ The paradox o f  the tension between negative and positive freedom 
underlies Cohen’s critique o f  Rawls. “We can all benefit in terms o f autonomy if
Cohen, Se//-Ownership, Freec/om, and£qua/i(y. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 237.
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none o f  us has the right to do certain t h i n g s . C o h e n ’s conclusion is that we have 
non-contractual obligations to serve other people, including laboring for them, so 
Rawls should affirm a duty o f  assistance. This critique was offered prior to Rawls’s 
publication o f T/^ e law q/'/'eop/es'wYiQXQxn Rawls did affirm a duty o f  assistance 
with limits. Cohen’s critique would be that the limits o f aid as Rawls defined them 
are unjustifiable. The first question is who is included in the scope o f  this limitation 
o f negative freedom and promotion o f  autonomy for “everyone”? Is this a universal, 
natural duty or a contractual duty limited to a specific contracting population? For 
Cohen, the duty is universal, but for Rawls it is unclear. Rawls must provide stronger 
reasoning other than prudential, modus vivendi Justification for this duty. Rawls 
argued that the motivation for the duty o f  assistance among peoples in the society o f  
peoples more than stability -  it is stability for the “right reasons.” The basis o f the 
rightness o f these reasons is the question. The restriction in freedom in the domestic 
example o f  r^e r/ieo/yq/yusZ/ce should mirror the duty in the law o f  peoples.
Rawls conceded in / ’o/zY/ca/Z/âera//sm ih&i more redistribution than the difference 
principle requires might be necessary in order to avoid oligarchy.™ The same 
problem holds within the Society o f  Peoples. If  there is to be a just process for 
deliberating about questions o f  how decisions are made at work and over the 
products o f  work then participation in that discussion must be accessible to all.
Ibid.
™ Rawls,PL, 328.
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Should talents and abilities be treated as properties that belong to people who 
happen to be lucky in birth? Some answer to this question will be implicit in any 
claims about distribution o f  wealth on an international level. By extension we could 
argue that some societies or some nations have property rights in the talents o f  their 
people. The controversial question o f  whether or not nations can be held responsible 
is only a first step in an argument that a particular nation is responsible for the 
poverty o f  its people.^' This is a matter that cannot be fully resolved since it is so 
deeply rooted in conflicting claims about the good.^^ Rawls said no. Rather, talents 
are resources belonging to the community as a whole.^^ Nevertheless, when 
justifying the limits o f material aid among the society o f peoples on an international 
level, Rawls resorted to reliance on the notion o f desert. Thomas Pogge agreed on 
this point and rejected Cohen’s critique o f Rawls. Pogge said that Cohen’s criticism 
would lead to a situation where “reluctant top earners are treated unfairly.” That is 
to say, workers like doctors, for example, whose services are valued highly because 
they are needed might not want to work even though the pay is an incentive. Their 
intelligence and abilities are not the property o f their society, but o f  themselves as
David Miller, “Holding Nations Responsible,” £fh/cs 114 (January 2004), 266. 
See M iller’s claim that “national poverty is rarely the sole responsibility o f the nation 
that suffers it.”
Ibid. See also Robert Goodin’s questioning o f  positive desert claims, and 
many other voices contesting the notion o f desert illustrate why Rawls avoided 
arguing on the basis o f the fuzzy notion o f desert.
Rawls, TJ, 101.
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individuals. Pogge argued that justice does not require an exceptionally talented 
worker to “reduce her own welfare in order to increase the welfare o f  others.
Making yourself show up at work is a matter o f  choice. However, in that same 
tradition, Rawls argued that reciprocity demands that the consequences o f  choice, 
labor, and self-denial, be reflected in benefits o f  that work.^^ Still, the connection 
between labor and desert raises an interesting problem for capitalism. If a person 
enjoys leisure as a result o f  years o f  hard work that yields a surplus, the 
accumulation o f  capital seems fair enough. But, what about a person who inherits so 
much capital that she never has to work, but lives o ff the income o f  investments? 
Isn’t inheritance o f  capital just as much a result o f  luck as natural talent? Freedom to 
dispose o f  one’s own property through gift or bequest leads to unfreedom for future 
generations because concentrations o f power are held by owners o f capital. On the 
domestic level, the difference principle leads to inheritance tax, but in the 
international application o f the theory there is no such protection.’^
In concluding this section on labor, I reiterate that Rawls must expand his 
theory o f  justice to the work place, just as he must expand it to matters within the 
family. Doing so could safeguard his theory from some salient criticism based on
Pogge, “On the Site o f Distributive Justice; Reflections on Cohen and 
Murphy.” P/j/Iosophj^Pub/ic J^/rs. 29, No2, (2000), 153.
Like Ronald Dworkin, Rawls wanted to eradicate inequality based on sheer 
luck while still maintaining reward for the efforts o f the will.
’^Rawls, TJ, 277.
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injustices o f  the m arket/^ In order for international trade to meet the Justice target o f 
the Law o f  Peoples, production as well as exchange must be scrutinized and 
regulated. Rawls did not rule out the need for such specification regarding the 
regulation o f  human rights. He claimed that his theory could provide more than 
merely procedural justice that would be hammered out at the level o f local 
constitutions and policies. For example, he pointed to the work o f Joshua Cohen as a 
possible path for realizing some o f  these goals through policy.^* Joshua Cohen and 
Joel Rogers encourage improving the organization o f  American workers. They view 
worker representation as an essential in reconciling democracy and work. In their 
article, “Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance” they examine 
implications for democracy based on the centrality o f  work. “The association 
framework that determines how it is organized, distributed and rewarded sets the 
background and tone for association action throughout much o f the society.”’  ^They 
recommend four types o f remedies.
(1) lower the barriers to unionization,
(2) encourage alternative forms o f self-directed worker 
organization.
^^David Ingram, “Between Political Liberalism and Postnational 
Cosmopolitanism: Towards An Alternative Theory o f Human Rights.” Po/i/ica/ 
Theofy. 31, No. 3, (June 2003), 384. Ingram said, “ ... perhaps his strictures about 
fair trade might reach all the way down to regulating, in some form, the background 
structures and institutions constraining trade.
Rawls, LP, 141.
Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, Associations and Democracy York:
Verso, 1995), 79.
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(3) raise the social wage, and
(4) promote more centralization in wage bargaining 
while permitting high levels o f decentralization in 
bargaining over specific work conditions.**^
This is exactly the type o f  specification required by the best in Rawls’s theory. 
Rawls should have affirmed this proposal as a way o f fleshing out the society o f 
peoples in relationship to potential injustice in the realm o f  labor. This expansion o f 
his theory in such a direction would have answered the criticism o f  G.A. Cohen and 
others. Making this move would be consistent with Rawls’s inclusion o f  human 
rights in the list o f  eight principles o f  justice for TAe Zaw o/Peo/?/es. He does 
acknowledge that the law o f peoples requires protection o f  worker’s rights among 
other basic rights. However, his assumption that protection o f such rights would 
become unnecessary is overly optimistic.*' His theory assumes that citizens in a 
secure and enduring constitutional democracy can interact free o f  the divisions o f 
“hostile social classes.”*^  However, in the international arena, the basis o f mutual 
respect and fair interaction does not exist.
G.A. Cohen’s critique o f  Rawls related to freedom and labor illustrates what 
the application o f a more robust notion o f  freedom could do for Rawls’s theory. 1 
believe that Cohen is correct that Rawls’s theory o f  justice requires redistribution at 
the global level, with no cut o ff point in sight. The expansion o f the difference
*" Ibid., 80.
*' Rawls, LP, 7.
*^  Rawls, PL, 38.
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principle to the international case is needed. Rawls argued against these extensions 
o f his theory because he wanted to avoid promoting a liberal version o f  the good. 
The concept o f  positive freedom that I espouse links the personal, moral autonomy 
o f individuals with the political freedom embodied in social systems. An individual 
exerts her force in creative work in the world as an expression o f her will and self­
development. These acts cannot be sharply or clearly divided from political acts 
with economic consequences. To reiterate Cohen’s critique, “the personal is 
political.” Therefore, it is impossible to think that a person in an affluent society has 
no obligation to a burdened worker in an impoverished society. The shared 
environment is a basis o f  a relationship between the two persons even if  complex 
webs o f  communication or trade are not. Cohen warned that if  Rawls aborted his 
leanings toward comprehensive conceptions o f justice then his theory o f  justice 
would not be able to deliver “ideals o f dignity, fraternity, and full realization o f 
people’s moral natures.”*^  Positive freedom links the full realization o f  people’s 
moral natures with their social and political actions in the world.
One modification that Rawls would probably have been able to accept more 
easily would be the inclusion o f  standards o f  fairness for international labor 
specifying more clearly workers rights. This could easily be included in the section 
on cooperative organizations derived from the second original position. Rawls 
granted that standards o f fair trade would be needed and could be provided as a
G.A. Cohen, “Where the Action Is: On the Site o f Distributive Justice,’ 
PMosophy andFub/i'c4//üirs, 26, 1 (Winter 1997), 17.
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background framework through agreements made in the second original position.*'*
There is no reason why Rawls could not have included provision for specification o f
international labor standards in the same way. This illustrates how much overlap
there is between the commitments o f a liberal like Rawls, and a Marxist like G. A.
Cohen. Given the vastly different philosophical commitments between Rawls and
Cohen, the shared agreement about self-ownership is striking. Positive freedom
explains how a socialist like G. A. Cohen can agree with a liberal like Rawls on this
point. It also explains why Rawls can advocate policies that seem so far to the left.
This explains the potential for the concept o f positive liberty to reconcile conflicts
between socialists and liberals. As David Purdy wrote:
Recently,... a certain convergence has occurred.
Socialists who are critical o f classical liberalism, but 
care about personal liberty, have begun to overlap with 
liberals who are critical o f classical socialism but care 
about social justice. From this standpoint, it can be 
argued that universal grants offer the best way to 
renovate the social rights o f  citizenship and bring 
considerations o f social justice and questions o f 
economic policy into a common frame o f reference...
For the moment, it suffices to say that the aim o f 
liberal-socialism is not to devise a definitive and 
comprehensive scheme o f  social justice which, once 
achieved, is then preserved forever. Rather, the point 
o f  the Citizens’ Income is to create a conspicuous 
public framework for handling sectional conflicts.*^
84 Rawls, LP, 42.
David Purdy, “Citizenship, Basic Income and the State,” JVew le/zReview, No. 
208, (November/December I994),37. The idea o f universal grants or minimum basic 
income as a global program is explored more fully in the conclusion. See also 
Katriona McKinnon.
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This type o f  procedural solution reflects the best o f  Rawls’s contribution. A 
public framework for resolving conflicts is required both within aggregates o f 
people and between aggregates o f people. Whether they are constituted as 
societies, states, or some other way, as long as they interact through 
economic transactions, some venue for conflict resolution will be necessary. 
Rawls did not adequately acknowledge the realist concern that holders o f 
greater political power always have greater freedom to control negotiations 
and decision-making in the workplace as in any realm o f society. Just as 
positive liberty is achieved through the material and social conditions at the 
domestic level, real freedom requires conditions the foster parties to interact 
as political equals at the international level.
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that positive freedom is a helpful concept insofar as it 
emphasizes the relational process o f self-development in the context o f enabling 
conditions. Rawls’s theory should be revised in order to avoid criticisms o f  being 
either irrelevant to crucial cases o f injustice or merely a modus vivendi argument that 
fails to accomplish Rawls’s intent. By leaving behind the Kantian notion o f  positive 
freedom, Rawls failed to account for the enabling conditions o f resources, the social 
cooperation that is not limited by national borders, and the requirement o f  self­
development through various options in labor. This notion o f positive freedom 
provides a way o f  linking the criticisms that Rawls received from various schools o f 
thought. On the international level the necessary provisions for the background 
conditions o f  justice would require ongoing redistribution as achieved in the 
domestic application through the difference principle. In The Law o/Peop/es, there 
is inadequate provision for the enabling conditions o f  meaningful freedom. However, 
the aspect o f  positive freedom that has been most troubling for liberals is not positive 
freedom as enabling conditions. Rather, liberals like Rawls or Berlin have been 
troubled by the fear that positive freedom would be a guise for ideal deployment. It 
is this fear that has led to avoidance and rejection o f  the concept o f positive liberty.
This same fear reveals a strange dilemma o f  liberalism. The tolerance that 
liberalism seeks to promote cannot accommodate intolerance. In other words, 
liberalism can seek to maximize any type o f  freedom except the freedom to
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dominate. Yet if  freedom is the cardinal value, then there are no grounds for 
criticizing the freedom to dominate or master others. Unfortunately rhetoric 
involving the term positive freedom has been used in the past as a means o f  ideal 
deployment to promote totalitarianism. Rather than promote a Kantian concept o f 
freedom, Rawls sought to maintain a strictly neutral procedure for resolving different 
ideas o f  the good. He secured this neutrality at the risk o f reducing freedom to a 
merely formal potential at the international level. The social and political structures 
that allow freedom to flourish require limits and mutual respect. Therefore, respect 
o f others is an ideal that must be fostered and defended in order to promote 
meaningful freedom. Liberals can only promote the ideal o f mutual toleration and 
respect by compromising their own commitment to neutrality. Rawls’s theory would 
be stronger if  he had specified more fully which types o f  freedom must be limited in 
other to promote other freedoms. In other words, when we speak o f limiting some 
freedom to promote some other freedom, it is helpful to delineate between types o f 
freedom.'
This essay has focused on the notion o f positive freedom as a matter o f 
enabling conditions for meaningful freedom. The enabling conditions examined are 
specifically economic conditions. In light o f my argument that freedom requires 
certain economic regulation and is incompatible with purely laissez-faire capitalism, 
my conclusions include endorsement o f  certain policies which promote freedom in
' I am indebted to John Gray, Two Faces o/Li6era/ism, as a background for this 
discussion.
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the positive sense. However, my conclusions do not end there. Rawls raised a 
question that is crucial in our time; namely, whether or not to honor decent, non­
liberal societies by granting them equal voice in the arena o f deliberation and policy- 
setting. Rawls wrestled with this question because o f  the sticky dilemma o f  granting 
freedom to those who might seek domination. His resolution o f  this problem 
illustrates his allegiance to the consistent valuing o f freedom. He did not want to 
coerce societies toward liberalism. He did not want to use domination to make 
societies liberal. That is to say, he was concerned that the liberal project itself may 
be a type o f ideal deployment insofar as it promotes the ideal o f equal and 
nonhierarchical respect for persons. Therefore, the notion o f positive liberty as ideal 
deployment will be examined further in this concluding section.
My conclusions again affirm the usefulness o f the concept o f  positive liberty 
in expanding Rawls’s theory. As 1 have argued, Rawls’s international theory needs 
to be more consistent with his domestic theory.^ In other words, the redistribution 
required by the difference principle that ensures background conditions for freedom 
cannot have a cut o ff point. Individual well-being is required as part o f the social 
basis o f self-respect that makes political freedoms more than merely formal
 ^Charles Beitz, “Rawls’s Law o f  Peoples.” Ethics. 110, No 4. (2000), 694-695. 
Beitz criticized Rawls for making a “sharp distinction between the domestic and 
international realms” in the application o f  his theory o f justice. He states clearly the 
choice between Rawls’s law o f peoples and Rawls claim that the best way to 
promote the well being o f  people through the wellbeing o f their society, and the 
cosmopolitan view. Beitz wrote, “The question is which orientation to the 
fundamental aims o f political life one should embrace— that which regards the 
flourishing o f  domestic society as the ultimate political value or that which judges 
the importance o f  any such accomplishment by its consequences for individuals.”
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provisions. Rawls attends to this problem in the domestic application o f  his theory, 
going to great lengths to insist that the theory only applies where enabling conditions 
are met. His own logic would dictate that the difference principle would also be 
required for distributive justice at the international level. The difference principle 
should be applied universally, despite Rawls’s own objections to this move. His 
critique o f  capitalism should be stronger, including more specification o f policies for 
redistribution o f  wealth. In short, my conclusions amount to a claim that the best o f 
Rawls’s work indicates that he was sympathetic with liberals who seek positive 
freedom.^
Finally, I want to at least point toward an indication o f how this concept o f 
positive freedom provides a bridge between liberal thinkers and liberation theory. 
Therefore, in this conclusion I will connect some reflections about Rawls’s theory 
with a broader notion o f  positive freedom as liberation. This reveals the common 
ground that positive liberty offers between lovers o f  liberty with a propensity 
towards endorsing socialism, and those inclined toward liberalism. I am simply 
agreeing here with T.H. Green’s definition o f true freedom as, “freedom in the 
positive sense: in other words, the liberation o f  the powers o f all men equally for 
contributions to a common good.”"* When Rawls distanced his work from Kant’s
^.Avital Simhony and David Weinstein, T/ieNewL/ôera//m.\Reconc/7ingLiberty 
and Community York: Cambridge University Press), 2001, 1. The concept o f
new liberals sympathetic to positive liberty is discussed more below.
Green, 200.
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notion o f  moral autonomy, he safeguarded the neutrality o f his theory at the expense
o f having grounds for promoting meaningful freedom. Rawls wrote:
While autonomy as a moral value has had an 
importance place in the history o f democratic thought, 
it fails to satisfy the criterion o f  reciprocity required o f 
reasonable political principles and cannot be part o f  a 
political conception o f  justice. Many citizens o f faith 
reject moral autonomy as part o f their way o f life.^
Rather than making that move, Rawls should have retained the Kantian notion o f 
moral autonomy and placed limits to the toleration o f  such faiths on the basis o f 
being unreasonable.
My first conclusion relates to the material conditions o f freedom.^ Material 
resources are the means o f  making freedom real rather than merely formal. The idea 
that individuals are due equal mutual respect is the basis o f nonhierarchical regimes. 
In contrast, hierarchical regimes, or illiberal systems, justify treating people 
differently assuming that some have superior natures while others are inferior. 
Women and children may or may not be afforded the equality as citizens that liberal 
regimes or cosmopolitan schemes require. Feminist theory is particularly adept in
 ^ Rawls, PL, xlv.
 ^Robert S. Taylor, “Rawls’s Defense o f the Priority o f  Liberty: A Kantian 
Reconstruction,” Fh/'/osophy anc/Puâ/icÀ^irs. 31, No. 3, 248. Taylor defends 
Rawls’s theory including the priority o f liberty on the basis o f an argument he called 
the “Hierarchy Argument.” Taylor suggests that “the Priority o f  Liberty follows 
directly from a certain conception o f free persons.” He notes that this priority o f 
liberty is only effective “ if sufficient material means are available to support this 
interest.”
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noting such systemic inequalities. Therefore, I have argued that Nussbaum’s critique 
o f Rawls illustrates the concern that freedom may be merely formal in Rawls’s 
theory. This is not necessarily a gender-based critique. Rather, it is based on 
historical particularity rather than sheer abstraction.
When Rawls’s theory is used to inform actual policy, greater particularity is 
required in order to insure that freedom is meaningful. In his essay, “Between 
Political Liberalism and Postnational Cosmopolitanism,” David Ingram criticized 
Rawls for leaving “the prescriptive meaning o f rights overly vague and 
indeterminate.”  ^ I share this criticism. Because the notion o f rights Rawls defended 
is not adequately “prescriptive” according to Ingram, he favors some solution like 
“an international democratic federation o f liberal democracies and interest groups.”* 
The relationship between states and NGO’s in this model would have to be further 
developed with attention to questions concerning the limits o f representation in such 
a scheme. In this way Ingram believes that he navigated a safe middle way between 
problems o f  political liberalism and cosmopolitanism. I agree with Ingram on the 
basis o f three criticisms developed by applying the concept o f positive freedom the 
theory o f  John Rawls.
First, if  liberal thinkers value freedom, they will regulate the economy 
enough to promote meaningful freedom. In other words, economic policy
 ^ Ingram, 373-374.
* Ibid., 386.
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recommended by liberals like Rawls should be similar to that recommended by 
cosmopolitans, communitarians, and socialists insofar as capitalism must be highly 
regulated. It can be reasonable and consistent to argue that no comprehensive view 
o f the good should guide social policy, but that economic matters must be limited to 
promote social freedom. Rawls should agree to this, given the requirements o f  the 
worth o f  liberty. This first conclusion follows from the premise that separating 
liberty and the worth o f liberty only works if  massive redistribution o f resources is 
involved. Some inequality o f resources is compatible with the possible separation o f 
liberty and the worth o f  liberty. If everyone’s basic needs are met, equality o f 
capability can be achieved without resource equality. However, the mutual respect 
and equality o f  political power will also require massive redistribution o f speech, 
voice, and representation. In other words, major regulation o f  electoral processes 
would also be required to compensate for the possible unequal worth o f  liberty.^ We 
recognize, as did Rawls, the need within a liberal democracy for public financing o f 
campaigns and other protection o f  political processes from the influence o f  economic 
power. The same dynamics necessitate these protections within the domestic sphere
’ In this respect, the conditions o f  liberty provide some common ground between 
Rawls and the new republican theory. This theory promotes political participation as 
a civic good and benchmark o f freedom. Philip Pettit, writing about republican 
theory, argued that “ If the republican state is committed to advancing the cause o f 
freedom as non-domination among its citizens, then it must embrace a policy o f 
promoting socioeconomic independence”(Pettit, 159). Far from arguing for material 
equality or much intervention, Pettit still reflects the awareness that freedom requires 
economic power. Despite theoretical differences, republican thinkers and Rawlsian 
liberals must be committed to some economic adjustments to protect the worth o f 
liberty.
293
are also present in the international sphere. Where concentrations o f economic 
power exist, there is the potential for possessors o f  that power to take over political 
processes. When that happens the political freedoms o f  other actors becomes merely 
formal. Therefore, protections o f  the equal worth o f  liberty need to be achieved at 
the level o f  the law o f  peoples, just as they are necessary in the domestic case. Thus 
the difference principle should be applied globally.''^
Extension of Justice as Fairness Beyond Borders
The second conclusion as a result o f  applying the concept o f  positive freedom 
to Rawls’s theory is that since social cooperation and the shared environment 
transcends borders, state borders are irrelevant to our duties and moral obligations. 
Although state borders continue to be helpful for practical purposes, state power 
must answer to international organizations that advocate for Justice across borders. 
The increase in economic activity between nations and across borders requires 
ethical theory that can unite peoples across divisions. The problems o f right or Just 
relationships with others beyond our state borders or affiliation as a people or society 
begs for ethical guidelines even if community is impossible on a global scale. If we 
stick with Rawls’s definition o f community as a group united by a comprehensive 
notion o f  the good, then clearly community would be impossible alongside freedom. 
But cooperation and mutual respect may be possible nonetheless. I have argued that 
Thomas Pogge’s critique o f  Rawls demonstrates the cosmopolitan concern for
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meaningful freedom. Rawls advocated a neutral procedure o f seeking overlapping 
consensus while refraining from the promotion o f Kantian notions o f  cosmopolitan 
right. Negotiating power struggles between states, international actors, individuals, 
and local affiliates o f persons will be a persistent challenge. I do not offer a solution 
to resolve the challenge. However, it does seem clear that Rawls’s attempt to bypass 
the problem by imagining a society o f peoples does not solve the problem o f 
conflicting state power.
The crux o f  the disagreement between Rawls and the cosmopolitans relates to 
concern for the welfare o f  individuals. Rawls’s theory is based on the social union 
o f persons as free and equal citizens.”  At least at the level o f the original position, 
and also at the level o f  political participation in a constitutional democracy a respect 
for others as equals is implied. Is this a matter o f ideal deployment? Some would 
argue that it is. If it is a moral position to view others as deserving o f mutual respect, 
then there is a type o f  ideal deployment inherent in Rawls’s theory. However, it is 
not an understanding founded on the notion o f  rights as much as it is founded on the 
reasonable and rational nature o f humans in the Kantian sense. This must derive 
from a universal respect for persons, not a particular contractual citizenship. For 
Kant, this respect for persons is grounded in the rational, moral quality o f  human life. 
Rawls did not want to promote that liberal idea because o f his desire to respect and
' ' Joshua Cohen, “Democracy and Liberty,” in ed., Elster, De/iâera/ive 
Democracy York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 229. His theory does 
assume what Joshua Cohen called the “background democratic understanding” that 
“the parties accept one another as equals.” As Cohen said, “equality is a benchmark.’
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cooperate with non liberal peoples. The Law o f  Peoples aims for respecting even 
hierarchical regimes in order to achieve their inclusion in the cooperative stability o f 
peaceful coexistence. A choice arises between remaining neutral on questions o f  the 
good versus advocating the well-being o f vulnerable individuals within various 
regimes. This tension between cosmopolitan thinkers and Rawls hinges on the 
potential problem that individuals’ needs can be invisible at the level o f  states or 
societies.'^
Economic Regulation for Justice
Third, Rawls’s theory in The Law o/Feop/e can be modified slightly in 
order to be reconcilable with cosmopolitan , communitarian, and socialist thought 
when it comes to matters o f  economic policy. At the same time, these modifications 
would make this international application more consistent with Rawls’s original 
theory o f  justice. The conflict between economic freedom o f laissez-faire capitalism 
and the positive freedom o f individuals or societies requires more assistance across 
borders and more regulation o f markets than Rawls admitted. The third conclusion I 
offer is that Rawls can be interpreted as sharing communitarian, cosmopolitan, and 
socialist concerns related to issues o f economic justice.'^ The result would be an
Cohen challenged Rawls on this problem o f individuals getting lost in the aggregate. 
He argued that political legitimacy depends o f the way in which collective decisions 
are reached by equal members o f society.
Immanuel Wallerstein, À//erL/hera//sm, described the need for a world system 
built on the “primacy o f  groups as actors.” Wallerstein viewed the “capitalist 
world-economy” as inextricably wed to liberalism arguing that both had reached 
their limits because liberalism as a rational, reformist ideology failed to deliver its
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overlapping consensus between democratic socialism and political liberalism. Rawls 
stressed the important difference between seeking an overlapping consensus versus 
promoting a good claimed to be universal. The idea o f  overlapping consensus is that 
various comprehensive ideas o f the good contain substantive commonalities. In 
other words, a particular value might be shared by lots o f  groups that view 
themselves as rivals or offer vastly different claims about why that value should be 
upheld. The belief that more economic equality is needed could be shared by 
thinkers from disparate ideologies. I have argued that G.A. Cohen’s critique o f 
Rawls represents this insistence that freedom be more than merely formal. Predatory 
capitalism does not promote freedom that is more than merely formal. Restrictions 
on markets like the GRT (Global Resource Tax)''' proposed by Pogge or the global 
redistribution schemes o f  Beitz would be part o f the solution endorsed by positive 
liberty. These are ways o f extending the difference principle to the global level. 
Rawls acknowledged his sympathy for these cosmopolitan impulses, although noted 
his disagreement over the issues o f a cut-off point for aid due to his concern for 
reciprocity.
promise to all individuals. Many different theories o f international relations share 
consensus that states are not the only important actors to be recognized. This view 
that Rawls is not at odds with communitarians over some economic justice issues is 
shared by others. Arguing that the liberal versus communitarian debate was 
“misconceived from the start,” new liberals such as Green and Hobhouse, among 
others, accommodate both liberal and communitarian concerns. See also Avital 
Simhony. “Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom: T.H. Green’s View of 
Freedom” 21, No. 1 (February 1993), 28-54.
''' Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law o f  Peoples,” 199.
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John Gray, in The Two Faces o/Lidera/ism, accurately criticized Rawls for 
failing to note the internal contradiction in two conflicting forms o f freedom. Gray 
recommended that liberalism should move forward allowing diversity through 
promoting mutual tolerance, rather than suggesting that a single, most rational way 
o f life was attainable through liberal thought. Gray claimed that Rawls was 
promoting a specific way o f life rather than encouraging diverse freedom. Either 
you limit the freedom to dominate others or you don’t. Rawls responded to that type 
o f criticism by moving farther and farther from Kantian defenses o f  moral freedom. 
The Law o f Peoples can be viewed as Rawls’s continued effort to avoid that type o f 
criticism by remaining neutral on concepts o f  human well-being. Recognizing that 
domination can be achieved not only through military power o f  direct force, but also 
through economic coercion, the prevention o f  domination must include the 
prevention o f great inequalities in wealth. Therefore, because Rawls cared about 
political freedom, he must limit economic freedom in order to promote meaningful 
freedom. Liberalism can be reconciled with socialism in this way, because curtailing 
the freedom o f  capitalists is required by liberal goals.
To illustrate, I turn to some suggestions offered by Ronal Beiner offered 
what he called a “civic” argument for socialism, that he said may be viewed as an 
“offshoot o f liberal discourse.” ’  ^ This is to say, Beiner gives examples o f liberal 
arguments for policies that have been labeled as socialist policies. For example, for
Ronald Beiner, “The Civic Argument for Socialism,” L/hera//smanc/Ts 
Tracf/ce. (ed.) Dan Avnon and Avner de-Shalit (New York; Routledge, 1999), 146.
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the purpose o f  promoting freedom, Beiner recommended what he called the Plato
principle. He wrote:
Applied to modem conditions, the Plato principle 
would yield the result that if a streetsweeper earned 
$25,000 a year, a corporate lawyer could not earn more 
than $125,000. While not perfectly egalitarian, the 
universal application o f  this five-to-one ratio would 
certainly have a revolutionary impact on capitalist 
societies as they now ex ist... No one can question the 
feasibility o f this proposal since (unlike certain other 
socialist projects), given the legislative will, it can be 
implemented instantaneously; at most, one can claim 
that putting it into practice would diminish economic 
efficiency.” '*
This type o f  suggestion for equalizing economic power would promote more 
meaningful freedom. The difference principle is supposed to balance the need to 
stimulate production and efficiency by both motivating entrepreneurial investors 
while at the same time providing a safety net. Beiner’s suggestion could be 
reconciled with the difference principle. It seems likely that if  Rawls extended the 
first original position to the international sphere that representatives selecting 
principles o f  justices would want to be sure that survival needs were met no less than 
provisions for freedom. Beiner concluded that the following policies should be 
endorsed because they lead to more extensive freedom:
Every employable member o f a society is to be 
guaranteed a job  at the behest o f  public 
authority. A Western society that consents to, or 
promotes, the unemployment o f 10 per cent o f
'* Ibid, 158.
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its working population should come to be seen in 
the same light, and be subject to the same degree 
o f moral censure, as a society that arbitrarily 
disenfranchises a tenth o f  its adult citizenry.
2. Public authority is obliged to do everything in its 
power to render it more likely that the kinds o f 
jobs actually available to members o f the society 
do not destroy the soul.
3. The ratio o f the highest to the lowest income in 
the society shall not exceed, say, five to one.
This ratio shall be implemented by a publicly 
enforced, non-loophole-ridden, redistributive tax 
system.'^
I agree with Beiner and others who propose such policies. It is crucial to note that 
the promotion o f  such policies is based on a desire to maximize freedom. Granted, 
there are limits o f  certain kinds o f  freedom involved as well. The arguments against 
this type o f  redistribution are related to the problem o f free riders and the potential to 
stifle entrepreneurial creativity.
Here is the dilemma: different people would choose differently between 
measures o f  freedom and measures o f equality. The choice between living in a 
society that has less material wealth and more equality versus that o f  a society with 
less equality but more material wealth cannot be answered through reason alone. 
What is clear is that the balance achieved with the difference principle in the 
domestic case is absent in the international model. The best in Rawls’s original 
theory would lead to policies like these and others that could be acceptable to 
cosmopolitans, communitarians, and socialists as well. In an early critique o f  Rawls,
Ibid., 160-161.
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Norman Daniels argued that “Rawls’ principles may drive him and other liberal
theorists toward far greater egalitarianism than was expected.” '* The work o f
McKinnon and others concluding that Rawls’s theory will lead to a requirement o f
insuring basic income concurs.'^ These policy suggestions that seem reasonable for
the purpose o f  promoting positive freedom would include: limiting inheritance to
personal property rather than capital, encouraging public property where appropriate,
supporting worker control o f means o f production, and regulating global markets on
the basis o f  human rights. The result o f  these reflections is a potential linkage
between democratic socialism and political liberalism. As Beiner said.
Some arguments for socialism regard politics as the 
means and economic equality as the end. Here this 
perspective is reversed: economic equality is the means 
and greater exercise o f political citizenship is the 
en d ... This theoretical strategy may be summed up in 
the notion that socialism should be pursued not on 
account o f equality for its own sake, but because it 
makes us better citizens or promotes citizenship 
generally, or rather, that greater equality is justified 
insofar as it makes better citizens and encourages 
citizenship.^®
Recognizing the economic enabling conditions o f  freedom requires that.trade 
agreements should be linked with human rights and environmental protection. 
Distribution and exchange o f  material resources should promote liberty for personal
'* Daniels," Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth o f Liberty,” Reai/ing J^ aw/s, 256. 
McKinnon, 144.
Ibid., 153-154.
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self-development underwritten by enabling conditions, even at the expense o f liberty 
of the entrepreneur to invest in new ventures. Therefore, the following requirements 
for the regulation o f  trade agreements should be promoted even though they sacrifice 
the negative freedom o f  business for the positive freedom o f citizens. The following 
policy suggestions are suggested by the “Citizens Trade Campaign,” a coalition o f  
environmental, labor, consumer, farm, religious, and other citizens’ groups.
Although these requirements were developed in response to concern about NAFTA, 
they could be applied to any regional or multilateral trade agreement.
There must be trade-linked enforcement o f 
worker rights and workplace standards. These rights 
and standards must include the right to organize and 
bargain collectively; workplace health and safety 
standards; meaningful minimum wage structures; a 
prohibition on child labor and forced labor; and the 
guarantee o f  non-discrimination in employment.
There must be trade-linked enforcement o f 
environmental, agricultural, health and safety laws and 
regulations.
Companies must demonstrate that they have 
complied with the host country’s labor, environmental, 
agricultural, health and safety laws and regulations 
before being allowed to gain NAFTA trade benefits.
No runaway plants should receive NAFTA benefits.^'
How would these policies fit with Rawls’s law o f peoples? I have argued that 
such policies are completely compatible with the procedural suggestions o f  the 
second original position. I believe that representatives o f liberal and decent societies 
would want to ensure such provisions precisely because these policies do promote
The Case Âgaihsf "Free Trade GATT, NAFTA, and /he G/oha/iza/ion o f 
Corpora/e Tower {Easth. Island Press, 1993), 225-226.
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freedom. Although Rawls was not completely clear on this point, these provisions 
seem compatible with his vision in the law o f peoples, as regulated by regional trade 
organizations. He might say that such policies would be selected by institutions 
designed to regulate fair trade. However, the establishment o f trade regulation would 
have to be backed up by power to enforce such regulation. Rather than leave these 
matters to decision-makers at the level o f  regional institutions, the Law o f  Peoples 
should specify more fully the extent o f protections for conditions o f  mutual respect.
Specific policy suggestions must be hammered out in the international 
organizations for deliberation as Rawls proposed. My purpose here is not to promote 
certain policies, but to clarify the need for attention to the consequences o f economic 
inequalities for political freedom on the global level. One reason that could be given 
for changes in neoliberal economic policies would be that such policies fail to 
accomplish their stated goal. O f course, economic policies are promoted for many 
different reasons and do not have one, clear purpose. If  the singular goal o f  a policy 
was financial profit by any means necessary, then liberal policies might be viewed as 
successful, at least in the short run. But the normative questions about trade call for 
defending policies in other terms. In the debate on international trade, liberal 
economic policies like privatization, deregulation, and opening new markets push 
old laissez-faire tactics using a variety o f  justifications. Most often, these policies 
are said to promote freedom and economic growth. Arguments against these policies 
could be arguments based on the value o f equality or some other comprehensive 
notion o f  the good. However, those arguments seem less likely to engage those who
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claim freedom as the cardinal value. So, I have argued that freedom itself is best 
promoted by some alterations and adjustments in what have been called liberal and 
neoliberal policies. Mine is not an attempt to replace liberalism with something else, 
but an effort to suggest some adjustments in the future o f liberal thought, and to 
demonstrate convergence between thinkers like Rawls and the democratic socialists.
Rawls developed his thought in the matrix o f  the historical polarization
between Marxism and capitalism. While philosophical debate inches along, world
leaders and policy makers grasp for reasonable ways to resolve conflicts over wealth
distribution, trade policies, and freedom. The need for the revisioning o f  freedom is
increasingly evident because o f globalization. What is globalization and how does it
connect with normative questions related to freedom? The literature on globalism
and global trade is vast. Yet there is common agreement that the definition o f
globalism itself is slippery and difficult to clarify completely. Fred Halliday
reviewed the history and definitions o f globalism, noting that technological
revolutions in communication and travel have been formative. Halliday provided
this definition o f  globalism:
At its simplest, globalization denotes three things: a 
marked reduction in the barriers between societies and 
states, an increasing homogeneity o f  societies and 
states and an increase in the volume o f interactions 
between societies -  be this in terms o f trade, capital 
volumes o f  currency traded or movements o f tourists 
and migrants.”^^
22 Fred Halliday, The fVorMai2000Ç ç^,'w York: Palgrave, 2001), 61.
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Increased power o f  multinational corporations and their relationship to 
state sovereignty and the role o f  states are common topics in discussions o f 
globalization. Halliday linked globalization with certain economic policies, saying 
that “ in the field o f  economics” globalization means “trade liberalization and the 
increased tendency o f capital to flow across frontiers.”^^  These economic 
interactions across borders necessitate new accountability in ethics o f  international 
trade. Halliday’s reminder o f  the connection between international relations and 
normative issues is being heeded by practitioners working on trade policy.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, winner o f  the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics has recently 
written,
The fact that trade liberalization all too often fails to 
live up to its promise— but instead simply leads to 
more unemployment -  is why it provokes strong 
opposition. ...The Western countries pushed trade 
liberalization for the products that they exported, but at 
the same time continued to protect those sectors in 
which competition from developing countries might 
have threatened their economies.^"*
Policies like the austerity measures, privatization, and market liberalization are
promoted by policy makers within the United States as the rational policies o f  those
who defend freedom. But, research may show that, they perpetuate poverty in
developing nations while diminishing state sovereignty. Stiglitz wrote:
Ibid.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globa/izatfon and Its Discontents York: W. W. Norton
and Company, 2000), 60.
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... while I was at the World Bank, I saw firsthand the 
devastating effect that globalization can have on 
developing countries, and especially the poor within 
those countries?^
Stiglitz began as an academic, then served on the Council o f Economic 
Advisers under President Bill Clinton. In 1997 he became chief economist and 
senior vice president o f  the World Bank. Stiglitz defined globalization as “the 
removal o f  barriers to free trade and the closer integration o f national economies,” 
arguing that the way globalization had been managed thus far needs to be changed.^^ 
The political motivation to change such policies requires reform o f  liberal political 
theory through the development o f  a more muscular concept o f  freedom.
Neoliberalism that is characterized by unfettered markets promotes a global 
economy that is not restrained by state power. In contrast, liberals concerned with 
meaningful freedom must insist that policies considered as socialist, communitarian, 
or cosmopolitan must be considered on their own merits. The ideological wars that 
polarize these various theories call for new concepts and bridge work. Based on my 
critique o f  Rawls in the light o f the concept o f  positive freedom, I would suggest that 
the possibility o f liberationist ethics be reconsidered. Ethics o f global trade brings 
new challenges to liberalism that a liberationist conception o f freedom can reform 
and enhance. In discussions o f  the ethics o f global trade the outdated notion o f 
freedom is one that arose in the modem struggle against feudalism and monarchy.
^^Ibid.,61.
Ibid, xi.
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Now the conception o f  freedom needs regeneration and careful examination since it 
often devolves to meaningless rhetoric that is used to defend the opposite o f 
freedom. For these reasons, I hope more work will be done developing a persuasive 
liberation theory. This would be a type o f liberal theory that is characterized by 
adherence to a concept o f meaningful, positive freedom that promotes the ideal o f 
mutual respect and concrete enabling conditions. I offer these concluding reflections 
as indicators pointing toward such a future liberation theory.
Bridges between Liberalism and Liberation Theory 
Liberation theory stresses the relational nature o f freedom rather than the 
rights o f  individuals to their own freedom, and it is characterized by care rather than 
neutrality. Consider these marks o f  liberation theory in more detail. First, in liberal 
thought freedom is usually thought o f as a matter o f  the rights o f the individual rather 
than as a dynamic o f  relational systems. In fact, freedom is often viewed as a point o f 
tension between the individual and the community. A more high resolution view o f 
freedom would make visible the necessity o f community for the fullest personal 
freedom. For example, the freedom to create the harmony o f the symphony requires 
the cooperation o f community. The individual cannot be free in that way alone. 
Furthermore, freedom does not have to mean detachment. Care rather than neutrality 
motivates defense o f liberation. The distinction between positive and negative types 
o f freedom begins to address the difference between the inadequate conception o f 
freedom in liberal thought and the richer notion o f liberation freedom. So, the 
liberation freedom could be understood as an inherently valuable, relational process.
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In looking for an alternative path for the future o f  liberalism as indicated by the 
positive concept o f liberty, I suggest consideration o f feminist theory and Latin 
American liberation theory. I argue that they provide compelling examples o f  why 
the liberal notion o f freedom is too narrow.
Although feminist theory is not monolithic, some feminist thinkers 
understand their work as a type o f  liberation theory. The wom en’s liberation 
movement has generated new ethical models that can enhance liberalism. Carol 
Gilligan’s book. In aD/j^ren/ Fo/ce, has been the wellspring for care ethics.^^ Both 
those who criticize her and those who agree with her have found that Gilligan’s work 
indicates the importance o f reforming, transforming, and expanding political theory 
in light o f  wom en’s realities. In attempting to sift through the treasures o f  feminist 
theory, Gilligan’s work contributes to a focus on freedom to care and act. Rather
Although some aspects o f  her work have been rejected by other feminists, 
Gilligan’s work continues to inform later feminist thought. In contrast to 
rationalistic, logically based ethical system, Gilligan’s work points to compassion, 
care and sympathy as the foundation for ethical life. She claimed that the concept o f  
rights has a masculine bias and that women care more about community than rights. 
This controversial premise has generated criticism from Joan C. Tronto who argued 
that care is a political concept and is a “complex set o f  practices” not dependent on a 
“supposed context” (Tronto,in RP, 151). Tronto and others share the concern that if 
sensitivity and care are linked with biology or oppression then the value o f  care as a 
political concept is undermined. Yet, in recent decades a debate between care ethics 
and justice ethics has emerged, largely because o f  Gilligan’s work. Margaret Moore 
criticized this polarization between care ethics and justice ethics arguing that justice 
theories like that o f  John Rawls presuppose care. Nancy J. Hirschmann also argued 
that care is “practi se-ori en ted” and not biologically determined (Hirshmann, in RP, 
164). Even the many criticisms generated by Gilligan’s work evidence her 
contribution to current feminist thought.
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than the goal being enlightenment, or detached, supposedly objective truth, the goal
is freedom, community, and diversity. Barbara Ameil wrote:
Gilligan argues that we have been trained to listen to 
the masculine voice, which exhibits a Cartesian style 
o f  reasoning that limits context and specific details, 
and a desire to find abstract general principles to 
govern unspecified individuals. Thus the contrast 
between male abstraction and female specificity is 
critical to the liberal ideas o f  justice being 
fundamentally about an abstract rule o f  law and 
universal sets o f  rights.^*
Attempts at being impartial can be paralyzing and can disable action. In contrast, 
this type o f  feminist theory fosters freedom to care and act.
This concern for action rather than abstraction was also central to the work o f 
Hannah Arendt who posed challenges and reform for political theory. Arendt’s 
influence on feminists derives from her profound analysis o f  concepts o f  power, 
ability, potentiality, and empowerment, authority, and compassion.^^ Arendt’s 
contrast o f  freedom and necessity informs this discussion o f freedom and domination 
inform my conception o f freedom . It would be a stretch to label Arendt as a 
feminist. Nevertheless, there is overlap with her insistence on attention to activity in 
community and that same insistence by some feminist thinkers. In The/fuman
^*Barbara Ameil, To/h/cs andFem/n/sm (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers LTD, 
1999), 135.
Arendt, /human Conc/hion. In her recent feminist rethinking o f power, Nancy C. 
M. Hartsock included an extensive review o f Arendt. (Hartsock,in RP 32-33.) 
Kathleen B. Jones in “What is Authority’s Gender,” referred to Arendt questioning 
the identification o f  authority with domination, see Jones in RP, 75.
309
Co/ic^ /Z/o/î^  Arendt outlined ways in which careful thought has been divorced from 
action in the modern world. Although there are questions about the implications o f 
some o f  her work for feminist thought or liberation theory, Hannah Arendt’s 
profound commitment to furthering freedom while reducing violence illustrates the 
importance o f the integration o f both thought and action. Arendt’s influence on 
feminist thought is illustrated in the work o f  Rian Voet. In Fem/n/sm and 
CiZizens/np, Voet pointed to Arendt as the provider o f a notion o f liberty as 
democratic and participatory that furthers the feminist project. Voet said, “ Instead o f 
positive liberty as sovereignty Arendt suggested positive liberty as participation.” ®^ 
The importance o f  participation o f citizens acting together in a public space is 
characteristic o f Arendt’s arguments for political life.
This is also remarkably similar to Mary Parker Follett’s conclusions about 
creative experience as the unifying ground for harmonious democracy. The 
genealogy o f Follett’s influence on feminist thought can be traced through Dorothy 
Emmett, the first woman president o f the British Aristotelian Society, who studied 
and wrote about Follett’s concept o f power.^' Nancy J. Hirshmann’s work at 
revisioning the concept o f  freedom drew on Follett’s writing about power, “related 
difference,” and equality.^^ Hirshmann wrote.
Voet, 57.
Emmett, 1-26.
Hirshmann, RP, 64.
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So the concept o f equality necessary to freedom is 
different than that found in either positive or negative 
liberty. I find Mary Parker Follett’s notion o f “related 
difference” particularly helpful.^^
Despite recent study o f  Follett and recovery o f her ideas, her potential 
influence in feminist thought in international relations theory has yet to be 
developed. Well ahead o f  her time, she saw the problems o f the tendency o f  the 
researcher to distort the subject matter by attempting detached objectivity. Although 
she did not fully develop this insight she indicated the need for action even at the 
expense o f the quest for neutrality or objectivity. Secondly, studying the conflicting 
interests o f  persons and the competitive situations that result from conflict, Follett 
said that we need to “seek the plusvalents o f  experience.” '^* In other words, there are 
shared connections o f common experience that connect persons. She wrote, “We 
need to study not the ‘conception’ o f  a general will but concrete joint activity.^^ This 
emphasis on shared action rather than shared understanding is shared by feminists as 
well as other liberation thinkers. Inadequate attention to the study o f  community has 
resulted because o f a tendency toward radical individualism. The idea o f  shared 
power is found throughout Follett’s work. She wrote, “Coersive power is the curse 
o f the universe; coactive power, the enrichment and advancement o f every human
Ibid.
Follett, Creative Experience York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924), x.
Ibid.
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soul.”^^  Her commitment to avoiding coercive power is illustrated in her analysis o f
democratic process, representation, and international relations. According to Follett,
true democracy must generate social process that incorporates the will o f  the people,
not merely secures the nominal consent o f the people. The tension and richness in
complex, diverse society is both a sign and a guarantor o f  freedom. The democratic
rule o f law does not decrease freedom, but extends freedom. Follett said,
We should however, see law not as restricting or 
regulating freedom, but as increasing our freedom by 
making wider and wider the area in which that freedom 
may operate. I have theoretical freedom in the forest;
I have actual freedom only with the freedom to do, to 
do and do, in wider relations, in more significant 
relations by extending ever more and more the 
possibility o f  fruitful response. Men do not lose their 
freedom in relation but thereby gain it.^’
Feminist voices urging care, community, and participation are a bridge for
connection with Third World liberationist thinkers who share the perspective o f
those disenfranchised by the global economy. In her book, G/oba/Obsceni/ies:
Fa/riarcky, Capifa/i'sm, ani//beLure o/Cyber^ntasy  ^ Zillah Eisenstein wrote:
Some 800 million people are starving across the globe.
Women and girls represent approximately 60 percent 
o f the billion or so people earning one dollar a day or 
less. However, in countries labeled as democratic, a 
new kind o f  excessive wealth exists in which 
billionaires are allowed to amass as much as they can 
with few limits. New levels o f arrogance emerge just
36 Ibid., xiii. 
Follett, 288-289.
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as the nation-state is being overshadowed by 
transnational corporation.
Drawing on the positive type o f  freedom, liberation theory world argue that freedom
is a dynamic process o f  liberation that can only be understood as an embodied,
relational process.
What are the implications o f  attempting to escape Western dualism and embrace 
ways o f  knowing and being within their own systemic context? One characteristic o f 
liberation theory is the insistence on embodiment. In other words, theory is viewed 
as inseparable from the crucible o f history and specificity o f experience. This 
requires thinkers to reflect carefully on their own embodiment and location in a 
particular political culture and time in history. Therefore, in this effort to suggest 
direction for future work reconciling liberal theory with liberation theory I turn to 
Central American liberation theory. Paulo Friere’s book, Fec/agogy o/^ /le 
Oppressed, is the primary source cited here for liberation theory. He wrote, “1 
consider the fundamental theme o f our epoch to be that o f  dominat/on- which 
implies its opposite, the theme o f  //deradon the objective to be achieved. 
According to Friere, liberation is a painful birthing. True freedom means 
participating in history as subjects and actors. The process o f being without freedom 
tends to strip persons o f their ability and power to act.
Zillah Eisenstein. G/o6a/ Odscenides: Pa/narchy, Capda/ism, and /he Lure o f 
Cyhe/Lhn/asyÇHç.^  York: New York University Press, 1998), 1.
Paulo Friere, Pedagogy o//he O p p re sse d York: Continuum, 1993), 103.
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In order for the oppressed to be able to struggle for 
their liberation, they must perceive the reality o f 
oppression not as a closed world from which there is 
no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can 
transform'*'’.
The struggle to act ourselves to new ways o f  thinking and to think ourselves
to new ways o f acting is the vocation o f becoming fully human. Attempts to remain
detached, purely neutral or impartial, and objective have some value, but cannot
replace the labor o f  self-development and responsibility for the construction o f
meaning. In fact, the notion o f  maximizing privilege at the expense o f  others is
viewed by Friere as a distortion o f the human vocation. Only from the flawed
perspective o f  privilege could a person enjoy benefits that cost others their freedom.
Formerly, they could eat, dress, wear shoes, be 
educated, travel and hear Beethoven” while millions 
did not. Any restriction on this way o f life, in the name 
o f  the rights o f  the community, appears to the former 
oppressors as a profound violation o f their individual 
rights -  although they had no respect for the millions 
who suffered and died o f  hunger, pain, sorrow, and 
despair.'*'
Care and compassion for others allows the motivation to desire change even 
if  it results in the end o f  a privilege once enjoyed. Solidarity is as sacred as freedom. 
The desire for personal freedom cannot be divorced from the desire for community. 
Friere wrote.
'*° Friere, 49.
Ibid., 59.
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The pursuit o f  full humanity, however, cannot be 
carried out in isolation or individualism, but only in 
fellowship and solidarity... attempting to be more 
human, individualistically, leads to having more, 
egoistically, a form o f  dehumanization.'*^
This claim that being human requires community leads to adjustment in the theories
that rely on the notion that humans are only individual utility maximizers. It is
precisely this respect for others that makes us care about the freedom o f others, even
minorities with whom we disagree. Freedom allows for difference without
domination. In contrast, domination results in oppression and hence, in injustice.
According to Friere’s thought, the desire to dominate is the root o f the relationship
o f oppression that is the opposite o f freedom.
In their unrestrained eagerness to possess, the 
oppressors develop the conviction that it is possible for 
them to transform everything into objects o f  their 
purchasing power: hence their strictly materialistic 
concept o f existence... Everything is reduced to the 
status o f  objects at its disposal... everything is an 
object o f dom ination... the earth, property, production, 
the creations o f people, people themselves, time...'*^
Rather than recognizing others as subjects, those who would dominate fail to
embrace the fullest challenge o f  living in community that allows for difference and
freedom. When people are robbed o f  their power and voice while being cheated in
the sale o f  their labor not only they themselves, but their oppressors are
dehumanized. To dominate another is to suffer dehumanization. Because freedom is
Ibid., 85-86.
Ibid.
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the human vocation, participation in the destruction o f  freedom is antithetical to 
being fully human. However, a duality exists because people both desire freedom 
and fear freedom. Therefore, persons will sometimes relinquish their own 
responsibility for freedom and participate in being dominated by another. The work 
o f liberation requires intentional work new ways o f  thinking. The opposite o f  the 
will to dominate is the participation in the effort for liberation o f all. According to 
Friere, “The commitment o f  the revolutionary leaders to the oppressed is at the same 
time a commitment to freedom.”'*'*
Miguel D’Escoto’s work embodies the pedagogy o f  the oppressed. During 
the 1980’s he was minister o f foreign relations in Nicaragua. His political activism 
and work as a liberation priest is reflected in his views on freedom. As a Sandanista 
leader, he has sometimes been accused o f  being an enemy of freedom and open 
society. 1 found him to be a passionate advocate o f liberty. In an interview with him, 
he noted the reality that liberals who talk freedom often dominate and coerce in the 
name o f  liberty. He referred to an official history o f the United States by Robert 
Moskin, who was him self a marine, to demonstrate his claim that the United States 
values domination not freedom. To illustrate this point, d ’Escoto quoted from 
M oskin’s book to describe the rationale for the Marine intervention and the invasion 
o f Nicaragua in 1928.
Why did they invade the country? It says, “Marines
protected the American lives, interests, and property.
Ibid., 168.
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When ordered to do so, the Marines went into and 
supported our people and squashed anti-U.S. 
nationalist.” ... And then it says, “ The Marines 
suppressed revolts against governments that accepted 
American aims.” ... So, they prevented the coming to 
power o f independent-minded leaders.... And they dare 
to talk about dem ocracy... This is not in a Marxist 
textbook but a book that was made for the making o f  
the Marines. It is used at the Marine Academy.'*^
What would Rawls say about this? I believe that Rawls would consider the U.S. 
invasion o f Nicaragua in the 1920’s as an instance o f injustice and noncompliance to 
principles o f justice. Rawls mentioned Nicaragua as a possible case o f  U.S. 
intervention with the goal o f regime change that is inconsistent with the Law of 
Peoples. He listed cases in which the United States overturned democracies because 
o f interests that may have been economic rather than security concerns. At the end 
o f this list he wrote, “and some would add, the Sandanistas in Nicaragua.”'*^  Rawls 
recognized the injustice o f cases where war is motivated by economic expansion. He 
said.
Thus democratic peoples are not expansionist, they do 
defend their security interest, and a democratic 
government can easily invoke this interest to support 
covert interventions, even when actually moved by 
economic interests behind the scenes.'*’
Miguel d ’Escoto. Interview with author. Tape recording, February 20, 2003. 
Managua, Nicaragua. See appendix, 337-338.
Rawls, LP, 53.
Ibid.
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The Sandanista government was claimed to be a threat to U.S. interests. It was 
therefore undermined until it was overthrown. This case o f the Contra war offers a 
good case for determining the usefulness o f  Rawls’s theory. According to Rawls’s 
vision, the Law o f  Peoples would determine an international body, comparable to the 
U.N. that would have to determine whether a regime like Ortega’s government was 
liberal or nonliberal. Even if it was deemed nonliberal, it might be viewed as decent. 
If so, then the type o f U.S. intervention that took place would have been viewed as 
unjust by tbe international community. Even if  the international community 
considered the Sandinista led Nicaragua as an outlaw state, the use o f  force would 
not be Justified in this case according to Rawls’s theory. In fact, the ruling o f  the 
World Court condemning the U.S. mining o f  the Nicaragua harbor could be viewed 
as evidence that such was the case. In this case the U.S. actions fit Rawls’s 
description o f an outlaw state better than Nicaragua did. Nonetheless, the 
unwillingness o f the U.S. to comply with the verdict o f  the World Court in this case 
is an example the difficulty that a state may not acknowledge or comply with the 
Judgment o f  the international community. This demonstrates the problem that a state 
that is considered a liberal state, like the U.S., may sometimes act like an outlaw 
state. This example o f noncompliance raises serious questions about how to 
implement Rawls’s theory in cases o f noncompliance.^* However, the positive 
freedom that D’Escoto would advocate as a liberation thinker goes beyond what
Darrel Mollendorf, 6bs///oj7ô>///i7//yi/s//ce (Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press, 
2002), 15. M ollendorf offers a similar criticism relating the stipulation that liberal 
and decent peoples not be aggressive.
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Rawls specified. Miguel d ’Escoto is convinced that freedom can be an illusion 
maintained by the government in affluent nations. True freedom requires 
transparency about policies and actions o f decision-makers.
Oftentimes I have been led to remember something 
that I saw in the Bronx in New York quite a few years 
ago, maybe thirty years ago. At the Bronx Zoo they 
inaugurated a new aviary with new methods for caging 
in the birds so that you don’t then see the cage. You 
walk inside -  outside there were glasses, there was 
glass covered all outside, but you could walk inside on 
something like a bridge. The different compartments 
for different birds did not have any partition or 
anything visibly to prevent the bird from going from 
one space to the other space. They did that with other 
means, light, air, whatever, insinuation -  insinuated the 
separation, and the birds stayed each in its own place.'^^
They have found a way to curtail the freedom of 
Americans in a very sophisticated way that they think 
they’re free.^°
Rawls would have no disagreement with d ’Escoto on this point that lack o f 
information about international policy o f United States government inhibits the 
freedom o f  its citizens. What true freedom requires is not only transparency but also 
liberation. Justice requires sharing the power to set limits to the spheres o f freedom. 
Conditions o f  severe poverty cannot be compatible with the kind o f  justice that 
Rawls sought to defend.
d ’Escoto. Interview. See appendix, 338-339.
Ibid.
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Rawls’s theory in q /'/’eo/?/espresupposes that justice can be
actualized within the liberal democracies that cooperate under that international 
scheme. He said,
Whether Kant’s hypothesis o f  a foedus pacificum is 
met depends on how far the conditions o f  a family o f 
constitutional regimes attain the ideal o f  such regimes 
with their supporting elements. If  the hypothesis is 
correct, armed conflict between democratic peoples 
will tend to disappear as they approach that ideal, and 
they will engage in war only as allies in self-defense 
against outlaw states. I believe this hypothesis is 
correct and think it underwrites the Law o f  Peoples as 
a realistic utopia.^'
This appealing hope for peaceful toleration underestimates the motivation o f 
the impulse to dominate others through economic power if  not through military 
strength. A decision to adopt a more substantive concept o f freedom, a Kantian 
positive freedom, as a necessary part o f  a theory o f  justice could ameliorate these 
problems. This international model needs greater protection for person’s individual 
well-being and personal power to construct a meaningful life. Consider again the 
concluding line o f  Rawls’s final book. He wrote:
If a reasonably just Society o f Peoples whose members 
subordinate their power to reasonable aims is not 
possible, and human beings are largely amoral, if  not 
incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask, 
with Kant, whether it is worthwhile for human beings 
to live on the earth.
51 Rawls, LP, 54.
Ibid., 128.
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Rather than maintaining such strict neutrality regarding claims about value or worth, 
Rawls should have retained the Kantian notion o f  positive liberty that must be 
defended in political systems. The obligations o f  a consumer in a relatively affluent 
society to a worker in an impoverished society producing goods enjoyed by the 
consumer exist as universal duties based on the nature o f  moral personhood. Justice 
requires attention to the economically poor workers’ freedom in the most meaningful 
sense o f  that term.
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APPENDIX 
INTERVIEW 2/20/2003 
Father Miguel d’Escoto 
Managua, Nicaragua
Explanatory note:
This interview was conducted in a traditional style, open-air Nicaraguan home. 
Comments throughout this discussion mention birds that flew in and out o f  the house 
as we spoke. The calls and songs o f  birds punctuated the interview.
M. d’E: Oh, there is a bird. He got inside. Do you see him? Did he fly out? O.K.
K.M.: Tell me about freedom in Nicaragua.
M. d’E.: This book is as close as you come to an official history o f  the United
States Marine Corps. It’s written by Robert Moskin, who him self is a 
Marine. He was sent by the Marines to prepare him self to study to 
become an historian. As an American historian, he has joined what I call 
a very special group o f people, which is the American Professorial 
Academic class. I take my hat o ff to them. I think they are very good. 
They try their best to be objective and honest in their research. I would 
say that across the broad for the American Professorial Class. When it 
comes to Latin America, those people gather around something which is 
known as LASA, L-A-S-A, Latin American Studies Association. They 
meet yearly. You can never totally -  a writer can never totally avoid bias, 
bias which is the result o f  her country o f origin or where they live or 
whatever, but I think in the United States they really do it better than any 
other parts.
Certainly if you want to know about Nicaraguan history you better go to 
Americans and not to Nicaraguans. Because we tend to be -  our 
historians are not really historians. They tend to be more propagandists 
for one party or another. And this goes back from the time o f 
independence. It was the same way. We had a couple o f good ones, but 
they don’t write about Nicaragua. The one is writing about Costa Rica, 
and the other one is also away.
So this man, Moskin, in this important book, the U.S. Marine Corps 
historian, okay, this -  look, it begins in the Forward. Right at the very 
beginning he says -  it begins by saying: “ This is the story o f  the U.S.
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Marine Corps. The story o f  the U.S. Marine Corps is, first o f  all, the 
story o f men o f  battle, the story o f  individual courage, o f men who risked 
everything to do what had to be done. It is obviously the story o f 
American impen'a/ism  ^ First o f  all, I stress the recognition that this is 
not some kind o f a Marxist accusation. That’s what the United States 
says! It’s an imperialistic power. Okay. So it says the story o f  the 
Marines is the story o f American imperialism, which it is -  and then he 
goes to Chapter 9.
The title o f  Chapter 9 is “ Imperialism in the Caribbean, 1901-1932.” And 
here is the picture from Nicaragua. It says this about Nicaragua; “In 
1928 a company o f mounted Marines in front o f  the house where rebels 
led by Augusto Sandino rounded a Marine garrison in July 1927.” Okay. 
And then when he begins this chapter he wants to give the rationale for 
the Marine intervention in this part o f  the world. Why did they invade the 
country? It says, “Marines protected the American lives, interests, and 
property. When ordered to do so, the Marines went into and supported 
people and squashed anti-U.S. nationalist.” Okay. So “our people” 
means clearly those who think the way the United States thinks. If there 
were nationalist who were anti-U.S. intervention, then the marines went 
to war against them.
And then it says -  I want to show you where it says -  yeah. “The 
Marines suppressed revolts against governments that accepted American 
aims.” So if  there was a government that was doing what the United 
States wanted to be done and then nationalist people rebel against them, 
the Marines intervened to support those. And they prevented the coming 
into power o f  independent minded leaders. In other words - and they dare 
- they are so cynical! With this record that was not only happening at 
this time but has been the constant behavior o f  the United States, they 
dare talk about democracy. But democracy from our point o f  view means 
trying to respect and to foster the aims that the people who vote for the 
leaders want to be developed and/or protected. But from our point o f 
view democracy cannot be -  democracy is dictated by the people here, 
not by Washington, you see. And so -  but yet they talk about democracy. 
I say it is not only the least democratic country in the world, the United 
States is, but it is the most -  the greatest enemy o f democracy and it is 
willing to use all its might, all its power to prevent independent-minded 
leaders from coming in to office. This is not in a Marxist textbook but a 
book that it was made for the making o f the Marines. It is used at the 
Marine Academy.
So why do I say it’s the least democratic? Because they talk about 
freedom in the United States but there’s no freedom. Oftentimes I have 
been led to remember something that I saw in the Bronx in New York
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quite a few years ago, maybe thirty years ago. At the Bronx Zoo they 
inaugurated a new aviary with new methods for caging in the birds so that 
you don’t then see the cage. You walk inside -  outside there were 
glasses, there was glass covered all outside, but you could walk inside 
and something like a bridge. And the different compartments for different 
birds did not have any partition or anything visibly to prevent the bird 
from going from one space to the other space. They did that with other 
means: light, air, whatever - insinuation -  insinuated the separation. And 
the birds stayed each in its own place.
They have found a way to curtail the freedom of Americans in a very 
sophisticated way so that they think they’re free. That is why I say they 
are the least free. Why? Because the fundamental hidden right is the 
right to know about those things which they are asked to vote about. The 
Americans -  I ’m not saying that the American people are not, like every 
other people, an intelligent people. But, I do believe it is the most 
ignorant on the whole planet earth — ignorant concerning the concept o f  
U.S. foreign policy abroad. The American people are systematically lied 
to, systematically deceived concerning not only the purposes o f  U.S. 
foreign policy, not only the objectives but also the content— what they 
really do.
And so -  it’s very important for them that the people say that they’re in 
favor o f the war against Iraq. So they got to build all kinds o f lies, lies 
about Saddam Hussein, so that you go ahead. I don’t think Saddam 
Hussein is one o f my favorite saints. Actually, that is my favorite saint, 
(pointing to a framed picture on the wall nearby). — Who happens to be 
an American.
K.M .: Dorothy Day.
M. d ’E.: Dorothy, yeah. But I certainly wouldn’t put Saddam Hussein in that
category! I do believe, however, that compared to Bush, he’s light years 
ahead morally speaking. For example, the United States is always trying 
to get people to -  to remind people o f what he did to the Kurds, Again 
this is done in a manipulative and deceitful manner. Because, first o f  all, 
when Saddam Hussein undertook those measures against the Kurds o f 
Iraq he was at that time a great ally o f the United States. He had allowed 
him self to be used to contain what the Americans feared was going to 
develop as the new wave o f Islamic fundamentalism. After the overthrow 
-  after the Shah o f  Iran was overthrown and the Ayatollahs came to 
power. They said, “Oh, my goodness, w e’ve got to build a fence there 
and contain it.” And they fomented that war.
And the action against the Kurds was not in anyway to be confused with 
ethnic cleansing. But it was because the Kurds in Iraq are fundamentalist.
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And it was the -  with the weapons provided for and provided by the 
United States. That is regrettable and condemnable. But the United 
States refused to accept culpability there. And now they are trying to use 
that to point fingers to Iraq. When it comes to Kurdish maltreatment, the 
United States is not telling its people what happened with the Kurds in 
Turkey.
And the greatest massacre ever undergone by the Kurds was in Turkey 
and for being Kurds. Not for siding with the enemy against the war, for 
being Kurds. In fact, we know that the Kurdish people were killed, some 
-  the biggest part perhaps in Turkey, some in Syria, some in Iraq and in 
Iran. But Iraq was the only place where -  Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s place, 
is the only place where they were able to have some o f their rights -  what 
do you call it -  respected. And when they were persecuted it was because 
they were siding with the other -  with the neighboring country in this 
war. And, again, they were persecuted with American complicity. 
Whereas in Turkey they were just persecuted for the sake o f  ethnic 
cleansing. And the whole world was manifestly against that.
And who was the one always protecting the Turkish government? The 
United States. The same way that they always protected apartheid. They 
always invented things like linkage or other crazy things they invented in 
order to build more time for the continuation o f  apartheid. The same way 
that they keep defending Israel for noncompliance. It was in 1967 I think 
it was. Resolutions o f  the Security Council that they leave the occupied 
territories in the West Bank. And so I think people are beginning to see 
that the United States is a fraud, that it ain ?what it claims to be afa//. It 
isn’t that -  there’s human frailty and that they are not able to do it, it’s 
Just that it’s a lie.
In Nicaragua you have more o f  a possibility to radically express dissent 
from the ongoing government policy. During the time o f the Nicaraguan 
revolution, in the United States, one o f the main banners in order to get 
any international support for its war against the Sandinistas was that 
Nicaragua was not respecting international -  was not respecting human 
rights — that we had curtailed freedoms o f  the press, et cetera, et cetera.
So at Harvard University a fellow who was doing his Ph.D. dissertation at 
Harvard under the great Abe Chase, who now died a few years ago, — he 
did not only read a book about Nicaragua, he came to live here three 
years to in a daily manner follow the legal system. And he published his 
dissertation, //uman Jiigh/s /n Times o f War, comparing American 
performance with regard to human rights in times o f  war compared to 
Nicaragua. He almost flunked the United States and Nicaragua got very, 
very high marks.
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Contrary he says, they were always saying that we were doing this to The 
Fr/nceds^ A all, that all -  according to our law, if  you had come out with a 
story that was totally wrong based, that you did not even care to verify, 
but a story that clearly was aimed at causing panic among the population, 
then that was penalized. And the Nicaraguan penalty says, well, you close 
it for a day or two days or three days, you close the newspaper. That’s it, 
nothing else. In the United States, o f  course it shows you what happened 
-  what would have happened in the United States if a national newspaper 
had done something like that during the second World War or any other 
war in which the United States was engaged. So this is a shame.
We are now seeing the American people awakening. Not only the 
Americans but also in Britain. On the 15‘^  o f  this month the street rallies 
in Britain were the largest ever in the history o f  the United Kingdom. You 
know, and it’s all over the world. The other thing is that the people have 
been given an opportunity to see the American understanding o f  
negotiation. They want something done by the United Nations, so they 
go ahead and they propose that something be done. If that is not readily 
accepted by the other members o f the Security Council, then they 
undertake a very high level, arm-twisting, and intimidating kinds o f visits 
in which they call negotiation. And then they say, “Well, all o f  the United 
Nations wants it.” This is sheer hypocrisy.
We know the first time they did something like that was just after the 
founding o f  the United Nations. One o f  the most horrible things in 
history o f  the United States was this pressuring, arm-twisting o f  the 
United Nations. Even all the American press came out, the New York 
papers and all, that the Security Council Resolution in 1947 for the 
partition o f Palestine would have never taken place had it not been for the 
degree o f  arm-twisting, pressure, and intimidating threats made by the 
United States to procure the necessary votes. In fact, when the -  the 
scheduled time for voting came, they saw they didn’t have enough votes. 
So they managed to get that voting date postponed a bit. That’s what 
they’re doing now.
I have personal experiences with regard to how they rob or intimidate 
another country when it came to Nicaragua because I have access to 
talking to other Heads o f States. They tell me: “This is what they came to 
tell us and this are the threats I get.” So I do believe with Harold Pinter, 
the great Harold Pinter, the great British playwright, who on the very eve 
o f the Twin Towers tragedy on 9 /11, just a few hours before he was 
receiving at the University o f  Bologna in Italy an honorary degree. And 
he says without any mincing o f  words, he says the United States 
represents the greatest threat to international peace and security that 
humanity has ever known. I think they far exceeded over Hitler.
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But you see what happened to that lady who was a Minister o f  Health in 
Germany. She was fired for saying that. She said what everyone is 
thinking —what I have written about — but what everyone was thinking. 
And it was intolerable because in Germany the United States would do 
quite a bit o f  pressuring. Schroeder might not have been elected if  he had 
not -  or might not have been reelected if  he had not moved quickly 
against his Minister o f Health. Was that publicized in the States?
K.M.: A little bit. So what are some solutions for the United States to expand
freedom?
M. d’E.: The United States wants to bring the showdown, see, to a military
showdown. That’s what the United States aspires to do. You see, right 
now the United States has a military budget bigger than the 26 countries 
that come after it. They have more than the 26 combined. I predict 
without any hesitation that in five years it will be bigger than the 40 that 
follow. Like Norm Chomsky says, the United States is a rouge state. I 
would say it’s a derelict nation, derelict. And they want to be so powerful 
that all other countries or coalition o f  countries would be afraid. They 
want to be so powerful militarily.
Besides that, their immediate foreign policy objective is the control o f oil. 
Is it that they need all that oil? No. They need it inasmuch as that would 
enable them more quickly to achieve their overall goal, which is the total 
subjugation o f  the world. Because if  I control what you need desperately- 
- if I control your oxygen, and it’s up to me to dole it out, to give you 
more or less or withdraw i t -  then I can -  I have a very good argument on 
my side to persuade you o f course to do what I want you to do. Otherwise 
there’s no oxygen. Otherwise there is no oil. And oil is so vitally 
important.
So the United States wants the showdown to be military. They are 
preparing themselves so that there is no way that anyone would dare even 
to do it. But they are -  for example, what happened in the Twin Towers, 
as horrible as it was, first o f  all it’s not unprovoked terrorism. And 
secondly, the only one to blame is the United States. Because there’s no 
negotiation possible. And so — The conscience o f  mankind is coming 
through other openings and seeing how they can get in through the 
backdoor, through the kitchen door, or whatever, and do the horrible 
things that they are doing. But it is not more horrible than what the United 
States has done only in Iraq where it’s close to 2 million people the 
victims o f  the -  what do you call it?
K.M.: Sanctions, economic sanctions.
M. d’E.: Yeah, Sanctions. And then when you are such a horrible woman as
Madeline Albright — she was asked years ago —what do you think about
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this? She said, this is horrible, look at that, there’s children. And in a 
few years it’s estimated by the United Nations that half a million have 
died who would not have died. And she says, “Well, we thought about 
that but, you know, it’s all collateral damage.” So they always have a 
gimmick, a little word. And the people are so stupid that they’re, “oh. I’m 
sorry, I didn’t realize it’s collateral. Well now that you explained it, how 
dumb o f me not to have thought o f it!” You see?
In the meantime, the American people have been betrayed, betrayed by 
their churches in the main. And in general at the level o f  the hierarchic 
level o f the church or at the national level. Why has the churches 
betrayed? I speak mainly about the church I know most— my own church 
that I love and that I am so sad about, for the Catholic Church in the 
United States. When it comes to the final word, the 1RS is more 
important than our Lord. It is the 1RS that in final analysis decides what 
the church speaks about. The American churches have been bought. 
Many have sold their soul to the government by allowing all these 
different privileges which become -  well, privilege has a way because we 
are creatures o f habit and then we build things that we would not be able 
to sustain if  we didn’t have the tax exemptions.
But then if we talk about the war, we are very prone to have the 1RS come 
and tell us, look, your tax exemption -  tax exempt status is being revised 
because it was given to you under the presumption that you were a 
religious organization but clearly you’re a political organization. You are 
addressing issues such as war and things like that and that’s political. So 
the question is: are we about to allow the 1RS to tell us what is religion 
and what is not religion or are we going to allow the spirit to be muffled 
in order that we don’t lose that tax exemption? Our Lord didn’t have any 
tax exemption, but we think we have to. And that’s why! We don’t want 
to be crucified.
And so when we talk about the people -  recently I was in a meeting with 
only priests and these priests were blasting the American government. 
Look, okay, I agree with the things that they said, but I -  how would 
Christ look upon it? W e’re not supposed to be the guide or at least tell 
people what our commitment to our Lord would imply being in a given 
situation o f  life and death? You know what I’m saying? I’m saying 
where w e’re at now. A few comments here and there and they get in 
trouble.
Dorothy said another thing, and she was always in jail. And in spite o f all 
the hypocrisy today o f  the Catholic church they want to cardinalize her. 
They should be stopped. We don’t want them to touch her, not to dirty 
her. She is a saint by acclamation by the people. O f course, in my book 
Marx is a saint. He was the only one, the only conscience o f  humanity
346
that had an impact with what was happening, to what man was doing to 
man in the industrial revolution. You had the Catholic Bishops coming 
together in the first Vatican Council only some twenty years after M arx’s 
Das Capi/a/. And these Bishops, if  you were to read -  they came 
together because the Pope wanted to be declared infallible. Really. He 
wanted to be declared infallible. I think he wanted to be declared God but 
he -  well, he had to be content with infallibility. I don’t want to be 
absurd, but it was obscene. But there’s no mention o f  what’s happening 
to human beings as a result o f  the industrial revolution. And yet some 
years before Marx was saying it. And he was the first one to explain to 
us the workings o f  capital, how it works.
And so there you have it. I was saying Dorothy is the saint, Marx is a 
saint, Gandhi a great saint, Martin Luther King, those are our saints. We 
don’t need the church to canonize them.
K.M .: Now in the United States they say that since the collapse o f the Soviet
Union it’s proof that communism and socialism doesn’t work. They say 
that the economic lack o f  production and efficiency is proof that 
capitalism is the only way.
M. d ’E.: Yeah, that’s what they always say. The collapse o f  the Soviet Union
from my perspective it shows the socialist system did not go deep enough 
in the construction o f democracy, much deeper than the United States but 
not deep enough. If  we understand democracy -  1 think it was the 
Lincoln definition: government o f the people, for the people, and by the 
people. I think that the Soviet Union, the system o f  socialism, was o f  the 
people and for the people, okay, but not by the people. And as Christians, 
you and I, -  for example, I will always say that I was wrong because our 
God we believe made us through his image and likeness. If  we want to 
understand our nature, listen to him. Among other things, he’s the 
creator, having made us through his image and likeness. He made us to 
be co-creators being an enterprise that he didn’t want to finish by himself. 
He wanted us therefore in the human society not to be spectators but to be 
active partners with God in the building o f brotherhood and sisterhood 
and in making sure that no one is humiliated or left behind —that we join 
efforts in the construction o f this family under God.
The United States never ever -  in other words, they lied to the people 
saying it’s a democracy. The founders o f  the American were against 
democracy. They said from the very beginning that they did not like.
They wanted to build a system for the land o f aristocracy.
K.M .: And they believed that the majority o f the people are neither wise nor
good. But Pablo Friere wrote about faith in the people -  believing that 
the people can find their solutions.
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M. d ’E.: Yeah. And so, okay, that part is the part that was missing in the Soviet 
experience. This is the part that was missing because the ways things 
were done. But remember Rosa Luxemburg. From the beginning she 
was saying watch out. She was speaking for what you just mentioned. 
You know, the problem -  I think it’s a problem that many parents have to 
deal with. When do you let go? When do you stop becoming so 
protective and allow people to have their own faults when they’re still 
small, when their bones get still take the falls without breaking apart, 
without shattering? When do you do it? That has to be early. And so 
oftentimes revolutions are afraid to do that because they are not 
revolutionary enough, but at least give us the ability -  it’s changing and 
that hasn’t finished.
When 1 don’t see any changes in the United States. I don’t see how the 
American people will ever make the United States a democracy because 
the methods that you -  the repressive methods that the United States has 
utilized outside its own borders to suppress independent minded people 
who are to do their thing and not what they are told to do. The moment 
that that becomes a real threat you will see the Americans turning and 
oppressing its own people like no one ever in history did. They are 
creating a monster. I say, well, these monsters like Bush are criminally 
insane, they’re blood thirsty monsters. But it’s not Bush. Bush may be 
that and more than anything else, but that’s not the problem. It’s the 
whole system.
K.M .: And the people elected Bush. The election was so close maybe, you
know, but a lot o f people wanted him.
M. d ’E.: But not only that, when it came to this last elections they supported him
by giving him the lead in both Houses.
K.M .: Yes.
M. d ’E.: Because -  it’s true -  it’s true, you know, the morals we use to talk about
ignorance being a mitigating factor — guilty culpability, with regard to 
culpability when somebody do something because you don’t know. It’s 
not the same as if  you did it with full knowledge. But there is such a 
thing as culpable ignorance. In other words, what happens is that the 
United States people have received more concentration warnings that not 
everything was all right and most people resist delving into such 
accusations. Perhaps they intuit before doing so —they think -  if  they 
discover certain things then they would have to be obliged to change 
something in their lives. So they say, “well, don’t confuse me with your 
facts, my mind is made up, 1 have no time, you know. I’m too old. I’m 
already 29!” (laugh). But then, again, where is the moral leadership? 
There’s none. At the local level somebody is blessed with a good pastor
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here and there. But the idea o f networking across the country to really 
bring about something better —So what can be done to change it?
There’s something that occurs to me that would be a good lesson to the 
United States if  only they can do it, something that will be in agreement 
with being nonviolence. Because I think that -  I understand people who 
use violence. Especially, for example, here in the Sandinista Revolution.
I thought it would be the height o f  hypocrisy to join my church in 
denouncing violence when it is used by the poor to defend from the 
violence that they have always suffered from. That is total hypocrisy.
And besides, the church has been one o f the most violent institutions in 
history. And o f  course it could never be against wars and this kind o f  
thing because it’s only 132 years ago that the church had its own army. 
That ended with the losing o f the papal states in 1870 because the Vatican 
extended from Rome to Bologna. They had hired police and everything 
else.
And Jacques Martinelli, who was the most important ecclesiastic after 
Pius XI for such a long period from the 18* century to the 19"^  century, he 
was simultaneously Minister o f War. Cardinal Jacques Martinelli. And, 
if  course, that’s why Tolstoy asked him self why is it that we don’t see 
that the gospel is radically nonviolent? Why don’t they? Because they 
have armies! Because they s^^ 'm God we trust. No. In fact, we trust and 
in armsyjt trust. And so -
K.M .: Lack o f  moral leadership.
M. D ’E.: Yeah. One thing that I think would really shake the United States the 
way it deserves to be shook and get people awaken and reflect. This 
would be to get people to change their dollar reserves to euros. Look at 
China and Russia go to Euros.
K.M .: I’ve heard some people say that if China embraced capitalism that they
would become the world power because their people are more disciplined 
and are better workers and in the United States the workforce is not.
M. D ’E.: China is no doubt on the road to become r/ie World power. The United
States will not be in that position forever. They know that and that’s what 
they -  that’s why Bush is in such a hurry. He says my patience is running 
out because they know. For him it’s either now or never.
What is it that you are concentrating on in your thesis or your thesis is 
about?
K.M .: My thesis is about the effects o f  economic policies on freedom. What
would be helpful to people’s freedom in true democracy?
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M. D’E.: You see -  well, I would say that along this line one o f the most important 
authors you might want to consult is Joseph Stiglitz. Are you familiar 
with him?
K.M.: Yes.
M. D’E.: Stiglitz is a good man. He’s a fair man. He received the highest award
given to economist under 40 for their contribution to the World Bank 
theory. Recently he received a Noble Prize for Economics for his 
contribution in the area o f  asymmetric relations. What happens when 
super-developed and underdeveloped come together and the problems 
that they endure? It means that steps can be taken to somewhat eradicate 
that problem as you are seeing happening in the European union with 
special privileges and prerogatives to countries like Spain or Portugal so 
that they catch up somehow.
And Stiglitz was the Chairperson o f  Clinton’s Economic Counsel. From 
there he was begged to go as First Vice President to the World Bank and 
C hief Economist o f  the World Bank. When he went to that position, his 
head was full o f  dreams. He was a good man, but still somewhat naïve, 
thinking o f  all the good things that he could do from such a high position. 
It isn’t that he had not heard, as he him self had said. He had heard 
different kinds o f  accusations against the IMF, the World Bank, but he 
never really delved into that. But he did think that perhaps it wouldn’t be 
that serious. How could it be? Americans are good.
He had only been one month at the World Bank when a big problem 
developed in Ethiopia where a high ranking person from the IMF was 
having a very difficult situation. They were trying to get the government 
o f  Ethiopia to adopt some o f these economic reforms that they said were 
absolutely indispensable. The government was not going along -  it was 
resisting to accept this medicine. And so they turned to Stiglitz. That 
was his conversion. He saw what was happening. He told the people 
from the World Bank, well, don’t you realize that you are supposed to 
come here to serve these people and give them options and hear them. It 
hasn’t occurred to you, he says, to ask the Ethiopians why they are 
resisting in such a manner. You just wanted them to follow and obey you 
as if  you were their superiors and you are not. And then he says, I think it 
would be good for us all to hear them and why they are resisting the 
acceptance o f  these policies that you are recommending. And the leaders 
from Ethiopia said, well, see what happened, in Kenya, see what 
happened in Somalia or some other neighboring countries where they had 
followed the same thing. The same thing that happened there is going to 
happen to us. And then Stiglitz says to them, do you see that they are 
right? He was never the same after that visit. But he was committed to
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Washington to continue that discussion but not at the level o f that 
delegation, the highest level at the IMF, and he won, Stiglitz won.
But only a few months later he began his tirade against the Washington 
consensus. It was the seventh o f January about seven years ago, the 
Helsinki, Finland. He gave an unbelievable speech that I had heard two 
days after and shared it with -  I had a little group o f  people who gathered. 
I couldn’t believe it, what he had said! And he was externalizing his 
confusion that were prompted by his Ethiopia experience. And then he 
didn’t stop talking. Every month I would get another one. My sister was 
watching for everything Stiglitz was saying in Washington and 
immediately sending it by e-mail. And then they don’t -  he wouldn’t stay 
there. He came down, and so he went to Columbia University. And you 
know that part.
But the other interesting thing that they found about Stiglitz was that they 
have such people that stand for Yale, Harvard, Princeton, and others at 
Columbia and around. The question we ask is this: is it too little too 
late? W hat’s going to happen? W hat’s going to happen? And there’s 
this war and then people will say they think it’s going to be anyway no 
matter what because it’s such an important part o f American foreign 
policy to control oil.
To understanding what is happening in the United States, it helps to know 
the Monroe doctrine for example. Even after unilateral declaration by the 
United States o f its right to militarily intervening any country in Latin 
America where they felt that their interests are somehow in danger. You 
know, that already begins to show us something. Why is it that 
Americans only talk about interests, and why don’t they talk about rights? 
I’ll give you an example that really shows what happens when you talk 
only about interest and then what you turn around and equate your 
interest with your rights.
Three years ago an Italian gentleman about my age with his wife came to 
Nicaragua. He was an old man, and he heard that there were nice places 
here. You know, not so cold, cool —but not cold, for he and his wife to 
live out the rest o f their days together. They were looking for a retirement 
place. And he had been told that Matagalpa might have something to 
offer. So he came down. He was really dreaming. And he saw a beautiful 
little place that he wanted so bad, and he bought it. Immediately he was 
arrested, put in jail, and then deported. Because there was another man 
-  the other man was the Aleman, the president. And he said, “How dare 
he buy this. I liked it, I had interest. I was interested in that property. So 
his interest wasn’t right. He said he had seen it, and he liked it, and how 
dare anyone— you know—obtain what I had liked. That’s exactly the 
American behavior. Interest— American interest.
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But the Monroe Doctrine grows, deepens and widens. Have you ever 
heard o f Dean Acheson? Yes. He was the Secretary o f  State for Truman. 
There’s another doctrine. I’m the only one that I know of, I call it the 
Acheson Doctrine —but it’s extremely important to know that doctrine. 
Acheson expanded the Monroe Doctrine, at least the conception, in a very 
important series o f  talks that he had with the American International Law 
Society. In a nutshell, he said something like this: international law is 
good. We should use it as a quarry to extract the quotes and to adorn our 
speeches. God forbid that we ever come to think that treaties, 
agreements, or international law in any way can curtail the freedom -  
they call that freedom -  the freedom o f  America to do whatever it wants 
to do. You know, it must not be patriotic to think that we should be 
curtailed by anything.
There’s another little book by Conner Crouse O ’Brian. This book was 
published by Harvard University Press and the title o f  the book is Goc/ 
Land It’s a tiny little book but it’s -  it begins to develop the concept o f 
cLosenessdxxdi what it does to some people — the thought that you might 
have been chosen by God to do something. Then he goes into the United 
States and says it is infinitely more dangerous because for the United 
States it means there’s no God but itself. And Conner Crouse O ’Brian 
wasn’t radical by any means, you know. He was Deg Hammarskjold’s 
right-hand man.. He was the editor o f  the London Review. Quite a feat 
for an Irishman for this literary journal — the British that put an Irishman 
is a great recognition. But that is an interesting book that’s, well, it’s 
interesting and frightening. It’s almost like political science fiction. But 
he hits on where the danger is and always the complicity and silence o f 
the churches.
But, anyway, that’s what Acheson was saying. We can, you know, 
sprinkle our speeches with quotes from international law, but we are 
never to think o f  international law as something that obliges us. It obliges 
the others but not us. When the others infringe it, we can go out and blast 
them out o f this planet if  we wish, if it suits our purposes. That’s why all 
these free trade agreements are not a problem only o f  the asymmetric 
levels o f  development between the United States and Central America for 
example. It is not a matter o f taking care o f  that by compensatory 
measures. What matters -  the important thing to keep in mind— is that 
the United States is not and will never, ever be a trustworthy partner 
because it really believes what I just said so literally.
But now Bush has brought it one step further with this whole Bush 
Doctrine, which is the American concept o f preemptive war. I oftentimes 
think what would I have done if  I had lived in Hitler’s days. I’ve been 
thinking more and more o f that, and it’s horrible. And now many books
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coming out are showing how the German people, in fact, were guilty o f 
complicity across the board. This is happening now.
This affects— you know— God only knows how many millions are dying 
in Afghanistan. And, you know, the war in A fghanistan,- all o f  the 
documentation to prove it and it is not secret. The war was planned, 
everything planned perfect to the last detail a year before the Twin 
Towers. They were waiting for the time to come and use that. That’s 
why some people say o f  the Twin Towers that it is not beyond the 
American government to have been behind that thing. After all, who was 
behind the sinking o f  the Maine? How many people, American soldiers, 
dyed? 260 on the Maine. And what about the Bay o f  Tonking?. In other 
words, they had a record o f  doing something and then not allowing time 
to investigate it. “ It’s obvious,” they said, “move.”
K.M .: But the mobilization o f  people protesting may be greater already than it
was during Vietnam.
M. d ’E.: Yes.
K.M .: So it seems as if  there’s an opportune moment right now for resistance
within the United States.
M. d ’E.: It is the best time ever. And it’s not only Stiglitz. What does he say
Chomsky? It’s tripled and quadrupled. And I would say in fact that the 
only hope for the world is that somehow it change. The only real hope is 
the American people. And why do I say that? Oh, there’s complicity up 
to now. There is, “oh, don’t bother me with these things. I’ve got other 
important things to look after.” But in the main, the American people, 
they’re victims o f their system. But they’re good people. Oh, yeah, 
they’re rich, and richness makes you less receptive to certain things. But 
they are good people.
And you know where is the Achilles heel o f the United States? The 
United States Government speaks about good things. They speak about 
freedom, liberty. They speak about democracy. They talk about human
rights. They talk about fteedom o f  the press, all o f  those things. The
people don’t know that America is the worse violators o f all o f  those 
things. They don’t know that. But they are sold on the ideals. What 
needs to be done is the unmasking, you know, show the -
K.M .: So the Achilles heel is to unveil the hypocrisy and the rhetoric?
M. d ’E.: Yeah, but the Achilles heel is in the fact that the United States
Government official rhetoric is being on the side o f good things. They 
don’t defend imperialism. When they talk they talk about freedom — they 
don’t come out defending freedom. Instead they come out, and their 
rhetoric is good. And that’s the Achilles heel. They’re acting
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diametrically against those sort o f thing. That’s my peacocks. They see 
something at the door.
K.M .: Like watchdogs.
So are there are certain policy changes that people in the United States 
could be working toward, specific policy changes, with regard to our 
policy for Nicaragua that you would like to see happen right now?
M. d ’E.: Let Nicaragua choose its own people. Don’t interfere -  stop interfering in 
their election. That’s it. Not too much, just that.
K.M .: And it’s not so much the private corporations that interfered with the
elections, it was the U.S. Government?
M. d ’E.: Oh, yes. You know historically we have not had difficulty with 
American corporations never or American capita interferingly.
K .M .: Except that wasn’t it the American capitalists that caused the Marines to
come here in the first place?
M. d ’E.: Yeah. Well, in the sense that the U.S. Government is the puppet o f 
American capital -
K.M .: Yes.
M. d ’E.: You know my friend who came from up north into Havana who asked me 
to go with her to a concert. Her husband was my very, very good friend. 
In fact, he finances all o f  this. He wanted me to keep helping the people 
that I have been helping to realize some o f the dreams, and so he -  I don’t 
have a salary. I have no -  not a banker, nothing like that. But yet I -  not 
only does it look good but we’re doing quite a few things, and he’s the 
one who financed it. But he died a year ago. But, anyway, he was the
greatest single contributor to Tony Blair. In fact, over the years he was
responsible for the making o f Tony Blair. He must be turning in his 
grave. And I could see with Helen that it was a real -  that was a real 
disturbing thing. We talked about those things. I don’t know exactly 
how to deal with that.
Are you involved with the church?
K.M .: Yes.
M. d ’E.: What church is that?
K.M .: UCC, United Church o f Christ.
M. d ’E.: And I make another kind o f  analysis o f  where things went wrong and how 
we must therefore embark upon the right road from now. Briefly it is 
this. Our Lord on his Last Supper, he wanted to really emphasize what his 
most important recommendations were for his followers. And so at a
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given point during the Last Supper he wanted to dramatize it and girthed 
him self with a towel and began to wash the feet o f the Apostles. It was a 
way o f  saying that among his followers authority should always be 
exercised a service not as power. The church went off tract centuries ago 
— than a thousand years. God knows how many centuries, more than a 
dozen — from that essential guideline that he gave us. We went for 
power, and power always ends up this way.
That’s why the United States is so utterly corrupted by our church. 
Because as Lord Acton, a great Britain over 150 years ago, he coined 
what has now become a famous quote but no one knows who said it I 
think: “Power corrupts and infinite power corrupts infinitely.” I think he 
said, “ total power corrupts totally.” And Lord Acton was referring above 
all to the church. But, o f  course, it refers to power — power to lord it over 
our brothers — to step upon them, to tell others what to do. And the power 
that he mentioned — it leads you -  leads anyone to tell people to forget 
their own consciences and to be robots. That’s what the pope did.
This pope also. But it was particularly terrible when Pious the twelfth 
ordered the German church to stop criticizing Hitler, to play ball 
according to the terms o f  the Concord Act. So what are we here to do? 
Become powerful? To become God in the sense o f the almighty? Or are 
we here to be, in the example o f our Lord, servants? And the example 
that has to be given by the hierarchy.
This world was supposed to function differently. But you know what I’m 
thinking? —that more and more I think that the introduction to John’s 
gospel right. In the beginning. He came into his own and his own 
received him not. We never received him because even his churches have 
betrayed him. And therefore I -  I was reading a book just very recently 
by a great American scientist, Edward Wilson. Have you heard o f  him?
K.M .: H m m ... Edward O. Wilson?
M. d ’E.: The Future o/L/fe. He says that it may well be that five, six hundred
years from now the human race will be extinct. We would have died 
because o f  selfishness, suffering for not accepting our Lord and not 
accepting the invitation to service to the Lord. And fortunately he says 
that that not necessarily means that the planet perishes. On the contrary, 
it may do better without us. Because the levels o f selfishness is going to 
kill us all, so the circle would disappear. And then God will continue 
here on this planet to see who else is next up, next turn to man. We hope 
that they will accept God and be the spreaders o f love. It’s getting to that 
point. So this should be a point that this will bring all the churches 
together, to come together and wake up and proclaim the ethic o f  life, o f a
355
role that will be favored no longer by our life but the life o f  every animal 
— the life o f  nature, and all living happily together.
I see people working in the streets. This is very, very good. And the 
church is very much involved in this. They’re trying to get more people. 
The churches, at least the big national churches, are they saying s this the 
way it is? They are afraid o f  the 1RS. So where to begin is that all 
churches that are needing to pray like crazy. It is prayer that will bring 
about the conversion o f  the churches. They know that the conversion o f 
the Pope is more difficult than the conversion o f  others or o f  a Bishop. 
The only thing more difficult after that is that o f a Priest! Because we 
think we live that way, we understand it all, and we understand the Lord! 
This is a time for much prayer and fastening o f  our seat belts because the 
levels o f turbulence are big, and they will get much bigger.
I’m afraid about the war. I am afraid that we may not know how to stop 
it, and I’m afraid because o f  what it will unleash from the sector o f  
groupings o f other governments. I’m beginning to see a resistance that 
we have not seen before. For example, France refuses to do this and to go 
along — and Germany and Belgium now, too. I don’t know. They need 
to end this war within the next few months. It was begun because o f  the 
greed. So -  and this situation is not very inspiring. It’s not -  it doesn’t 
give you lots o f hope. We must fall down to our Lord and not allow our 
faith or hope to be diminished by the example o f our brothers and sisters. 
Or look at the good example, and there’s plenty o f good examples except 
that they are not in the high offices. The only leader — by far the great 
leader o f  the world today is Fidel Castro. And he has been the most 
maligned by the United States, but that itself is an indication.
K M :  And does he have a successor? What kind o f a plan for a transition when
he’s no longer here?
M. d ’E.: People say the successor is going to be his brother. I don’t know because 
his brother is already my age. He’s already 70 or 71. And so the best 
man is one that I think Fidel would like to be, he’s a magnificent man, 
Ricardo (inaudible). I spent hours with him on this trip and you know we 
have a friendship going back to almost 30 years. And it was wonderful 
for me to see that he’s the same as 30 years ago -- the same child with 
the spark in his eyes, the same enthusiasm, the same faith that a better 
world is possible, and the same intelligence. Having gone to the second 
highest office, I worried, because that can go to people’s head. But my 
problem is not with succession.
After all the people have been made to really suffer. You know, the 
embargo and those things were so long in time. Despite o f  that, Cuba has 
done unbelievably well. They are a world powerhouse in biochemistry.
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The levels o f  education in Cuba almost are unmatched by any other 
country. Cuba alone has many more doctors across the planet, much 
more than the world health organization o f the United Nation —. Much 
more Cuba alone.
They are now in the process o f becoming a super power in software. 
They’re going into every field. They just got to where their education is 
very good. So Fidel started about three years ago to select 2,500 best 
young mathematicians. They’re all working on his development o f 
software for education, for culture, for health. And Bill Gates went down 
there and said it was unbelievable. So they’re going to do in software 
what they achieved in biochemistry. In sports they have done it and 
that’s what it takes. Cuba is a real athletic country. They already got all 
kinds o f gold medals for such a little country. Why? Because so many 
people have a participation in the sports. It’s not only for the privileged 
few, but you have an ample opportunity to select. In piano, look at Roger 
Woodwards. That’s the best I’ve ever heard. Something is happening. 
And now every child in Cuba has access to a computer in the school, 
every child from grade one. I don’t know that that’s readily available in 
the United States.
K.M.: No. Some schools.
M. d’E.: In order to be able to do that they had to bring electricity to some places
where they didn’t have it. Where it was expensive they put solar energy 
for the computers even if  there’s one place where they have only one 
student. But there was the idea that no one be left behind.
K.M.: But to have a system like that, do you think there’s some level o f
coercion, some level o f limiting free speech and resistance that has to 
happen?
M. d’E.: It’s going to be eminently less than in the United States. You want to see
the United States now. It was Operation Tip. Do you know o f  Operation 
Tip?
K.M.: No.
M. d’E.: Operation Tip in the United States now, at this point in time, has already 
hired people who are informers to the authorities in Washington and they 
will train them; If you see anyone strange, if  they look Arabic to you or 
dark skin, and they look a bit weird in attire —, and the people who are in 
that, in Operation Tip, are people who have access to homes or to offices 
such as mailmen and other people who at their work have access inside 
homes and offices. And they criticize Castro!
K.M.: There are so many people in Florida who are saving money and rallying
political power with the hopes o f  changing the system.
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M. d ’E.: Yes, o f course. Obviously it had some people who supported it or
otherwise it would have been easy to get rid o f  it. And some people, you 
know, they w on’t take no for an answer, they insist. The same thing with 
the Tories in the United States at the time o f  independence. Except the 
American Tories — they didn’t have any superpower interested in helping 
them to develop strengths to come back and to take the United States.
But you will always have that, the counter -  the potential counter­
revolutionaries. The terror is there. Many o f  these terrorist plans are 
perpetrated in countries beneath the eyes o f their hosts. When they say, 
you know, that they should move against countries that harbor terrorism, 
the biggest in the world is the United States.
K.M .: You have been so generous with me with your time. I’m very grateful to
you for taking this time.
M. d ’E.: I think I am going all over the map and not maybe where you want to. I 
want you to look at that book Freedom Under Fire. Michael Greenleaf, 
Freedom o/iheFires. He is the fellow who spent three years in 
Nicaragua. But then there is another book about American democracy 
which is interesting. This fellow is from Europe, the University o f 
Massachusetts. His name is Ferguson. The name o f  the book is 
published by Chicago University Press and the name o f  the book is Tiie 
Go/den Fu/e.
K.M .: Okay.
M. d ’E.: This is the kind o f  sociological study, things that can be done today
because o f  computers, that there’s all kinds o f crossings and all. Who 
votes in the United States? It’s supposed to be the first step in democracy 
and they don’t give a hoot, the people. The poor don’t vote. Less than 
one percent o f the poor vote in the United States. The four million people 
who are under the poverty line, they don’t vote. The United States may 
be, I think it still is, — o f all those countries where you have a right to 
vote —the one with the least voting participation by its citizens. They 
have come to the conclusion that it’s six o f one, half a dozen o f  the other, 
that it doesn’t matter because you won’t be able to change it, that the 
whole thing is against you to begin with.
And will they rebel? They’re not rebellious. It’s not the best way. 
Too many problems. It is best to prepare for something through non-violent, 
gradual change.
K.M .: So, tell me more about your views on freedom in the US and Nicaragua.
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M. d ’E.: You have to go into a theoretical question o f  what is freedom. The
United States never, never tries to define things like many people. For 
example, what about the definition for terrorism? Oh, that is wasting 
words, seeking for a definition. They did say that a few years ago. Like 
eight or seven years ago the United Nations General Assembly, they 
would come up with such a resolution and definition for terrorism and it 
only got two votes against it — the United States and Israel, the two 
greatest terrorists. Their terrorism as explained by this definition would 
be the use o f  force or the threat o f the use o f  force for the purpose o f 
intimidating someone through the purpose o f breaking the sovereign will 
o f  another nation. That it has many -  the fact that it takes innocent lives - 
- that happens in war. And then they never liken it with the threat o f the 
atom bomb. Really genocidal. But that’s not what makes it terrorism.
But the twin towers — this is reprisal for American terrorism. Its the only 
way that some people see that they can react that may make a difference.
K.M .: Yes. Even my daughter, who is sixteen, said to me a few days ago why is
it terrorism when they do it, but if  we bomb Iraq we don’t call it 
terrorism? So even this child can see.
M. d ’E.: Yeah. But you know that fellow -  people think McVeigh was deranged
and whatever and did a horrible thing in Oklahoma to this Federal 
Building I think they called it and so -  did you see him speaking prior to 
going through the injections?
K M .: No.
M. d ’E.: He said something that I could have heard here on television. We saw 
him speak.
K.M .: He said what?
M. d ’E.: They say what I have done is very bad, but I was taught to do those
things. He says, I had my experience in the Desert Storm. That’s what 
they called that war, and you know what? I had an opportunity to meet 
some o f  those Iraqi people. You may not believe me, he says, but they 
are just like you or I. You know, they have wives and they have children, 
and I believe they love their wives and they love their children. And why 
is it okay to murder them and what’s the difference? That was quite a 
question for those who want to listen.
W e’ve got to pray like never before. And also at the same time we’ve got 
to pray that we don’t become bitter or in anyway that we allow whatever 
anything like hatred to grow. Because then that’s it. God will never use 
us as instrument for his needs if we allow those things to happen. But we 
cannot help but be very, very sad. Our Lord sweated blood. I think it
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was because he envisioned us using his name for our ‘holy work” -- like 
popes leading armies.
Have you heard about the latest problem in Nicaragua?
K.M .: No.
M. d ’E.: About this little nine-year-old girl?
K.M .: No.
M. d ’E.: Oh, that’s the thing everyone in Nicaragua is talking over. This nine- 
year-old girl was made pregnant -  she was eight when she became 
pregnant; she is nine now. She was a Costa Rican, you know. She was 
raped. As a result, she conceived and -  it’s not too long ago because I 
think the pregnancy is about three months. And then they have a debate 
and the Cardinal has spoken. He said it’s a crime to commit abortion and 
the doctors do not want to touch it. The little girl, she keeps saying, “I 
want to live.” They’re saying it will be very, very difficult for her to have 
a successful term o f pregnancy, and maybe the child and the mother will 
die in the process because she hasn’t developed.
But they are asking people in the street. And people are saying, well, I -  I 
heard many say, “Well, I’m a Catholic. I heard what the Cardinal said, 
but I don’t care what he says. This girl has a right to live. And so they 
support the parents just like I would because I think that maybe at three 
months the fetus is not very highly developed. It’s difficult for me 
because I’m not a doctor. Let’s just hope that Saint Thomas was right. 
What Saint Thomas -  do you remember Saint Thomas?
K.M .: Yes.
M. d ’E.: He believed that the early stages you had a vegetable existence. Now 
what should happen to the boy who did that? It was not a boy — it’s a 
man, a young man twenty years old. Anyway, my sister called, I w asn’t 
here to answer her call but she talked to Jan and she said -  because she’s 
got five daughters and her daughters are married and all that. But 1 can 
imagine every woman with a child, especially daughters, suffering over 
this. And more discredit goes to the Cardinal. He’s always on the wrong 
side! On the wrong side — in this case!
I’m not for abortion. I think it’s not natural. I don’t think that many of 
the women who do it are happy to do it, or I don’t know. Maybe they are, 
maybe it’s only irresponsible. But I think if  I were the parent I would go,
I have no doubt, I would go for abortion and then my conscious would 
not be troubled by that. Do you think it would?
K.M .: No. I agree with you. I have a little daughter who is eleven, and when I
think about the nine-year-old child, that breaks my heart.
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M. d ’E.: Yeah. And the father and mother are going from hospital to hospital. And 
they close the doors because they’re afraid o f  censure. Maybe doctors are 
afraid that they would not be able to practice. So Cuba has invited the 
little girl to go to Cuba with her parents and that will give more pretext to 
criticize Fidel.
To me Fidel is a saint. 1 have had the opportunity to really spend all 
nights and all hours, like ten hours at a time, many times, talking with 
him. And if anything comes across clearly it’s a commitment to 
bettering things. First o f  all, he’s not a person who any hint o f hatred.
But he’s committed to making this a better world. As he said in his 
speech in Mexico, a better world is possible. He refuses to believe that 
the only solution is capitalism. What do you mean it works? Look at the
mess! It works? This is a good thing that you have six people in the 
world that have a combined wealth larger than that o f 120 nations?
That’s wonderful? Your family is going to come in a little while.
K.M .: Anytime, yes.
M. d ’E.: I want to go and change because 1 -
K.M .: It would be very nice for me to have some time just to sit and write, so
please do. Thank you so much. This is a form that the University has to 
show that you willingly talked with me, that I may quote you in my 
dissertation.
M. d ’E.: Have you ever heard Casal da Liga? He’s one o f the most wonderful 
Bishops I’ve ever heard —from Brazil. His dieses is huge. And it 
includes Indians who only wear the lion cloth with bow and arrows in the 
Amazon. He has an island there in the river and the island is larger than 
El Salvador. But it’s just beautiful. And I love this phrase: “We must 
shout, scream, the gospel with our life.” Our lives should be like this 
screaming. W e’re screaming out the good news with our lives. And then 
he quotes something here from Dom Quixote, -  to dream the impossible 
dream. Have you ever heard that song?
K.M .: Yes.
M. d ’E.: To struggle when it’s not easy to -  to struggle when it’s easy to just
accept, when acceptance would be easier and yet to struggle, to overcome 
the invincible foe. I would like to have the words. 1 remember seeing 
“Man from La Mancha” and he said a direct quote from Dom Quixote.
I’ll find out who here has that because it’s a few years back but I should 
know it.
K.M .: I haven’t seen the play but I’ve heard the song.
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M. d ’E.: Yeah. This is a good little phrase; “To shout out the gospel with our
lives.” He’s retiring. He’s just becoming 75 years old.
K.M .: How is his name spelled?
M. d ’E.: C-a-s-a-l-d-a-l-i-g-a. He is a poet, is the greatest o f all our bishops in the 
whole world. The Brazilian hierarchy refers to him as the conscience o f 
the hierarchy. He is not English speaking; He’s got to wait for someone 
to replace him. We are trying to get him to relocate here. His dream was 
to move to Africa, but now I think he’s discarded that because he’s got 
Parkinson’s.
I’m going to change.
K.M .: Yes. Okay.
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